Opinion
B327311
05-06-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAURICIO A., Defendant and Appellant.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA499176 Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2022 Mauricio A. was charged with the rape of his 16-year-old daughter, K.A. When K.A. learned she was pregnant a few months after the assault, she initially told her mother and a nurse that a boyfriend was responsible, but she soon told her mother that Mauricio was the father. Eventually, K.A. reported in detail to police that Mauricio had raped her.
We use K.A.'s initials to protect her privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) Because K.A. and Mauricio A. share a last name, for K.A.'s privacy we omit Mauricio's last name and refer to him by his first name. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(11).) We intend no disrespect.
Mauricio proceeded to trial and his counsel conceded Mauricio had sex with K.A., but he argued it was consensual. K.A. testified that she did not consent, and Mauricio's counsel cross-examined her about the delay in reporting the rape and inconsistencies in her statements. To rehabilitate K.A., and over Mauricio's objection, the People introduced expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). The expert testified that victims of child sexual abuse often delay reporting and lie to protect an abuser in their family.
Mauricio was convicted and sentenced to 11 years. His only claim of error on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of CSAAS. The trial court did not err, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information
In 2022 Mauricio was charged with one count of rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)). The information alleged three aggravating factors: that Mauricio's offense involved great violence, great bodily harm or threat of great bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); that the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); and Mauricio took advantage of a position of trust and confidence to commit the offense (rule 4.421(a)(11)).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
B. The People's Evidence
1. K.A.'s Testimony
At trial, K.A. testified she lived with her father Mauricio, her mother, and her two younger siblings. K.A. described that Mauricio began to "stare" at and "comment" on her body when she entered her teenage years.
K.A. testified that, when she was 16 years old, Mauricio had sex with her against her will. Mauricio entered K.A.'s bedroom as she was resting in bed using her cell phone. He locked the door behind him and put his "full body" on top of K.A, "pushing [her] against the bed," and "grabbed [her] two arms." K.A. testified she tried to escape Mauricio's grip, asked him "what was he doing," and told him to stop. She "punched" Mauricio in his chest. K.A. testified Mauricio "just kept on doing what he was doing," pushed her clothing aside and her legs apart, held her wrists down, placed his body weight on her, and penetrated her with his penis until he ejaculated in her vagina. After Mauricio left, K.A. testified she stayed in her room crying for the rest of the day.
Three days after the rape, Mauricio told K.A., "[I]t's better for you to keep quiet, or you will ruin the family." K.A. explained she did not tell her mother about the incident at the time because she "didn't know how to tell her." K.A. felt "disgusted" by the whole situation and feared that her mother would not believe her.
Some weeks later, Mauricio again came into her bedroom and "jumped on" her, but she "pushed him" and left the room. K.A. also did not immediately tell her mother or anyone else about this incident.
Months after the rape, K.A. saw a doctor after "throwing up every morning" for four weeks. K.A. initially told the nurse she was not sexually active, she spent most of her time at home, and she did not have a boyfriend that visited her home. Testing revealed K.A. was pregnant. K.A. testified she "lied" and told the nurse that the father was "a guy from school." K.A.'s mother, Claudia, asked whether she was telling the truth, or whether "someone else did it" and "forced" K.A. K.A. said she was telling the truth. Because of certain inconsistencies in K.A.'s statements to the nurse (i.e., K.A. told the nurse she was not sexually active before the test, then after the test was positive, she said she had sex with a boy from school), the nurse filed a report of suspected child sexual abuse.
A few days after the pregnancy test results, Claudia observed K.A. was not eating and had not left her room for days. Claudia cried and asked K.A. "why was [she] acting this way," saying she didn't believe K.A.'s explanation that she was pregnant by a boy from school. K.A. felt "bad" for lying and told her mother that she was pregnant because Mauricio had sex with her, and she had never had sex with anyone else. K.A. did not tell Claudia about the incident in detail. Claudia asked why K.A. did not tell her earlier, and K.A. said, "I was scared, [and] I didn't know what to do." Believing Mauricio's statement that disclosing the assault would "ruin the family," K.A. asked her mother "not to tell no one . . . because it was going to turn into a bigger problem."
