Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA 033009, Charles A. Chung, Judge.
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Shawn McGahey Webb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
Richard V. Mayes appeals from the judgment following his conviction by a jury of the crime of battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Appellant contends the judgment should be reversed, because the presiding judge had no power to act once appellant had filed a statement of disqualification against him, and because the court erred in denying appellant’s Marsden motion without an adequate inquiry.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
In addition to the charge of battery, the information alleged that appellant had suffered five prior serious felony convictions and three prior strike convictions. Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations.
At the preliminary hearing, appellant acted as his own attorney. Sometime afterwards, the trial court terminated appellant’s right to represent himself because of his disruptive conduct, and it denied his request to relieve appointed counsel. Appointed counsel declared a doubt as to appellant’s competency to stand trial, and the court suspended the proceedings. The matter thereafter was continued for an evaluation of appellant’s mental competency. Criminal proceedings remained suspended for appellant’s evaluation. The court later found appellant competent to stand trial and reinstated the proceedings.
Appellant ultimately was evaluated by three doctors who provided mixed conclusions and recommendations. One evaluator concluded appellant was incompetent, one concluded appellant was competent and one was not sure.
Trial thus proceeded, and a jury found appellant guilty as charged. The same jury found three prior felony conviction allegations to be true. The court sentenced appellant to serve 25 years to life as a third strike, the term to run consecutively to a 41-years-to-life sentence that appellant was currently serving.
The prosecution amended the information after the jury returned the guilty verdict, to allege only three prior felony convictions.
Appellant timely appealed.
FACTS
1. Prosecution Evidence
In March 2005, appellant was being returned to his cell in the administration segregation unit of the state prison at Lancaster, California. Correction Officer Cox escorted appellant. Appellant’s hands were cuffed behind his back. For some reason, appellant was very angry and cursing. Officer Thomas came to help Officer Cox return appellant to his cell. Once the three reached the cell, appellant stepped inside with his back towards the cell door. Officer Thomas took hold of the handcuffs behind appellant and held onto them through the food port in the door as it slid closed. Officer Thomas began to take the handcuffs off, but appellant jerked forward and attempted to pull the handcuffs into the cell. Officer Thomas pulled appellant back by the handcuffs. The officer continued in removing the handcuffs from appellant’s hands. At that point, appellant spun around, reached through the food port and grabbed Officer Thomas’s lanyard that was attached to his utility belt. Appellant attempted to pull Officer Thomas through the food port by his lanyard. Appellant released the lanyard only after the officer shot appellant with pepper spray. Officer Thomas suffered no permanent injuries, but his wrist struck the food port when appellant jerked away, and he had to brace himself when appellant pulled on the lanyard, causing the officer pain.
Unlike the general prison population, inmates in the administrative segregation unit are kept in their cells 22 or 23 hours a day, fed in their cells on trays passed through a food port in the door and always handcuffed when outside their cells. Inmates are placed in the administrative segregation unit for concerns over their safety or for their serious violation of prison rules. The jury was not told the reason appellant was in the administrative segregation unit.
Officer Podratz from the prison investigative services unit testified that for security reasons inmates generally are not allowed to walk behind correctional officers or to touch them. Inmates are regularly searched for weapons, and weapons are frequently found concealed in or on inmates’ bodies, in their clothing or in their cells. Correction officers are placed at risk during the cuffing or uncuffing of inmates and when the food port is open. A number of things can happen to an officer when the food port is open. An officer could be “gassed” (have feces, urine or other liquids thrown at the officer), injure a wrist or elbow or other body part coming into contact with the food port, or be stabbed, cut or punched through the food port. Inmates have also manipulated themselves out of handcuffs and gained control of them, requiring officers to enter the prisoner’s cell to retrieve them from the now-armed inmate. Officer Podratz testified hypothetically that correction officers may be endangered by an inmate’s grabbing hold of an officer’s lanyard through the food port, because it could give the inmate access to the keys officers have attached to the lanyard.
Appellant had a long history of assaultive and violent behavior that included at least three prior convictions of robbery, an attempted carjacking and an assault with a deadly weapon.
