Harrison, the first of these cases, set forth the argument and the other three cases merely deferred to its authority in their computations of the 60-day period. Harrison, in turn, relied on the two earlier cases of People v. Peter, supra, 20 Cal.App. 151, 152 [ 128 P. 415], and People v. Martinelli (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 96-97 [ 257 P.2d 37]. For the latter group of cases, see footnote 8, infra.
" ( People v. Martinez, 88 Cal.App.2d 767, 774 [ 199 P.2d 375].) Accord: People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 96 [ 257 P.2d 37]. [6] The judgment of conviction is attended by a strong presumption of validity.
( People v. Newell (1923) 192 Cal. 659, 669 [5] [ 221 P. 622].) It is too late to raise the point for the first time on appeal ( People v. Sylvia (1960) 54 Cal.2d 115, 123 [9] [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 509, 351 P.2d 781]; People v. Jordan (1955) 45 Cal.2d 697, 708 [16] [ 290 P.2d 484]; People v. Mitman (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 685, 689 [1] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 712]); nor may it be raised for the first time by a petition for habeas corpus after judgment of conviction ( In re Anderson (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 552 [ 285 P.2d 690]; In re Todd (1919) 44 Cal.App. 496, 502 [4] — 503 [6] [ 186 P. 790]) or by an application for writ of error coram nobis ( People v. Martinelli (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [4] [ 257 P.2d 37], followed in People v. Jackson (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 183, 185 [2] [ 331 P.2d 981]). [6] The right to a speedy trial, furthermore, will be deemed waived unless the defendant both objects to the date set and thereafter files a timely motion to dismiss.
The defendant legally may not complain of fortuitous incidents of a delay to which he has agreed. The reasons which foreclose a defendant from complaining because he was not tried within the time required by law when he has consented to the delay ( People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 96 [ 257 P.2d 37]), from asserting errors occurring in the course of his trial that were invited by him ( People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 722 [ 172 P.2d 18]; People v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3, 9 [43 P. 198]), or from claiming that he was deprived of a fair trial by circumstances of his own making ( People v. Simmons, supra, 28 Cal.2d 699, 722; People v. Miller, 185 Cal.App.2d ___ [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 91]), analogously foreclose a defendant who consents to a delay in securing the name of an informer from complaining of the incidents of such a delay. The defendant claims that his conviction of the possession charge is not supported by legal evidence, in that the only proof thereof was obtained through an unlawful search of his residence.
In any event, if a non-speedy sentencing does assume that stature, the post-appeal-time remedy for that type of irregularity generally approved by appellate decisions is a petition for writ of habeas corpus ( In re Perez, 65 Cal.2d 224, 229 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6]; In re Cruz, 64 Cal.2d 178, 179 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 289, 410 P.2d 825]; In re Boyce, 51 Cal.2d 699, 700-701 [ 336 P.2d 164]; see also 2 Cal. Criminal Law Practice (Cont. Ed. Bar (1969)), § 21.7, pp. 357-358), and not a petition for writ of error coram nobis ( People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [ 257 P.2d 37]) to which, it has been held, a motion to vacate judgment is akin. Irregularity in the procedure leading to and involved in the pronouncement of judgment is not cognizable under coram nobis.
In view of the fact that the judge who passed on the petition for coram nobis relief was the same judge who made such order, we must assume that he knew that defendant was rejected and the basis for such rejection. (See People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 98 [ 257 P.2d 37].) Aside from the foregoing allegations, defendant has not alleged with particularity any facts meriting relief on the ground of an induced plea.
The court then continued the case to May 23. Six days of the delay were chargeable to defendant who had, on March 11, requested that his plea be continued to March 17. ( People v. Burch, 196 Cal.App.2d 754, 761-762 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 102] ; People v. Harrison, 182 Cal.App.2d 758 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 345] ; People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 96 [ 257 P.2d 37].) Trial to a jury actually started on May 24.
It is further clear that the court need not believe all the allegations or affidavits even if they are uncontradicted. ( People v. Tannehill, 193 Cal.App.2d 701, 705 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 615] ; People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 98 [ 257 P.2d 37].) In conclusion, the appellant has set forth no allegations which can be presented on coram nobis.
As is said in People v. Ayala, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 243, 249-250: "This matter of inadequate representation is not properly raised in coram nobis ( People v. Martinelli, supra, p. 98 [ 118 Cal.App.2d 94 ( 257 P.2d 37)]); it is likewise true of the specific claim of being forced or defrauded into entering a plea of guilty that it cannot be entertained unless it appears that the district attorney or other prosecuting official was a party to the same. `Where the defendant's attorney makes the fraudulent representation, the rule is contrary to that which prevails when the misrepresentation is made by the prosecution.
[3] Neither the trial court nor the appellate court is required to accept at face value the allegations of the petition even though the petition be verified and uncontradicted. ( People v. Cole, supra, 152 Cal.App.2d 71, 74; People v. Fritz, supra, 140 Cal.App.2d 618, 621; People v. Martinelli, 118 Cal.App.2d 94, 98 [ 257 P.2d 37].) [4] The discovery of new evidence affords no ground for the issuance of the writ. ( People v. Krout, 90 Cal.App.2d 205, 208 [ 202 P.2d 635]; People v. Knight, 73 Cal.App.2d 532, 535 [ 166 P.2d 899].)