Opinion
C083674
04-10-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL DAVID MATTSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. 15F1243, 16F3657)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant Michael David Mattson pleaded no contest to misdemeanor felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated) in case No. 16F3657, and was found in violation of his probation in case No. 15F1243. The trial court executed the previously imposed but suspended seven-year sentence in case No. 15F1243. The court also imposed a concurrent one-year sentence in case No. 16F3657.
On appeal, defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that the warrantless search of his residence was unlawful because, even though he was on probation at the time of the search and one of the conditions of his probation was that he agreed to the warrantless search of his home, the evidence is not sufficient to show that the officer who conducted the search knew he was subject to warrantless searches. He maintains that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest plea in case No. 16F3657, and that the order revoking his probation in case No. 15F1243 must be reversed because the trial court erroneously relied on evidence obtained during the unlawful search in finding he violated his probation.
We conclude the warrantless search of defendant's residence was unlawful because the officer did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe defendant was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation at the time of the search. However, even though the search was unlawful, the trial court did not err in considering evidence obtained from the search in finding that defendant violated his probation in case No. 15F1243. Therefore, we will the reverse the judgment with instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his no contest plea in case No. 16F3657, to vacate the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress, to enter a new order granting the motion to suppress, and for further proceedings in accordance with the law. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Our recitation of the facts and proceedings in the underlying cases is limited to the information necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal.
On May 20, 2015, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded no contest to burglary (§ 459) in case No. 15F1243. He also admitted that he had served four prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) On September 17, 2015, the trial court sentenced him to seven years in county jail but suspended execution of sentence and placed him on probation for three years with various terms and conditions, including a warrantless search condition.
On June 13, 2016, following a search of his residence, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)) in case No. 16F3657. It was also alleged that defendant had served three prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) On the same day as case No. 16F3657 was filed, a petition for revocation of probation was filed in case No. 15F1243. The petition alleged that defendant violated his probation by unlawfully possessing ammunition in violation of section 30305, subdivision (a)(1).
On August 16, 2016, defendant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that suppression of the ammunition found during the warrantless search of his residence was required because, at the time of the search, the officer did not know he was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation. The People filed a written opposition, arguing that the search was permissible because the officer knew defendant was on probation at the time of the search and was informed where defendant resided prior to the search. The People further argued that, even if the officer was unaware that defendant was on searchable probation at the time of the search, the search was permissible because it was reasonable for the officer to believe defendant was subject to warrantless searches since he knew defendant was on probation for burglary.
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Nathaniel Helle of the Shasta County Sheriff's Department testified that, around 10:07 p.m., on June 10, 2016, he was dispatched to a residence located in Palo Cedro in response to a report of a domestic disturbance. Dispatch informed Deputy Helle that defendant was on probation for burglary.
Prior to arriving at the residence, Deputy Helle called the reporting party, Julie C. During the call, Julie told Deputy Helle that defendant and a female would be at the residence. Julie also told Deputy Helle that defendant was shirtless, pounding on her front door, and demanding his child from the woman.
Upon his arrival at the residence around 10:40 p.m., Deputy Helle spoke with Julie. She explained that she lived in the main residence, and that defendant was inside the apartment-like structure in the garage. She also said that she wanted defendant to leave.
When Deputy Helle knocked on the garage door and announced his presence, defendant did not immediately open the door. Deputy Helle could hear defendant yelling but could not make out what he was saying. After a short delay, defendant opened the door and complied with Deputy Helle's request to step outside. However, because defendant was acting agitated and took "somewhat of a bladed stance," Deputy Helle detained him in handcuffs.
After placing defendant in the back of his patrol vehicle, Deputy Helle conducted a probation search of the apartment-like structure within the garage. During the search, he found a box of ammunition on a shelf in a doorless closet.
When asked at the suppression hearing if he knew whether defendant was on searchable probation at the time of the search, Deputy Helle testified that he was "under the knowledge" that defendant was subject to warrantless searches based on the information he received from dispatch. However, the parties subsequently stipulated that dispatch never advised Deputy Helle that defendant was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation. Deputy Helle further testified that he believed that a person on probation for burglary would likely be subject to warrantless searches but stated that he could not recall if he had ever come into contact with a person that was on probation for burglary. At the time of the search, Deputy Helle had only been a deputy sheriff for approximately three months.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the parties made arguments similar to those set forth in their written submissions. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court reasoned that Deputy Helle knew defendant was on probation prior to the search and believed it was likely that defendant was subject to warrantless searches because he was on probation for burglary.
On August 17, 2016, the parties agreed that the petition for revocation of probation in case No. 15F1243 would be "heard as a Court Trial concurrently [with] the Jury Trial in [case No. 16F3657]." On August 19, 2016, the trial court declared a mistrial in case No. 16F3657 after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Thereafter, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had violated his probation in case No. 15F1243 by unlawfully possessing ammunition in violation of section 30305, subdivision (a).
On August 30, 2016, defendant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)) in case No. 16F3657. On October 25, 2016, the court executed the previously imposed but suspended sentence of seven years in case No. 15F1243. The court also imposed a concurrent one-year sentence in case No. 16F3657.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. His request for a certificate of probable cause was granted.
DISCUSSION
I
The Motion to Suppress
Defendant contends that the warrantless search of his residence was unlawful because there was insufficient evidence to show the officer knew he was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation at the time of the search.
