Opinion
March 23, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dufficy, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The arresting officers observed the defendant and his two companions peer into car windows in a motel parking lot, follow the complainant into the motel and flee from the motel minutes later. This, in conjunction with the statement from the complainant that he had just been robbed by three persons, provided the officers with probable cause to arrest the defendant. Thus, the hearing court did not err in denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was to suppress physical evidence and identification testimony on the basis that he was arrested without probable cause.
The jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bigelow, 106 A.D.2d 448). Although the complainant's testimony contained minor inconsistencies, its accuracy and credibility was primarily for the jury to determine (see, People v. Herriot, 110 A.D.2d 851; People v. Bigelow, supra), and there is no basis in the record at bar to warrant this court's interference with its determination.
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial on the basis that the jury was permitted to see the screwdriver which was allegedly recovered from the defendant at the time of his arrest but which was not admitted into evidence, since any prejudice suffered by the defendant was cured by the court's curative instruction to the jury. In any event, it appears that the People established an adequate predicate for the admission of the screwdriver into evidence (see, People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, cert denied 449 U.S. 1087; People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48; People v. Julian, 41 N.Y.2d 340).
The defendant's contention that his conviction of robbery in the first degree requires the dismissal of the remaining counts is without merit, since robbery in the second degree as defined in Penal Law § 160.10 (1), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree are not inclusory concurrent counts of robbery in the first degree as defined in Penal Law § 160.15 (3) (see, CPL 300.30; People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61; People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427; People v. Perez, 45 N.Y.2d 204; People v. Zada, 82 A.D.2d 926).
The sentence the defendant received was not unduly harsh or excessive and there are no extraordinary circumstances present which would warrant disturbance of the sentencing court's exercise of discretion (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have considered the remaining contentions raised by the defendant and his attorney and find them to be either unpreserved for our review or without merit. Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.