Claudia told her pastor, Douglas Tinoco, that "her daughter had become pregnant" and "it was her father who had gotten her pregnant." Tinoco reported this to the police, who contacted K.A.
K.A. testified that, in her first interview with a police detective, she initially denied that Mauricio had sex with her. She told the officer she got pregnant by her boyfriend. But, "at the end of the conversation," K.A. "spit it out" that she was assaulted by Mauricio. For the first time, K.A. disclosed details of the assault and described that Mauricio used force to overcome her resistance. K.A. told detectives she "know[s] for a fact [Mauricio] loves me" and felt he was "honestly sorry."
2. Mauricio's Interview with Police
After K.A.'s interview, Mauricio was arrested. The People presented testimony from Sargeant Omar Rodriguez, who interviewed Mauricio after the arrest. Mauricio admitted to having sex with K.A. in the interview, but he described that K.A. "[g]ot on top of him" on the couch, she "remove[d] her clothes," and she "placed his penis inside her vagina." Mauricio stated "he told his daughter to stop" because "what they were doing was bad" and he "felt shameful." Mauricio asserted he had sex with K.A. twice but "was able to stop her" from having sex a third time.
3. Clinical Psychologist Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
The People called Dr. Jayme Jones, a clinical psychologist, as an expert witness to testify on CSAAS. Mauricio objected to Jones's testimony, arguing it was not "particularly relevant in this case" as K.A. was 18 years old at the time of trial and she had already explained that "[s]he didn't report right away because she was concerned about her father." Mauricio asserted the CSAAS testimony was "prejudicial" because Jones did not know whether K.A. was lying but would only testify to "what the [CSAAS] model says." The trial court overruled Mauricio's objection, commenting, "Remember the witness isn't going to tell us whether to believe [K.A.] or not. She's going to talk in terms of the sorts of influences that, let's say, contaminate the retelling of what actually occurred."
On the stand, Jones described CSAAS as "a model that was written to help people understand the behavior of children who have been sexually abused in particular by someone they know." Jones had never talked to K.A. or read any police reports in the case.
Jones explained, "[C]hildren who have been sexually abused are likely to not disclose at all. The most common reaction if they do [disclose is] it tends to be a significant time after the event, sometimes months." Jones opined that a child may "accidental[ly]" disclose the abuse without "intend[ing] for the authorities or adults at large to find out." When a child is not "prepared to disclose but is being pushed to disclose" sexual abuse, Jones testified, he or she may "say I don't remember, I don't know, that didn't happen, as ways of ending the conversation."
Jones also described CSAAS in the context of sexual abuse by a family member: "[W]hen children and teenagers are abused by someone they're close to, it's a very confusing situation for them. There are things about the person they like . . . [and] they like to think that the good parts of the relationship will last, and the abuse will go away." "In all of the cases" Jones had observed, "the children who are abused by a family member are motivated to protect [the abuser] for a variety of reasons." "[I]t is common for children who have been abused to lie" for two reasons, Jones stated: "either to keep themselves out of trouble or to protect the person that abused them."
During Jones's testimony, the prosecutor asked whether it was common for a victim of child sexual abuse to "minimize the situation" when disclosing the abuse to an adult. Mauricio objected to this question as calling for speculation. In response, the trial court admonished the jury about Jones's testimony regarding CSAAS: "Understand, everyone, these are general impressions regarding the circumstances and what stem from them in a general sense. And there's no suggestion that necessarily any of this is directly applicable to this case. The question is[,] do you find it to be[,] based on the facts[?]" The court then overruled Mauricio's objection and allowed Dr. Jones to answer the question.
