Opinion
03-08-2017
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Anthony MARTINEZ, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, NY (David P. Greenberg of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Avshalom Yotam of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, NY (David P. Greenberg of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Avshalom Yotam of counsel), for respondent.
L. PRISCILLA HALL, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, and VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Firetog, J.), rendered June 10, 2014, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Evidence of uncharged crimes is not admissible if offered only to raise an inference that a defendant is of a criminal disposition (see People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263 ). Nonetheless, evidence of uncharged crimes may be admitted to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish, inter alia, "(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; [or] (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial" (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286 ; see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59 ). "[T]he decision whether to admit evidence of defendant's prior bad acts rests upon the trial court's discretionary balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice" (People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d at 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263 ).
Here, a witness's testimony that the defendant had committed a prior, uncharged crime was improperly admitted by the trial court (see People v. Scaringe, 137 A.D.3d 1409, 27 N.Y.S.3d 712 ; People v. Wright, 121 A.D.3d 924, 994 N.Y.S.2d 396 ). Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was not so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial (see People v. Abdul–Aleem, 133 A.D.3d 867, 20 N.Y.S.3d 153 ), and any other error in this regard was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, and no significant probability that any error contributed to the defendant's convictions (see People v. Scaringe, 137 A.D.3d 1409, 27 N.Y.S.3d 712 ; People v. Bounds, 100 A.D.3d 1523, 954 N.Y.S.2d 321 ; People v. McCarthy, 293 A.D.2d 490, 740 N.Y.S.2d 381 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).