2. Defense Evidence
Appellant rested without offering any evidence.
Appellant expressed a wish to testify in his own defense, but his contumacious behavior caused him to be removed from the courtroom for most of the trial, and he was deemed to have voluntarily absented himself through his repeated misbehavior in front of the jury, his self-mutilation and other serious disruptive conduct.
DISCUSSION
1. Revocation of in Propria Persona Status
Appellant contends the order revoking his right to self-representation must be reversed because the trial court had no power to act by virtue of his filing a statement of disqualification against Judge Thomas R. White on November 15, 2005. We disagree.
A. Factual Background
Appellant’s preliminary hearing was held on October 13, 2005, before Judge Randolph Rogers with appellant appearing in propria persona. Appellant was held to answer, and his arraignment was set for October 27, 2005, before Judge Lisa Chung. Judge Chung determined that proceedings had been adjourned pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, and she continued the matter. The case was called for arraignment again on November 3, 2005, but appellant refused to leave his cell. Judge Chung signed an extraction order. When appellant subsequently appeared in court, he filed a section 170.6 motion against Judge Chung. Judge Chung found the motion timely and transferred the case to Judge White.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant then appeared before Judge White on November 3, 2005. Judge White granted appellant permission to proceed in propria persona, with an admonishment that he was not to interrupt proceedings or refuse to exit his cell and any such conduct could be used in any determination whether he would continue to be allowed to represent himself. To “clear the record,” the prosecutor interjected that appellant had twice before been subject to extraction orders, and the prosecution did not believe appellant had been entirely cooperative. Judge White stated he would not make “any specific alternative findings,” but he warned appellant that “if there should be any form of disruption similar to that in the future,” it could be used in a determination “whether you are allowed to continue to represent yourself.” He notified appellant, “if there is any... action that would cause the court to feel it has to issue a formal extraction order and use of any force necessary, this may be considered in allowing you to proceed or not in pro per.” Appellant was then arraigned. During the arraignment, appellant interrupted several times, prompting Judge White to admonish him not to do so. The matter was continued to November 8, 2005, for further proceedings.
Judge White informed appellant that in the event of “any deliberate misbehavior..., the court has the right to terminate your own right to self-representation.” Appellant said he understood that “in-court disruption as opposed to something that happened over in the jail” could lead to termination of his in propria persona rights.
On November 8, 2005, appellant appeared before Judge Christopher G. Estes, who was sitting in for Judge White. Because the court file was not available, the judge ordered the matter to be trailed to November 10, 2005, when Judge White was to return. Appellant interrupted the proceedings several times, requiring Judge Estes to admonish appellant not to interrupt. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Estes expressly found appellant had become “verbally combative” and it should be taken into consideration on appellant’s opportunity to continue his in propria persona status.
Further proceedings occurred on November 10, 2005, before Judge White, and appellant again appeared in propria persona. However, those proceedings were not requested by appellant to be transcribed by the reporter. The minute order for that date indicates the matter was continued for lack of the court files.
On November 15, 2005, appellant appeared once more in propria persona before Judge White. At the beginning of the hearing, Judge White stated the matter had been continued for further proceedings for determination of “certain issues” appellant had brought up at his last appearance, as well as for the court to determine whether to consider “pulling” appellant’s in propria persona privileges “based upon some alleged prior misconduct and reports from the prison liaison officer, as well as admonishments that have been made by two bench officers, including Judge Estes, who indicated that [appellant] was completely disruptive [and] very verbally combative during proceedings....”
Judge White asked appellant if he wished to address the issue of his in propria persona “privileges.” Appellant announced that he had a motion for disqualification under section 170.1 for the court. The court allowed appellant to lodge this motion and stated, “We’ll suspend further proceedings and pass the matter.” After a recess, Judge White called the matter again. He informed the parties he did not have sufficient information to determine how to proceed and thus continued the matter to November 17, 2005, so that additional materials could be obtained from the court that was handling appellant’s prior section 170.1 motion made against Judge Rogers.
