That issue is whether Massarella's conviction of the felony of perjury in Illinois' courts violated the ex post facto clause of the Federal Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The facts of Massarella's case are recited in detail in People v. Massarella, 80 Ill.App.3d 552, 36 Ill.Dec. 16, 400 N.E.2d 436 (1979) cert. denied, Massarella v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 1077, 101 S.Ct. 855, 66 L.Ed.2d 799 (1981), and will be stated only briefly here. In 1973 an Illinois jury found Massarella guilty of conspiracy, theft, and one count of perjury.

The reason for the disparity is controlling. People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 400 N.E.2d 436, cert. denied (1981), 449 U.S. 1077, 66 L.Ed.2d 799, 101 S.Ct. 855. • 4 A disparity in sentencing of codefendants may be justified when the individual with whom the defendant's conduct is compared possessed a more serious criminal record or was a more active participant in the offense.

Defendant maintains that in the court's discussion of the lack of corroboration as to Matecki, it implied that there was sufficient corroboration of Cullotta's testimony as to Neumann to find defendant guilty. This indicated prejudice against him. A trial judge is under no duty to recuse himself because he presided at a prior trial of a codefendant or even because he presided at a prior trial of the defendant in the same cause. ( People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 400 N.E.2d 436, cert. denied (1981), 449 U.S. 1077, 66 L.Ed.2d 799, 101 S.Ct. 855.) Further, to be disqualifying, the alleged bias or prejudice of the trial court must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on a basis other than what the judge learned from the case.

See People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 54, 434 N.E.2d 1121; People v. Jackson (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 698, 708, 398 N.E.2d 959. • 2 Moreover, it is proper for a trial court to grant leniency in sentencing a defendant who by his plea ensured prompt and certain application of correctional measures to him, acknowledged his guilt and showed a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct, and cooperated in the successful prosecution of other offenders. ( People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 573, 400 N.E.2d 436.) It has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the trial court may properly take into consideration, when fixing a sentence, the defendant's willingness or refusal to cooperate with law enforcement officials investigating criminal activity in which he was a participant. (See Roberts v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 552, 63 L.Ed.2d 622, 100 S.Ct. 1358.)

87 Ill.2d R. 21(b). • 7 Defendant relies on the decision in People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 400 N.E.2d 436, to support his argument that the substitution denied him a fair trial. The court in Massarella stated that even if a motion for substitution of a judge is filed within the 10-day period required by the statute (Ill.

Moreover, the courts consistently recognized that in order for alleged bias or prejudice of a trial judge to trigger disqualification, it must have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and resulted in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. See People v. Butler, 137 Ill. App. 3d 704, 720 (1985); People v. Massarella, 80 Ill. App. 3d 552, 565 (1979). We presume that when the legislature adopted section 2-1001(a)(3) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3) (West 2006)) in its present form, it was aware of the case law construing the parallel provisions in section 114-5(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 114-5(d)).

For at least 30 years, the appellate court has held, in conformance with this court's direction that section 114-5(a) must be liberally construed ( Walker, 119 Ill.2d at 480-81), that a motion for substitution is timely filed if it is brought within 10 days of the date the defendant could be "charged with knowledge" that the judge at issue had been assigned to his case. People v. Lackland, 248 Ill. App.3d 426, 432 (1993) (defendant must be "clear or certain" that the judge had been assigned to his case); Williams, 217 Ill. App.3d at 795; People v. Redisi, 188 Ill. App.3d 797, 801 (1989); Aldridge, 101 Ill. App.3d at 184; People v. Oatis, 69 Ill. App.3d 736, 741 (1979); People v. Massarella, 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 563 (1979); People v. Thomas, 58 Ill. App.3d 460, 462 (1978); People v. Flowers, 47 Ill. App.3d 809 (1977); Ehrler, 114 Ill. App.2d at 176-77. To resolve the question presented in this appeal, i.e., whether defendant's substitution motion was timely filed, we must determine when, based upon the record presented, defendant could be "charged with knowledge" that Judge Pacey had been assigned to his case.

United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839, 843 (6th Cir 1992).See, e.g., United States v. Taliaferro, 979 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir 1992); United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839 (6th Cir 1992); Clement v. United States, 266 F.2d 397 (9th Cir), cert den 359 U.S. 985 (1959); Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (2d Cir), cert den 277 U.S. 590 (1928); People v. Russo, 439 Mich. 534, 487 N.W.2d 698 (1992); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 520 Pa. 165, 553 A.2d 897 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589, 524 N.E.2d 829 (1988); State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988); People v. Whitesell, 729 P.2d 985 (Colo 1986); People v. Callan, 174 Cal.App.3d 1101, 220 Cal.Rptr. 339 (1985); People v. Massarella, 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 400 N.E.2d 436 (1979) (all so holding). The majority misses the foregoing pivotal distinction and, instead, wrestles statutes of limitations into the realm of protections to which the rule against ex post facto laws applies. It does so by modifying the longstanding legal standard.

The fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a defendant on a previous occasion does not necessarily disqualify the judge from later sitting in judgment of the same defendant's claims. See People v. Vance (1979), 76 Ill.2d 171, 178; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill.2d 286, 310; People v. Beasley (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 301, 309; People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 552, 565. Thus, the fact that the trial judge had rejected defendant's claim of discrimination in jury selection on the basis of 1982 law does not by itself imply that the judge would hold a strong predisposition and would not fairly decide defendant's renewed claim on the basis of 1987 law.

See Bargeron, supra at 592 n. 1, citing People v. Smith, 171 Cal.App.3d 997 (1985) (prosecution was timely based on double extension of statute of limitations where each extension was effective before then applicable limitations period had run); People v. Whitesell, 729 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986) (amendment extending applicable statute of limitations applied to all offenses not time-barred as of its effective date); People v. Massarella, 80 Ill. App.3d 552 (1979) (legislature can extend statute of limitations as long as original has not expired), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); People v. Liebling, 36 Ill. App.3d 1073 (1976) (court held defendant could be prosecuted under the new statute of limitations because reclassification of crimes occurred before expiration of original statutes); and other cases cited. Prosecution of July, 1987, indictments alleging violations of G.L.c. 265, § 23, occurring on August 15, 1977, and February 15, 1979, is barred.