¶ 15 But "[a] suspect's request for the assistance of counsel is not irrevocable." People v. Martinez , 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990). In Edwards , the Supreme Court held that a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel must not be "subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."
It is long settled that if a defendant makes an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel, the request must be scrupulously honored and no further questioning can occur until either a lawyer is provided for the accused or the accused voluntarily reinitiates the questioning. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990). For a suspect to reinitiate a conversation, his comments must "`evince [] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,' and not merely question the reasons for custody."
Even so, a defendant may waive his previously invoked rights by reinitiating the conversation with police. People v. Martinez , 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990) (a request for counsel isn't "irrevocable"). ¶ 17 In considering whether police stopped interrogating the suspect, we must keep in mind what, exactly, interrogation means in this context.
The trial court concluded that the defendant initiated the November 24th meeting and that Corporal Hartley did not ask any questions at that meeting. It also determined that although Hartley initiated the conversations after that date, nothing which pertained to the defendant's alleged crime was said at those meetings. Applying the analysis of People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1990), it concluded that although Ross had initiated the first meeting, the evidence was insufficient to show a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of the right to counsel. Thus it ruled that the information obtained from the defendant on November 24th was obtained in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, and the trial court also suppressed any statements which Ross made subsequent to the conversation of November 24th. Ross now argues that admitting the statements would violate his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality op.); id. at 1052-54 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-86 n, 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880; see People v. Redgebol, 184 P.3d 86, 99 (Colo. 2008); People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990). To open the door to further questioning, the suspect's statements must "'evince[] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,' and not merely question the reasons for custody."
A suspect may later rescind the decision if he initiated further communication. People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420.With these cases in minds [sic], the Court turns to the totality of the circumstances and the objective standard that is required of officers in Detective Bjorndahl's position.
For a suspect to reinitiate questioning, his comments must "'evince[] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,' and not merely question the reasons for custody." People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (noting that "routine incidents of the custodial relationship," such as a request to use a telephone, do not constitute reinitiation of communications)). Therefore, if the "suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities," he may revoke his previous request for counsel.
For a suspect to reinitiate questioning, his comments must " ‘evince[ ] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,’ and not merely question the reasons for custody." People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (noting that "routine incidents of the custodial relationship," such as a request to use a telephone, do not constitute reinitiation of communications)). Therefore, if the "suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities," he may revoke his previous request for counsel.
See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1991) ("[I]t is critical that the trial court, in making its findings, expressly resolve on the record the contested factual issues."); People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 423 (Colo. 1990) ("The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . lack the specificity that would enable us to make a proper determination of the constitutional issues in this case without invading the fact-finding province of the trial court."). Accordingly, because the trial court's findings are insufficient for appellate review, we reverse the trial court's order suppressing the defendant's pre-Miranda statements and remand for further findings on this issue.
1990), it is critical that the trial court, in making its findings, expressly resolve on the record the contested factual issues. People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 423 (Colo. 1990). A trial court also is obliged to apply the correct legal standard to its factual findings in resolving a suppression motion.