B. Order Revoking In Propria Persona Status
At the continued November 17, 2005 hearing, having obtained and reviewed the additional materials, Judge White indicated that appellant’s challenge to Judge Rogers for cause was still under consideration by the Orange County Superior Court. Judge White recited the history of the proceedings, stating the matter had been assigned to him after appellant filed a challenge to Judge Lisa Chung, and Judge White had “commenced addressing issues of pro per status” in an attempt “to facilitate [appellant’s] ability to respond to any pleadings or determinations that might come forth from the determination on the original causal challenge.”
In that regard, Judge White stated he had “reconfirmed the fact that [appellant] wished to proceed in pro per, made the requisite findings that he may continue as pro per, and [afterward] started noticing [appellant’s] disruptive and disorderly conduct in court.” Further, Judge White stated, “[a]nother bench officer who sat in for me had observed that [appellant] was not only disruptive, but verbally combative. [¶] Records that we have received in terms of minute order[s] from two other bench officers from this court indicate that [appellant] had to be ordered forcibly extracted from his cell, so there has been disruptive conduct in other ways, including a document indicating some incidents regarding the law library. [¶] I had to repeatedly admonish [appellant] not to disrupt court proceedings, and I had indicated that I would consider revoking his pro per privileges and made that comment on several occasions to him if he continued to disrupt the orderly proceedings in court.”
Judge White concluded that “based on all the matters recited, and based on the general principles under Faretta, which [appellant] has cited to this court several times, I find that there has been sufficient disruption of the orderly proceedings to cause me to revoke his pro per privileges, and I do so.”
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
Judge White then stated, “that having been said, [appellant] wishes to file... a [section] 170.1 causal challenge to this court, and I did indicate I would accept that. That having been accepted at this time, I do not strike the documents. I am filing a memorandum and verified answer to [the] statement of disqualification, which will also be lodged in the court file....” Judge White then ordered the proceedings transferred to the presiding judge’s department “for further assignment and determination of this causal challenge.”
So as not to prejudice appellant unduly, Judge White appointed appellant defense counsel from the independent bar panel. Counsel accepted the assignment and immediately proceeded to represent appellant.
C. Discussion
Appellant contends that because he filed his section 170.1 motion for disqualification on November 15, 2005, Judge White had no power to revoke appellant’s right to self-representation on November 17, 2005. Appellant argues that under section 170.4, subdivision (d), there are two instances when a judge “shall have no power to act in any proceeding”: (1) after his or her disqualification, and (2) after the filing of a statement of disqualification until the question of disqualification is resolved. Appellant maintains his case falls within the latter category, namely, that the judge had no power to act in any proceeding after the filing of a statement of disqualification until the question of disqualification was resolved.
Section 170.4, subdivision (d) provides: “Except as provided in this section, a disqualified judge shall have no power to act in any proceeding after his or her disqualification or after the filing of a statement of disqualification until the question of his or her disqualification has been determined.” (Italics added.)
Section 170.4, subdivision (d) expressly provides the judge has no power to act “[e]xcept as provided in this section.” Subdivision (c)(1) of section 170.4 provides that “[i]f a statement of disqualification is filed after a trial or hearing has commenced by the start of voir dire, by the swearing of the first witness or by the submission of a motion for decision, the judge whose impartiality has been questioned may order the trial or hearing to continue, notwithstanding the filing of the statement of disqualification. The issue of disqualification shall be referred to another judge for decision..., and if it is determined that the judge is disqualified, all orders and rulings of the judge found to be disqualified made after the filing of the statement shall be vacated.” (Italics added.)
We are “guided by well-settled statutory construction rules [in interpreting these statutory provisions:] ‘The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the words of the statute provide the most reliable indication of legislative intent. [Citation.] When the statutory language is ambiguous, the court may examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In construing statutory language, we must ‘apply reason, practicality, and common sense.... If possible, the words should be interpreted to make them workable and reasonable... in accord with common sense and justice, and to avoid an absurd result.’ [Citation.]” (Eckert v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 262, 265-266 (Eckert).)
