Defendant argues his due process rights were violated by the State's failure to comply with the constitutional requirements of Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and the disclosure requirements of Supreme Court Rule 412 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 412). In People v. McCabe (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 162, 166-67, 393 N.E.2d 1199, this court stated: "The basic requirements of due process demand that items of discovery in the possession and control of the State must be produced in the face of a defense request where such items are beneficial to the accused and are material to either guilt or punishment. Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786, 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 92 S.Ct. 2562; Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194.

Here, it is not alleged that the Cortez sisters were accomplices of defendants. In People v. McCabe (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 162, 393 N.E.2d 1199, and in People v. Lott (1977), 66 Ill.2d 290, 362 N.E.2d 312, the State did not disclose material evidence, a composite drawing used to identify defendant and evidence that defendant had admitted to a fellow inmate that he committed the crime, respectively, until trial was underway. Here, we find that the information revealed here regarding the purchase of an airline ticket for Anderson Cortez was not of such materiality.

The cases relied upon by defendant. e.g., People v. Burns (1979), 75 Ill.2d 282, 388 N.E.2d 394, People v. Murdock (1968), 39 Ill.2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 442, People v. Bass (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 624, 405 N.E.2d 1182, and People v. McCabe (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 162, 393 N.E.2d 1199, are inapposite, since in those cases the State or one of its departments was in timely possession of the requested evidence. In considering defendant's motion for a new trial, the circuit court was not compelled to believe the post-trial testimony of Wilson.