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is settled that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they come within an established exception to the warrant requirement. [Citation.] A search by police under an adult probationer's search condition comes within an exception. [Citation.]" (People v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184.) That exception is based on consent: A person who voluntarily accepts a grant of probation subject to a condition allowing warrantless searches has consented to such searches, and a "search conducted pursuant to a valid consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the search exceeds the scope of the consent." (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 605.) "[T]he exception is inapplicable[, however,] if police are unaware of the probation search condition at the time of a warrantless search." (Hoeninghaus, at p. 1184; see People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863 (Douglas) [because a search condition is not mandatory in every grant of probation, "in the case of probation searches, the officer must have some knowledge not just of the fact someone is on probation, but of the existence of a search clause broad enough to justify the search at issue"].)
In an analogous situation, Douglas held that an officer's belief that an individual who he detained and searched was on post-release community supervision making him subject to search without a warrant had to be "objectively reasonable," that is, would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the person searched was on post-relief community supervision. (Douglas, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 869-870.) "Adapting an objectively reasonable belief standard to the present context, the question becomes whether, judged against an objective standard, the facts available to Detective Bailey at the moment he detained Douglas would have warranted an officer of reasonable caution to believe Douglas was on PRCS." (Id. at p. 868.) We are of the opinion the same standard should apply here.
In this case, we are asked to decide if Deputy Helle's correct belief that defendant was on searchable probation was objectively reasonable. It is undisputed that Deputy Helle knew defendant was on probation prior to the warrantless search; the only issue here is whether his claimed knowledge that defendant was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation--although true--was objectively reasonable.
"[W]hether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted . . . ." (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 332.) " '[A]lmost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the [United States Supreme] Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.' " (Id. at p. 334.) Thus, the pertinent question here is whether, judged against an objective standard, the facts available to Deputy Helle at the moment he searched defendant's residence would have warranted a belief that defendant was on searchable probation. (Douglas, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 868, 870.)
In evaluating a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to that court's factual findings, express or implied, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924.) We then exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Ibid.)
Here, it was not enough for Deputy Helle simply to know defendant was on probation in order for Helle to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's residence; rather, Deputy Helle had to have knowledge of facts that gave him an objectively reasonable basis for believing the terms of defendant's probation included a warrantless search condition.
On this record, we conclude Deputy Helle did not have an objectively reasonable belief that defendant was on searchable probation at the time of the search. Deputy Helle's claimed knowledge of the search condition was based solely on his erroneous belief that a defendant on probation for burglary would likely be subject to warrantless searches. In the absence of evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that Deputy Helle's belief in the existence of the search condition was objectively reasonable, the People failed to establish that the warrantless search was justified as a probation search. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand the case with instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his no contest plea in case No. 16F3657, to vacate the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress, to enter a new order granting the motion to suppress, and for further proceedings as appropriate.
II
The Probation Revocation Proceedings
Defendant contends that the order revoking his probation in case No. 15F1243 must be reversed because the trial court erroneously relied on evidence obtained during the unlawful search in finding he violated his probation.
"[I]n 1982, the California voters passed Proposition 8. Proposition 8 enacted article I, section 28 of the California Constitution, which provides in relevant part: 'Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings . . . .' " (People v. Lazlo (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069 (Lazlo), quoting Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f), par. (2).) "Our Supreme Court has observed that Proposition 8 'was intended to permit [the] exclusion of relevant, but unlawfully obtained evidence, only if exclusion is required by the United States Constitution. . . .' " (Lazlo, at p. 1069, quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890.)
"Under federal constitutional principles, the search of [defendant's residence] may have violated the Fourth Amendment, but the evidence obtained is nonetheless admissible to establish a probation violation. 'The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is enforceable against the states as a component of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of due process of law [citation], provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." ' [Citation.] However, the United States Supreme Court has 'emphasized repeatedly that the government's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution. [Citations.] Rather, a Fourth Amendment violation is " 'fully accomplished' " by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding can " 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.' " [Citation.] The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures. [Citation.] As such, the rule does not "proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons," [citation], but applies only in contexts "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," [citations]. Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, [the United States Supreme Court has] held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs." [Citation.]' [Citation.] In recognition of these costs, the United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.' [Citation.]
"The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation hearings but has refused to extend the rule to parole revocation proceedings. [Citation.] But . . . the lower federal and California courts have specifically held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation hearings, unless the police conduct at issue shocks the conscience. [Citations.]" (Lazlo, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1069-1070; see, e.g., People v. Racklin (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 872, 878-879; People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 811; People v. Nixon (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 687, 691, 693-694; United States v. Vandemark (9th Cir. 1975) 522 F.2d 1019, 1020.)
Here, defendant does not argue that the police conduct at issue was so egregious as to shock the conscience. Thus, he does not maintain that the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful warrantless search should have been excluded at the probation revocation hearing pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Instead, he argues, as the defendant unsuccessfully argued in Lazlo, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pages 1067-1068, that the trial court was prohibited from relying on the evidence obtained during the unlawful search under section 1538.5, subdivision (d) and People v. Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673. Defendant maintains that Lazlo was wrongly decided. We disagree.
Having reviewed Lazlo, we find the decision well reasoned and follow it here. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in considering the evidence obtained during the unlawful search in finding that defendant had violated his probation. Because we find no error by the trial court, we will not address the People's harmless error argument.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part. The trial court shall allow defendant to withdraw his no contest plea in case No. 16F3657, vacate the order denying the motion to suppress, enter a new order granting the motion to suppress, and conduct further proceedings as appropriate. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HULL, J. We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J. BUTZ, J.