Following these tenets, we conclude that because appellant’s motion to appear in propria persona had already been “submitted” to the trial judge for determination, the judge had the discretion to remove appellant’s in propria persona status even after appellant filed a disqualification statement against the judge. Section 170.4, subdivision (c)(1) provides that if a “hearing” has “commenced” by the “submission of a motion for decision,” the judge whose impartiality has been questioned “may order the... hearing to continue,” despite the filing of the statement of disqualification. In such event, “if it is determined that the judge is disqualified, all orders and rulings of the judge found to be disqualified made after the filing of the statement shall be vacated.” The Legislature’s provision for the vacation of “orders and rulings... made after the filing of the statement” if the judge is later found to be disqualified presupposes that the judge may continue to preside over the matter and issue orders and rulings subject to such condition.
We find support for this position in Eckert, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 262. In Eckert, the court held that when a party files a statement of disqualification under section 170.1 after a trial judge has ruled on motions in limine but before voir dire has begun, the trial judge is not required to stay the proceedings until a second judge rules on the disqualification motion and may proceed with the trial. (Eckert, supra, at p. 264.) The court reasoned that section 170.4, subdivision (c)(1) provides three ways in which a trial or hearing may commence: “by the start of voir dire, by the swearing of the first witness or by the submission of a motion for decision.” (§ 170.4, subd. (c)(1); see also Eckert, supra, at p. 266.) Because the three events are stated in the alternative and each event may occur in a single trial, the court held the Legislature necessarily intended to designate alternative means by which a trial might “commence.” (Eckert, supra, at p. 266.) Under section 170.4, therefore, trial “commenced” upon the submission of the motions in limine to the trial judge for decision, and the court at that point had discretion to continue with the proceedings despite the filing of the motion for disqualification. (Eckert, at p. 266.)
A motion is deemed “submitted” when the parties have presented the motion to the court for decision. (Eckert, supra, at pp. 266-267.) In this case, appellant’s motion to proceed in propria persona had already been submitted to Judge White and granted subject to conditions. Judge White had the discretion to proceed in the matter notwithstanding appellant’s subsequent filing of a disqualification statement.
We also find support for this interpretation of the word “submission” in the ordinary dictionary definition of “submit,” which is defined as “to present or propose to another for review, consideration, or decision {~ a question to the court}...; also... to defer to or consent to abide by the opinion or authority of another....” (Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1994) p. 1173.) Appellant had presented his motion to appear in propria persona to Judge White for consideration and decision long before appellant first sought to challenge the judge and purported to consent to abide by the judge’s decision.
Geldermann, Inc. v. Bruner (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 662 (Geldermann), upon which appellant relies, is distinguishable. Geldermann held that when a trial judge voluntarily disqualifies himself or herself after completion of a court trial and the issuance of a tentative decision, the judge is statutorily precluded from any further action in the case, including the issuance of a statement of decision, except for those limited activities permitted by section 170.4, subdivision (a). (Geldermann, supra, at p. 663.) The court relied in part on the provisions of section 170.3, subdivision (a)(1) that state, “‘Whenever a judge determines himself or herself to be disqualified, the judge shall... not further participate in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 170.4....’” (Geldermann, at p. 665.) The appellate court observed in Geldermann that the trial judge was not required to disqualify himself once the party had filed the statement of disqualification after trial had begun. He could have ordered the trial to continue, bringing into play that part of section 170.4, subdivision (c) providing, “‘if it is determined that the judge is disqualified, all orders and rulings of the judge found to be disqualified made after the filing of the statement shall be vacated.’” (Geldermann, at p. 666, fn. 3, quoting § 170.4, subd. (c).) However, the trial judge, out of a desire to expedite the proceedings, had voluntarily recused himself, and, having done so, was precluded by section 170.4 from issuing a statement of decision and a judgment. (Geldermann, at p. 666.)
Unlike the judge in Geldermann, the trial judge in the present case did not voluntarily disqualify himself and properly ruled on appellant’s in propria persona status, a matter already submitted to him, as allowed under section 170.4, subdivision (c).
