That subsection was added when an issue arose as to whether an Illinois trial court had authority to direct that an Illinois sentence run concurrently with a sentence imposed by the court of another state. In People v. Matthews, 17 Ill. App. 3d 395, 398, 308 N.E.2d 230, 232 (1974), the First District Appellate Court held the answer to that question was no; instead, concurrent sentencing under the then-applicable statutory provision (a precursor to section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code) was authorized only with other Illinois sentences or with previously imposed federal sentences. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 1-7(m)(n).

Petitioner, James B. Matthews, appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition filed under the provisions of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.). The appellate court affirmed ( 17 Ill. App.3d 395), and we allowed petitioner's petition for leave to appeal. The facts are adequately reviewed in the opinion of the appellate court and will be restated here only to the extent necessary to the discussion of the issues. Petitioner was arrested in Chicago on December 25, 1964, and charged with armed robbery.

In the case at bar, the State's Attorney, although not objecting to the defendant's statement that he would serve his time in a Federal correctional institution, did not encourage the defendant's belief by indicating the defendant's remark, if it related to his place of imprisonment in this case, was true. (Compare People v. Wadlington (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1072, 1078.) Furthermore, given the facts (1) that the defendant acknowledged that no Federal charges were currently pending against him, (2) that the court admonished the defendant that it would sentence him to 18 years in the Department of Corrections (see People v. Matthews (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 395, 400, aff'd (1975), 60 Ill.2d 123) and (3) that it then sentenced him to the Illinois Department of Corrections, the defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the plea, when judged by objective standards, justified his mistaken impression regarding the place of imprisonment. We note also that that part of the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea that related to the question of incarceration in a Federal penitentiary is based totally on bare, unsupported allegations regarding a discussion with an FBI agent.

• 1 It is well settled that habeas corpus is not an available remedy to review errors of a nonjurisdictional nature, but it has been employed where the original judgment was totally void or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the conviction which entitles the defendant to immediate release. ( People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill.2d 58; People ex rel. Kelley v. Frye, 41 Ill.2d 287; People v. Matthews, 17 Ill. App.3d 395.) In the instant case the petitioner apparently alleges that the refusal of the Department of Corrections to give him credit for time served in the Federal penitentiary as ordered by the trial court constitutes an act entitling him to release.

OPINION • 1 Petitioner first contends that subsections (m) and (n) of section 1-7 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 1-7(m), (n)) should be construed to allow a trial judge to give a sentence to run concurrently with a sentence imposed by a court of another State. Respondent argues that the statute authorizes no such power and refers this court to People v. Matthews, 17 Ill. App.3d 395, 398-399, 308 N.E.2d 230. The court in Matthews was presented only with this question of statutory construction and found: Affirmed at 60 Ill.2d 123, 324 N.E.2d 396.