Opinion
1-22-0844
09-29-2023
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOVANNY MARTINEZ, Petitioner-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County 09 CR 11925 Honorable Maura Slattery Boyle, Judge Presiding
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ELLIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Vacated and remanded with instructions. Trial court erred in resentencing defendant as adult without permitting discretionary transfer hearing.
¶ 2 In this appeal, the State, after review, has agreed with defendant that error was committed below, and vacatur and remand is required. Both defendant and the State agree on the following:
1. Defendant, Jovanny Martinez, was convicted of first-degree murder and was 15 years old when he committed the murder; he was sentenced to 75 years in prison;
2. This court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded, because defendant received a de facto life sentence without the court having held a hearing consistent with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012);
3. By the time the matter was remanded for resentencing, a new statute had taken effect that no longer allowed automatic transfers to adult court for 15-year-olds accused of murder; under the new law, the State had to petition the court for a discretionary transfer;
4. Though defendant raised that issue at resentencing, the trial court did not permit any such hearing to take place and resentenced him, as an adult, to 33 years in prison;
5. Defendant argues, and the State agrees, that this was error, and the proper course is to remand the matter to permit the State, if it chooses, to petition to have defendant sentenced as an adult, at which point the court would conduct the discretionary hearing.
¶ 3 We concur with the parties and order just that relief.
¶ 4 BACKGROUND
¶ 5 We recite only the necessary facts to dispose of the issues here. The State charged defendant with multiple counts of first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated unlawful restraint, and concealment of a homicidal death in the death of Alex Arellano. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense, and since he had been charged with first-degree murder, he was automatically transferred to adult criminal court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2008). He was convicted and sentenced to 75 years in prison.
¶ 6 While his appeal was pending, the legislature changed the law on automatic transfers of 15-year-old defendants. Under the new statute, a 15-year-old accused of first-degree murder was not automatically transferred to adult court; the court could decide to transfer the matter if the State petitioned for such a transfer. People v. Martinez, 2018 IL App (1st) 132670-U, ¶¶ 1-18, 27; see Pub. Act 99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)).
¶ 7 On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence; we rejected that claim and affirmed the conviction. Martinez, 2018 IL App (1st) 132670-U, ¶¶ 24-25. Defendant also claimed that the change to the juvenile-sentencing statute should apply retroactively to him on appeal. We relied on a recent decision of our supreme court, with the same facts as ours, that held that this law did not apply to defendants whose convictions were on appeal. See People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶¶ 32-33. The supreme court in Hunter held that the new law would apply retroactively to any defendant whose trial proceedings had yet to conclude, but not to those defendants, like Hunter, whose trial proceedings had concluded and had advanced to appeal. Id. ¶¶ 30-33. Our defendant was in the same situation as Hunter.
¶ 8 But we agreed with defendant that, before it sentenced him, the court did not make an adequate inquiry into "defendant's immaturity, impetuosity, failure to appreciate risks and consequences, or susceptibility to peer pressure and other negative influences." Id. ¶ 65. Since such an inquiry was necessary before sentencing a 15-year-old to a de facto life sentence (see Miller, 567 U.S. at 477), we vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Martinez, 2018 IL App (1st) 132670-U, ¶¶ 64-74.
¶ 9 On remand, defendant filed a motion in the trial court arguing that the recent amendments to the Juvenile Court Act that transformed a 15-year-old's automatic transfer into a discretionary one should apply, because the trial proceedings had been reopened-he was being resentenced. The trial court saw nothing in our mandate that ordered the court to order a discretionary transfer hearing or to treat defendant as a juvenile; thus the court resentenced him, as an adult, to 33 years in prison, after conducting a Miller hearing.
¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Defendant's argument on appeal is rather straightforward. Once his case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing, it was no longer true that his trial proceedings had concluded, for a conviction is not final until after sentencing. See People v. Vara, 2018 IL 121823, ¶ 14; People v. Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 70; People v. Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶ 20. Thus, the amendments to the juvenile-sentencing law did, in fact, apply to him when he was back in the circuit court for resentencing, though they did not while he was on appeal. See People ex rel. Howard v. Alvarez, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28 (amended section 5-130 applied to cases pending in circuit court); Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 70; Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶ 22 (amended section 5-130 applied to sentencing hearing held after amendment became law).
¶ 12 As the State notes, this case has the same relevant facts as Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533. Clark was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes he committed when he was 15. Id. ¶ 1. Before Clark's sentencing (though after his conviction), the new change to the juvenile-sentencing law went into effect. Id. ¶ 51. But the trial court did not apply the new law and sentenced Clark as an adult to 18 years in prison. Id. ¶ 67. We reversed, finding the amendment to the juvenile-sentencing applicable, because the trial court proceedings had not yet concluded; they would not be deemed concluded until sentencing was concluded. Id. ¶ 70 (citing Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶¶ 20, 31).
¶ 13 We agree with both parties that the same result should obtain here. As the State puts it, "the present case is identical to Clark and the same result should apply here." Defendant should not have been automatically resentenced as an adult.
¶ 14 But there is a twist-fortunately the same twist as in Clark: defendant here is now older than 21 and can no longer be under the authority of the Juvenile Court Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5755 (West 2018) (proceedings under Act automatically terminate when minor turns 21 years old); Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 77.
¶ 15 The same was true of Clark at the time of his sentencing. See Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 77. The court in Clark noted, however, that "a case that had been tried in the [adult] circuit court could feasibly be transferred to juvenile court for sentencing." Id. ¶ 71.
¶ 16 The court relied on our supreme court's decision in People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, which dealt with a similar issue. Fort, who was 16 at the time of his crime, was charged with first-degree murder, spawning an automatic transfer to adult court, but was convicted only of second-degree murder. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. The problem was that second-degree murder is not a crime for which a transfer to adult court was automatic. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Our supreme court agreed with defendant that he was unlawfully sentenced as an adult. Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 17 But like here and Clark, Fort was now over 21 years old. Id. ¶ 41. The supreme court ordered the following remedy:
"the proper resolution is to remand the cause to the trial court with directions to vacate defendant's sentence and allow the State to file a petition requesting a hearing for adult sentencing pursuant to section 5-130(1)(c)(ii). Should the trial court find after the hearing that defendant is not subject to adult sentencing, the proper remedy is to discharge the proceedings against defendant since he is now over 21 years of age and is no longer eligible to be committed as a juvenile under the Act." Id.
¶ 18 The court in Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 82, noted that, as in Fort, the State had never had the opportunity before the trial court to petition for adult sentencing under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act. The court thus ordered a remand for resentencing that gave the State an opportunity to file that petition. Id. The court then ordered, as did the supreme court in Fort, that," '[s]hould the trial court find after the hearing that defendant is not subject to adult sentencing, the proper remedy is to discharge the proceedings against defendant since he is now over 21 years of age and is no longer eligible to be committed as a juvenile under the Act.'" Id. ¶ 84 (quoting Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 41).
¶ 19 As the State agrees, our case is indistinguishable from Clark. We thus enter the same order with the agreement of the parties: Defendant's sentence is vacated. On remand, the State should be given an opportunity to petition under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) to have defendant sentenced as an adult. If it does not do so, or if the court determines that defendant is not subject to adult sentencing, the proper remedy is to discharge defendant, as he is over 21 years of age. ¶ 20 Given our resolution, we need not consider defendant's argument that his sentence was excessive. Nor will we consider defendant's one-sentence request, at the close of his brief, for a new sentencing judge on remand. Absent any real argument in the opening brief, that question is forfeited. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) (points not argued in opening brief are forfeited); BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 23.
¶ 21 CONCLUSION
¶ 22 The judgment of the circuit court is vacated. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
¶ 23 Vacated and remanded with instructions.