First National Bank, 71 Ill.2d at 8. Plaintiff also relies upon People v. Maya (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 961, in support of her assertion that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to her claim alleging violations of the Vehicle Code because the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code were enacted after, and are more specific than, the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff correctly states that "[w]here two statutes conflict, the more specific statute controls that which is more general."

The appellate court affirmed the order awarding fees but vacated the fee awards themselves and remanded to the circuit court for a hearing on the reasonableness of the fees. ( 119 Ill. App.3d 961.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal under our Rule 315(a) ( 87 Ill.2d 315 (a)).

On this issue, we agree with the Village that the Pension Code provisions, which apply specifically to only policemen and firemen, are the more specific statutes, and thus are controlling. See People v. Maya (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 961, 965. Claimant also asserts that the Act should take primacy over the Pension Code, noting that the Act applies generally to all employees in this State, and noting the Act's remedial purpose.

The appellant raises several issues for determination; however, expressing them in the most simplistic manner, this court is confronted with the question of whether the trial court was correct in entering judgment for the people on Rivera's bond forfeiture and thereafter denying attorney Lucenti's motion for payment of fees from the bond deposit. Lucenti in support of his assertion relies on the case of People v. Maya (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 961, 457 N.E.2d 501, as well as sections 110-7(h) and 115-4.1(a) of our Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 110-7(h), 115-4.1(a)). The case of Maya is pertinent in that it addresses the issue of defense attorneys being compensated for their services from a defendant's bail bond deposit.

Lack of more detailed legislative guidance on the matter of priorities is not surprising, since the purpose of bail is merely to ensure a defendant's presence at trial. ( People v. Maya (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 961, 963, 457 N.E.2d 501, 503, aff'd (1985), 105 Ill.2d 281, 288, 473 N.E.2d 1287, 1289.) As noted above, the practice of assigning bail bond deposits to an attorney in a criminal case to assure the attorney's collection of fees is well recognized in Illinois.

One of the well-established principles of statutory construction is that a specific statutory provision controls as against the general provision on the same subject. ( People v. Maya (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 961, 965, 457 N.E.2d 501; People v. Matzker (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 70, 72, 450 N.E.2d 395.) Sections 5-8-1(a)(1) and (b) are general provisions governing when a natural life sentence may be imposed for murder.