Both the appellant and the State agree that the 160-day period should have been measured from this date, and there is ample authority to support this contention. ( People v. Kuczynski (1965), 33 Ill.2d 412, 211 N.E.2d 687; People v.McClure (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 476; United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455.) Furthermore, the plain reading of section 103-5(b) leads to the conclusion that a person may demand a speedy trial as soon as he is placed on bail or recognizance. Since in the instant case this demand was made more than 160 days before the date of the trial and the delay was not occasioned by the appellant, the appellant must be discharged. The judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County is reversed.

For the purposes of such argument the State has assumed an effective and timely demand for speedy trial, and cites People v. Johnson, 45 Ill.2d 38, 257 N.E.2d 3, People v. Hamby, 27 Ill.2d 493, 190 N.E.2d 289, People v. Jones, (Ill.App.2d), 266 N.E.2d 411 and People v. Ross, (Ill.App.2d), 271 N.E.2d 100, as authorities for conduct that tolls the running of the 160-day statute. Defendant relies upon People v. Kuczynski, 33 Ill.2d 412, 211 N.E.2d 687 and People v. McClure, 106 Ill. App.2d 283 for authority that when a defendant is free on bail the 160-day period commences to run when the demand is made. Both parties overlook the fact, as reflected in those opinions, that the demand involved was a demand made by a person on bail at the time the demand was made.