Appellant argues that when the trial court revoked his in propria persona status there was no “motion” pending and no “hearing” within the meaning of section 170.4, subdivision (c)(1). We are not persuaded. When the trial judge granted appellant’s motion to appear in propria persona, it was on a conditional basis only. The judge expressly admonished appellant at the time that he was not to interrupt proceedings or refuse to exit his cell and that such disruptive conduct could be used in determining whether he could continue to represent himself. When appellant appeared before the trial judge again on November 15, 2005, the trial judge stated at the beginning of the hearing that the matter had been continued for further proceedings for determination of “certain issues” that appellant had brought up at his last appearance, as well as whether appellant’s in propria persona status should be “pull[ed].”
As respondent argues, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the court’s decision because the hearing was not reported, we may infer from the trial judge’s comments that the trial judge notified appellant at the November 10 hearing that the revocation of his in propria persona status was in issue.
The judge asked appellant if he wished to address the issue, and appellant’s response was to submit a statement of disqualification of the judge under section 170.1. The record reflects whether appellant’s self-representation should be revoked was a recurring issue of which appellant had reasonable notice. Moreover, section 170.4 refers to the commencement of a “hearing” and to the “submission of a motion for decision.” The statute does not restrict “hearings” or “motions” only to formally noticed hearings and formally noticed motions. (See Eckert, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 267 [“the submission of a motion for decision may be the first event in a... hearing”].)
If the Legislature had intended to so confine the court’s power, it could have expressly so stated. Absent such restriction, no further or formal “motion” was necessary for the trial judge to proceed under the statute. The presiding judge thus had power to act even after appellant filed his disqualification motion.
2. Marsden Motion
We further conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s Marsden motion. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) Pursuant to Marsden, under the Sixth Amendment made applicable to the state under the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of court appointed counsel if they are unable to employ private counsel. (Marsden, supra, at p. 123; see Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335.) The right to counsel may include the right to discharge or substitute other counsel, if the failure to do so would substantially impair a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel. (Marsden, supra, at p. 123.) Appellant contends the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry under Marsden into the effectiveness of appointed counsel and failed to preserve an adequate record for review. We disagree.
A. Factual Background
On November 17, 2005, after revoking appellant’s right to represent himself, Judge White appointed bar panel Attorney David Houchin to represent appellant. The judge also suspended proceedings until appellant’s two disqualification motions were resolved.
Appellant’s motions to disqualify Judge Rogers and Judge White were referred to the Orange County Superior Court, and appellant’s criminal proceeding was stayed for a period pending that court’s decision.
Proceedings were resumed on May 23, 2006, before Judge White. Appellant requested a Marsden hearing, and Judge White conducted an in camera hearing outside the presence of the prosecutor. At the in camera hearing, appellant had a multitude of complaints regarding his appointed counsel, who was present.
The record does not reflect whether the section 170.1 statement of disqualification against Judge White had previously been denied, but appellant does not raise any separate issue regarding Judge White’s authority to preside after proceedings resumed in May 2006.
The court asked appellant, “What is it that you feel Mr. Houchin has done or not done?” Appellant responded that “every time” he tried to speak to counsel in court, approximately five correctional officers stood ready nearby. Appellant told counsel he wanted to have a private conversation, but counsel would not speak to him without the correctional officers being present. When the court had stayed proceedings, appellant had asked counsel to object to the stay and to insist on a speedy trial, but counsel had refused to do so. Appellant also complained that for six months, between November 17, 2005, and May 23, 2006, counsel never came to talk to him and failed to answer any of his letters.
Correctional officers were kept stationed about three to four feet away from appellant due to his volatile conduct.
Appellant stated he asked counsel to help him get his in propria persona status back and counsel said no because he worked for the court and not for appellant. Appellant claimed his counsel had a conflict of interest because counsel represented another prisoner on a murder charge where appellant was housed. Appellant tried to give counsel documents in court to establish he filed grievances against prison officials who, he alleged, raped him with foreign objects. Appellant stated he tried to kill himself.
Appellant also said he tried to hand appointed counsel hospital records, but counsel said he would not speak to appellant without the officers and only after court. Appellant asserted there was a second incident of rape by a prison official and his cohorts in which they knocked out several of appellant’s teeth and broke his jaw and hand. Counsel refused to accept appellant’s documentation regarding the incident or to talk to appellant about this. Counsel also refused to object when the court took away appellant’s in propria persona status after reading in the court file that he had talked too loud and after the court stated self-representation was a privilege and not a right.
