This court has previously found that such circumstances support application of the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception. See In re Maureen D. , 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 24, 395 Ill.Dec. 730, 39 N.E.3d 197 (in appeal from a 90-day involuntary medication order, noting the record indicates that respondent "is likely to be prescribed [psychotropic] medications in the future due to the ongoing nature of her illness; and, given her history of refusing such medications and the written information about them" there was a "reasonable expectation that respondent would be subject to the same action, involving the same issue"); see also In re Christopher C. , 2018 IL App (5th) 150301, ¶ 14, 425 Ill.Dec. 470, 113 N.E.3d 1192 ("We conclude that the capable-of-repetition exception applies, here, due to the short duration of involuntary treatment orders and the respondent's ongoing mental health issues and unwillingness to take medication.").

As will be discussed below, some of respondent's arguments on appeal concern the circuit court's compliance with the requirements of the Mental Health Code, and courts have repeatedly found such matters qualify for review under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Robert S. , 213 Ill. 2d at 46, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 ; In re Maureen D. , 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 22, 395 Ill.Dec. 730, 39 N.E.3d 197 ; In re Katarzyna G. , 2013 IL App (2d) 120807, ¶ 9, 374 Ill.Dec. 446, 995 N.E.2d 585. We come to the same conclusion here.

This court has previously found that such circumstances support application of the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception. See In re Maureen D., 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 24 (in appeal from a 90-day involuntary medication order, noting the record indicates that respondent "is likely to be prescribed [psychotropic] medications in the future due to the ongoing nature of her illness; and, given her history of refusing such medications and the written information about them" there was a "reasonable expectation that respondent would be subject to the same action, involving the same issue"); see also In re Christopher C., 2018 IL App (5th) 150301, ¶ 14 ("We conclude that the capable-of-repetition exception applies, here, due to the short duration of involuntary treatment orders and the respondent's ongoing mental health issues and unwillingness to take medication.").

As will be discussed below, some of respondent's arguments on appeal concern the circuit court's compliance with the requirements of the Mental Health Code, and courts have repeatedly found such matters qualify for review under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d at 46; In re Maureen D., 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 22; In re Katarzyna G., 2013 IL App (2d) 120807, ¶ 9. We come to the same conclusion here.

Respondent conceded the involuntary admission order was entered for a period of 90 days, which have expired, and thus the case is moot. See In re Maureen D ., 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 20, 395 Ill.Dec. 730, 39 N.E.3d 197 (and cases cited therein). Nonetheless respondent argues the case falls within the "public interest" and "collateral consequences" exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

In reviewing the entry of an involuntary commitment order or an order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, we will not reverse the circuit court's decision unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Deborah S., 2015 IL App (1st) 123596, ¶ 29; In re Maureen D., 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 26. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.