C. Mauricio's Defense
Mauricio did not testify at trial. He called Claudia to testify that she had once taken away K.A.'s phone because "she was sending inappropriate things to other people," and that Claudia had previously told K.A. "not to hug [Mauricio] a certain way or not to sit on top of him . . . [or] stay up at night with him."
In Mauricio's closing argument, his counsel admitted Mauricio had sex with K.A. but argued that she consented to the sexual encounter. Mauricio's counsel argued to the jury that K.A. "has the ability to change her story at the drop of a hat" and the case was "about judging credibility of witnesses."
D. Jury Instruction on CSAAS
After closing arguments, the trial court delivered CALJIC No. 10.64 on consideration of CSAAS evidence. CALJIC No. 10.64 instructs:
"Evidence has been presented to you concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. This evidence is not received and must not be considered by you as proof that the alleged victim's rape claim is true.
"Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome research is based upon an approach that is completely different from that which you must take to this case. The syndrome research begins with the assumption that a rape has occurred, and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of children to that experience. As distinguished from that research approach, you are to presume the defendant innocent. The People have the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
"You should consider the evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the limited purpose of showing, if it does, that the alleged victim's reactions, as demonstrated by the evidence, are not inconsistent with her having been raped."
E. Mauricio's Conviction and Sentence
The jury convicted Mauricio of rape and found true the aggravating factors that K.A. was particularly vulnerable and that Mauricio took advantage of a position of trust. As to the third aggravating factor, the jury found it was not true that the offense involved great violence, great bodily harm, or the threat of great bodily harm.
The trial court sentenced Mauricio to the upper term of 11 years. Mauricio timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mauricio's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony on CSAAS.
To the extent Mauricio challenges the scientific reliability of CSAAS evidence, he concedes that "California courts have not found a Kelly issue presented by admission of CSAAS evidence," and presents no persuasive argument CSAAS evidence is not reliable in this case. (See People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-31 [articulating test for admissibility of expert testimony on scientific techniques].) In this light, we decline to consider Mauricio's cases from other jurisdictions questioning the scientific reliability or application of CSAAS in particular cases.
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
"'CSAAS cases involve expert testimony regarding the responses of a child molestation victim. Expert testimony on the common reactions of a child molestation victim is not admissible to prove the sex crime charged actually occurred. However, CSAAS testimony "is admissible to rehabilitate [the victim's] credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident-e.g., a delay in reporting-is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation."'" (People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 245 (Perez), quoting People v. Sandoval (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 994, 1001; accord, People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300 (McAlpin).) "'Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly selfimpeaching behavior.'" (McAlpin, at p. 1301; accord, People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503.)
We review the trial court's decision to admit expert testimony on CSAAS for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 170 (Lapenias); People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 186 (Wells).) "'[W]e will not disturb a trial court's [evidentiary] ruling "except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice."'" (People v. Flores (Apr. 15, 2024) __Cal.App.5th __ at *5 (Flores).)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Testimony on CSAAS
Mauricio argues CSAAS evidence had "no particular relevance" to this case. Because he admitted at trial to having sex with K.A., he contends the central dispute was whether K.A. consented to the encounter. He argues that CSAAS evidence is only relevant to "whether the abuse occurred at all," not the issue of consent. Mauricio's argument is unpersuasive.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony on CSAAS. "'[I]t is well established in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.'" (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 215 (Ramirez); accord, Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 171 [collecting cases]; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1745 (Patino) [CSAAS evidence "is pertinent and admissible if an issue has been raised as to the victim's credibility"].) CSAAS evidence "must be targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence" about how victims react to sexual abuse. (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393-394 (Bowker); accord, Patino, at pp. 1744-1745.)
