Opinion
905 KA 17-01821
10-09-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Raequan P. MCCALL, Defendant-Appellant.
CARRIE BLEAKLEY, CONFLICT DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (GARY MULDOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. JAMES B. RITTS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (V. CHRISTOPHER EAGGLESTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
CARRIE BLEAKLEY, CONFLICT DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (GARY MULDOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JAMES B. RITTS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (V. CHRISTOPHER EAGGLESTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., LINDLEY, WINSLOW, BANNISTER, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree ( Penal Law § 160.15 [4] ) and robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10 [1] ). Defendant contends that County Court failed to make the necessary determination whether he was eligible for youthful offender treatment (see CPL 720.10 [3] ; see generally People v. Middlebrooks , 25 N.Y.3d 516, 525-527, 14 N.Y.S.3d 296, 35 N.E.3d 464 [2015] ; People v. Rudolph , 21 N.Y.3d 497, 499-501, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457 [2013] ). We reject that contention. "[A] court in an armed felony case can satisfy its obligation under Middlebrooks by declining to adjudicate the defendant a youthful offender after consideration on the record of factors pertinent to a determination whether an eligible youth should be adjudicated a youthful offender" ( People v. McCall , 177 A.D.3d 1395, 1396, 112 N.Y.S.3d 846 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1130, 118 N.Y.S.3d 509, 141 N.E.3d 465 [2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Rice , 175 A.D.3d 1826, 1826, 109 N.Y.S.3d 808 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1132, 118 N.Y.S.3d 511, 141 N.E.3d 467 [2020] ; see also People v. Stitt , 140 A.D.3d 1783, 1784, 33 N.Y.S.3d 641 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 937, 40 N.Y.S.3d 365, 63 N.E.3d 85 [2016] ). Here, the court "implicitly resolved the threshold issue of eligibility in defendant's favor" ( People v. Macon , 169 A.D.3d 1439, 1440, 92 N.Y.S.3d 812 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 978, 101 N.Y.S.3d 224, 124 N.E.3d 713 [2019] ; see People v. Keith B.J. , 158 A.D.3d 1160, 1160, 70 N.Y.S.3d 291 [4th Dept. 2018] ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant him youthful offender status (see McCall , 177 A.D.3d at 1396, 112 N.Y.S.3d 846 ; Rice , 175 A.D.3d at 1826, 109 N.Y.S.3d 808 ; Macon , 169 A.D.3d at 1440, 92 N.Y.S.3d 812 ), particularly in light of the seriousness of the offense and defendant's failure to accept any responsibility (see People v. Ford , 144 A.D.3d 1682, 1683, 42 N.Y.S.3d 491 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1184, 52 N.Y.S.3d 710, 75 N.E.3d 102 [2017] ), and we perceive no basis for exercising our discretion in the interest of justice to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender (cf. Keith B.J. , 158 A.D.3d at 1160-1161, 70 N.Y.S.3d 291 ; People v. Thomas R.O. , 136 A.D.3d 1400, 1402-1403, 25 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2016] ).
Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.