Opinion
08020145.
Decided December 11, 2009.
Amanda Balling, Esq., Assistant District Attorney.
Silvia Lopez, Esq. Assistant Public Defender.
The defendant was charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 4th Degree, P.L. 265.01 and Menacing in the 2nd Degree, P.L. 120.14(1) by a Prosecutor's Information dated March 19, 2008. The charges stem from an incident occurring on February 9, 2008 in the Village of Webster. The case was set down for a jury trial commencing on September 11, 2009. At the conclusion of the People's case defense counsel made a motion for a trial order of dismissal, pursuant to C.P.L. 290.10(1) and C.P.L. 360.40. The court reserved on said motion. At the conclusion of the defendant's case defense counsel renewed her said motion. The court again reserved on said motion and sent the case to the jury for its deliberation. After deliberating the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges. Defense counsel then made a motion to set aside the verdict, pursuant to C.P.L. 330.30(1). The court reserved on said motion, giving the attorneys an opportunity to submit briefs on the motions in question.
The defendant was originally charged with the Class D felony of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 3rd Degree, P.L. 265.02(1) and Menacing in the 2nd Degree, P.L. 120.14(1). The matter was waived to the Monroe County Grand Jury on February 20, 2008. The case was returned to Webster Town Court via the said prosecutor's information.
Legal Analysis.
A. Trial Order of dismissal.
Criminal Procedure Law Section 290.10(1) states in pertinent part as follows:
"At the conclusion of the people's case or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may, except as provided in subdivision two, upon motion of the defendant, (a) issue a trial order of dismissal,' dismissing any count of an indictment upon the ground that the trial evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense, or (b) reserve decision on the motion until after the verdict has been rendered and accepted by the court."
The court must determine if the evidence presented by the people is legally sufficient to establish the charge or any lesser included offense. In other words ". . . it seeks to end the trial at the close of the prosecution's case on the grounds that the proof fails to establish a prima facie case." Muldoon, Handling a Criminal Case in New York,, Section 18:339. "In evaluating this motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the People with the review limited solely to the legal sufficiency of the evidence as defined in CPL 70.10(1) ( see, People v. Singh, 191 AD2d 731, 595 N.Y.S.2d 510, lv. denied 81 NY2d 1020, 600 N.Y.S.2d 208, 616 N.E.2d 865)." People v. Beecher (1996) 225 AD2d 943, 944, 639 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865. A trial order of dismissal should not be granted on the ground that the people failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. In a jury trial that determination is one for the jury. Holtzman v. Bonomo (1983) 93 AD2d 574, 462 N.Y.S.2d 690. See also Muldoon, Handling a Criminal Case in New York, Section 18:341.
(i) Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 4th Degree, P.L. 265.01. The model charge
as set out in CTJNY Section 83:13 sets out four elements of the charge of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 4th Degree as same pertains to this case, i.e. (1) That the defendant possessed an object; (2) That the object possessed was a firearm; (3) That the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; and (4) That the firearm was operable.
The people's first witness Giovanni Novelli testified that he was in an altercation with the defendant outside the Coach Bar in the Village of Webster. That he had held onto the defendant to prevent an altercation between the defendant and another individual. That upon releasing the defendant he heard him say "I'm going to get a gun". That witness testified to seeing the defendant come back to the scene with an object in his hand. The object was identified by Giovanni Novelli as a firearm, i.e. a handgun. Lastly, the people presented as a witness, Eric Freemesser of the Monroe County Public Safety Laboratory, who testified that the gun in question was operable.
Whether or not the elements of the charge were established beyond a reasonable doubt is not before the court for purposes of the motion for a trial order of dismissal. Instead the court must determine if the people presented "legally sufficient evidence'" as defined by C.P.L. 70.10(1). In other words the court must determine if the evidence presented established a prime facie case.A review of the evidence presented by the people in a light most favorable to the prosecution would require the court to determine that the evidence was in fact legally sufficient to establish the charge of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 4th Degree, P.L. 265.01. As a result, the defendant's motion for a trial order of dismissal of this charge is hereby denied.
C.P.L. 70.10(1) states that "Legally sufficient evidence'" means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof; except that such evidence is not legally sufficient when corroboration required by law is absent.
(ii) Menacing in the 2nd Degree, P.L. 120.14(1). The model charge as set out in CTJNY Section 54:2 sets out three elements of the charge of Menacing in the Second Degree., i.e. (1) That the defendant displayed a firearm; (2) That the display of such weapon placed the victim in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death; (3) That the defendant intentionally placed or attempted to place the victim in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death.
The people presented evidence that the defendant displayed a handgun. The testimony was that the defendant intentionally pointed that handgun at a victim, namely Giovanni Novelli. The victim testified credibly that when the defendant pointed the gun at him he was in fear of his life. Again, in order to survive a motion for a trial order of dismissal, the people need not establish their case beyond a reasonable doubt as defined by C.P.L. 70.10(2). Instead the motion must be denied if the court determines that the evidence was legally sufficient. The evidence presented was legally sufficient as set out in C.P.L. 70.10(1) to establish the charge of Menacing in Second Degree, P.L. 120.14(1). Thus the defendant's trial order of dismissal relative to this charge is hereby dismissed.
Ibid.
B. Motion to Set Aside Verdict. Criminal Procedure Law Section 330.30 sets out the grounds for the granting of a motion to set aside a jury verdict.
(i) C.P.L. 330.30(1).
C.P.L. 330.30(1) states as follows:
"At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict or any part thereof upon the following grounds: Any ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court."
However, a motion to set aside a verdict would not be permitted if it is based solely on the weight of evidence. People v. Garcia (2000) 272 A.D.189, 707 N.Y.S.441. Instead, an order granting such a motion under this subsection could only be granted if the evidence was not legally sufficient as defined by C.P.L. 70.10(1). Ibid at 189, 442.
(ii) C.P.L. 330.30(2).
An order to set aside a verdict pursuant to this subsection could be granted only upon a showing of some misconduct outside the presence of the court, that substantially affected a substantial right of the defendant, unknown to the defendant before the jury rendered its verdict.
The defense has not made any allegations relative any issues of misconduct.
(iii) C.P.L. 330.30(3).
An order to set aside a verdict pursuant to this subsection could be granted only upon a showing that new evidence was discovered after trial, that the defendant would not have reasonably been able to discover that evidence prior to the completion of the trial and that the evidence was of such a nature that if presented to the jury it would be probable that the verdict would have been in the defendant's favor. Peoplev. Rivera (1986) 119 AD2d 517, 501 N.Y.S.2d 38. The defense has not made any allegations of any new evidence in this case.
As previously indicated, the evidence presented by the people in support of the charges against the defendant was legally sufficient pursuant to C.P.L. 70.10(1) as it pertained to each and every element of the chargers of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 4th Degree, P.L. 265.01 and Menacing in the 2nd Degree, P.L. 120.14(1). Therefore, the defendant's motion to set aside the verdicts rendered by the jury in this matter, pursuant to C.P.L. 330.30, is hereby denied.
The case is hereby restored to the disposition calender to set a time for sentencing after a review of a pre-sentence investigation. This constitutes the decision and order of this court.