The trial court noted it was generally aware of defense counsel’s background and experience because he had tried cases throughout the court system, but it requested counsel to describe his professional background for the record. Counsel stated he had been in practice since 1982 and, for the last 10 to 15 years, about 99 percent of his practice was in the area of criminal law. He had tried upwards of 250 felony jury trials, including approximately 40 murder and 18 special circumstances cases. Counsel stated he had begun representing appellant since the last court appearance. However, the case had been awaiting an Orange County ruling regarding the motion to disqualify the trial judge.
Counsel stated he had no comments regarding appellant’s allegations. He stated he had an opportunity to speak with appellant “before the Orange County issues came up,” and “some of the things that [appellant] wished that I would do, I simply wasn’t going to do.” Counsel said he told appellant he would represent appellant as best as he could, but he was “going to have to drive the bus when it came to legal issues,” and that did not sit well with appellant. Counsel declared he did not know to whom appellant was referring in complaining about counsel’s representing another defendant at the prison on a murder case.
When invited to make a “final comment,” appellant said there were “irreconcilable differences” with his counsel, who had indicated they were waiting for appellant’s section 170.1 challenges to be resolved; however, those challenges had been over for seven months, and counsel did not speak to or visit appellant in that time and had refused to address appellant’s claims.
Appellant submitted to the court 18 pages of exhibits. The court read the exhibits, found they were “not needed” for purposes of appellant’s motion, and returned them to appellant. Appellant requested a new attorney and also asked to represent himself.
The exhibits consisted of documents, letters and records, including a letter addressed to President Bush.
B. Order Denying Motion
The trial court found no basis on which to find a conflict, finding no showing “any other attorney would do anything differently” nor any reason to believe counsel would not continue to represent appellant “in a good fashion” and protect appellant’s constitutional rights. The court found any deterioration in the attorney-client relationship was the product of appellant’s attitude rather than irreconcilable differences between appellant and appointed counsel. With respect to appellant’s comments, the court stated it had reviewed the court file, specifically docket entries indicating appellant was “verbally combative” with the court in prior proceedings, which the court appropriately could do and which counsel could not have prevented the court from doing. The court stated its prior comment that appearing in propria persona was a privilege was probably inappropriate, as self-representation is a constitutional right if a defendant is otherwise acceptable and acts suitably, but its ruling was not. Because the section 170.1 statement of disqualification was filed before counsel was appointed, the court explained, counsel could not have taken further action at that time.
C. Discussion
“‘“When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.”’ [Citation.] The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would ‘substantially impair’ the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 681.)
In the instant case, appellant contends that the trial court made a constitutionally inadequate inquiry of appointed defense counsel because, as part of its duty of inquiry and its duty to adjudicate a fundamental issue, the court should have questioned counsel after appellant stated facts sufficient to raise a question about counsel’s effectiveness. Appellant relies on People v. Groce (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 292, 296-297, People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62, 66, People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 317-318, and People v. Eastman (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 688, 696-697. Unlike those cases, in the present case the court questioned appellant about his reasons for wanting substitute counsel, asked defense counsel for his response and denied appellant’s motion based upon its assessment that grounds for substitution did not exist. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 490.) And, unlike in Munoz, the court below made an appropriate record for this court to make an “intelligent appellate review” whether the court properly exercised its discretion. (See Munoz, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 66.)
An indigent defendant has no constitutional right to an attorney who would conduct the defense according to an indigent defendant’s whims, and the defendant’s disagreement with appointed counsel regarding trial tactics does not automatically compel the appointment of another attorney. (People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281-282.) An inquiry into appointed counsel’s state of mind is required only in those instances in which a reasonable explanation for counsel’s conduct or attitude toward his client is necessary in order to ascertain whether counsel can provide adequate representation. (People v. Turner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219.) Appointed counsel, moreover, has no duty to support a motion for self-representation. (See People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1010, disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 855-856.) The court made a sufficient inquiry of counsel and was not required to delve further into counsel’s state of mind.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, Acting P. J., MOHR, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.