Opinion
905 KA 17-01821
10-09-2020
CARRIE BLEAKLEY, CONFLICT DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (GARY MULDOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. JAMES B. RITTS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (V. CHRISTOPHER EAGGLESTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT:
CARRIE BLEAKLEY, CONFLICT DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (GARY MULDOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JAMES B. RITTS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (V. CHRISTOPHER EAGGLESTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (William F. Kocher, J.), rendered April 21, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]) and robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10 [1]). Defendant contends that County Court failed to make the necessary determination whether he was eligible for youthful offender treatment (see CPL 720.10 [3]; see generally People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516, 525-527 [2015]; People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497, 499-501 [2013]). We reject that contention. "[A] court in an armed felony case can satisfy its obligation under Middlebrooks by declining to adjudicate the defendant a youthful offender after consideration on the record of factors pertinent to a determination whether an eligible youth should be adjudicated a youthful offender" (People v McCall, 177 AD3d 1395, 1396 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1130 [2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Rice, 175 AD3d 1826, 1826 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1132 [2020]; see also People v Stitt, 140 AD3d 1783, 1784 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 937 [2016]). Here, the court "implicitly resolved the threshold issue of eligibility in defendant's favor" (People v Macon, 169 AD3d 1439, 1440 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 978 [2019]; see People v Keith B.J., 158 AD3d 1160, 1160 [4th Dept 2018]).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant him youthful offender status (see McCall, 177 AD3d at 1396; Rice, 175 AD3d at 1826; Macon, 169 AD3d at 1440), particularly in light of the seriousness of the offense and defendant's failure to accept any responsibility (see People v Ford, 144 AD3d 1682, 1683 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1184 [2017]), and we perceive no basis for exercising our discretion in the interest of justice to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender (cf. Keith B.J., 158 AD3d at 1160-1161; People v Thomas R.O., 136 AD3d 1400, 1402-1403 [4th Dept 2016]).
Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Entered: October 9, 2020
Mark W. Bennett
Clerk of the Court