Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC065853.
Sepulveda, J.
Defendant Steven Robert Mays was convicted by a jury of driving a vehicle while under the influence of a drug and causing bodily injury to another. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a).) The injury occurred when defendant, fleeing the police, overturned his vehicle and injured his passenger. The passenger was defendant’s sexual partner, Angela Mason.
The court issued a witness protective order before trial prohibiting defendant from contacting Mason. (Pen. Code, § 136.2) Following trial, the court issued an order commanding defendant to stay away from Mason. Defendant challenges these orders on appeal, and the People concede that the orders must be stricken. We accept the concession.
Defendant also raised another issue in his opening brief concerning custody credits but, after resolving that issue in the trial court, has withdrawn the issue.
Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (a) provides that “upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, any court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders including, but not limited to, the following: [¶]... [¶] (4) An order that any person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with any specified witness or any victim, except through an attorney under any reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.”
Witness and victim protective orders apply during the pendency of criminal proceedings and may not extend beyond the date of entry of judgment. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382-383; People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118-119; People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159-160.) The court’s order here, operative for three years regardless of the termination of proceedings, was unauthorized. (People v. Stone, supra, at p. 160.) “Because the only purpose of orders under [Penal Code] section 136.2 ‘is to protect victims and witnesses in connection with the criminal proceeding in which the restraining order is issued in order to allow participation without fear of reprisal, ’ the duration of such an order ‘is limited by the purposes it seeks to accomplish in the criminal proceeding.’ [Citation] That is, the protective orders issued under [Penal Code] section 136.2 were operative only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and as prejudgment orders.” (People v. Selga, supra, at pp. 118-119.)
The stay-away order imposed at sentencing is likewise unauthorized. Stay-away orders may be imposed at sentencing under certain circumstances as, for example, a probation condition upon a defendant convicted of domestic violence. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097, subd. (a)(2).) The order issued here fails to articulate any basis for its issuance, and the People can provide none.
Accordingly, the protective orders issued on July 27, 2009 and May 27, 2010 are stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P. J., Rivera, J.