Mauricio's defense put K.A.'s credibility directly at issue, opening the door to expert testimony on CSAAS. While K.A. testified she resisted having sex with Mauricio, his counsel elicited testimony undermining K.A.'s credibility, and argued to the jury that K.A. invited the sexual encounter. Defense counsel cross-examined K.A. on why she lied to the nurse about the father of her pregnancy and why she delayed disclosing the rape to the police. The People were entitled to introduce CSAAS testimony from Jones to rehabilitate K.A. Additionally, in closing, defense counsel told the jury they must make "a credibility decision": "[Mauricio] admitted that he had sex with his daughter . . . What we are trying to establish is . . . how did it happen. Was it rape[?]" Counsel also argued K.A. was not credible because "her story shifted" over time as she revealed more details.
The CSAAS testimony was properly admitted for the purpose of showing that K.A.'s contradictory statements and "'delay in reporting'" were "'not inconsistent with having been molested.'" (Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 215; accord, Perez, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) Dr. Jones's testimony explained that children who have been sexually abused often delay reporting or lie to protect an abuser who is a family member. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. (See Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17441745 [CSAAS evidence properly admitted "for the limited purpose of explaining why [victim] did not immediately inform anyone of her molestation and why she slowly revealed the details of the molestation"]; accord, Flores, supra, __Cal.App.5th__ at *11 [same, where "the defense placed the victims' credibility at issue using precisely the kind of 'paradoxical' behaviors, including delayed reporting, helplessness, and memory repression, that CSAAS testimony is admissible to address"].) Jones's testimony on CSAAS was targeted to explain why victims of sexual abuse may deny or delay reporting the abuse. (See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172 ["CSAAS testimony may have informed some jurors that [victim's] apparent accommodation, helplessness, secrecy, and delayed disclosures were typical reactions among children who have been sexually abused."]; McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300 ["expert testimony on the common reactions of child molestation victims . . . is admissible to rehabilitate such witness's credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident-e.g., a delay in reporting-is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation"].)
Mauricio contends the prosecutor improperly argued that K.A. demonstrated symptoms of CSAAS and thus the jury should conclude that she was sexually abused. In support, he relies on Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at page 393, and People v. Clotfelter (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 30, 64 (Clotfelter), but those cases are distinguishable. Unlike the prosecutors in Bowker and Clotfelter, the prosecutor here did not argue that K.A.'s testimony was true because she delayed disclosure or gave varying accounts consistent with CSAAS. (See Clotfelter, at pp. 63-64; Bowker, at p. 395.) Instead, the prosecutor referred to CSAAS evidence to explain K.A.'s behavior: "There were times when [K.A.] recalled things slightly different. But Dr. Jones told you that is a common behavior for someone who's gone through a traumatic event, when someone is raped....[K.A.] only told her mom part of what happened. That is consistent with disclosure especially with children.... And for the first time she disclosed the entire details to the detective.... [T]he delay [from] the partial disclosure to the entire disclosure is very consistent with sexual assault victims." The prosecutor's statements were not improper. (See Bowker, at p. 393 [prosecutor may use CSAAS evidence "to say that child abuse victims often exhibit a certain characteristic or that a particular behavior is not inconsistent with a child having been molested"]; accord, Wells, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 188.)
Mauricio further argues that "no expert is needed to explain that a pregnant minor might not want to identify her father as the father of her child." But because Mauricio's defense counsel argued at trial that K.A. failed to disclose the rape immediately because she had in fact consented to intercourse with her father, the prosecution was entitled to present CSAAS evidence and such evidence was admissible to demonstrate why K.A.'s delayed disclosure could be consistent with having been sexually abused. (See Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394 [CSAAS testimony is admissible where there is "danger of jury confusion" based on a "myth or misconception" about sexual abuse].)
Finally, there was no error in admitting the CSAAS evidence, given that the trial court delivered a limiting instruction to the jury explaining that the evidence could not be "considered . . . as proof that the alleged victim's rape claim is true." (See Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 217 [affirming admission of CSAAS testimony where "[t]he judge instructed the jury concerning the limited use for which [the expert's] testimony could be considered, and we presume the jury generally understands and follows instructions"]; accord, Flores, supra, __Cal.App.5th__ at *11.) In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on CSAAS.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
We concur: SEGAL, Acting P. J. FEUER, J.