Opinion
October 26, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pitaro, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The decision as to whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the sentencing court (see, CPL 220.60; People v Brownlee, 158 A.D.2d 610; People v Rodriguez, 150 A.D.2d 812). The court entertaining the motion must exercise discretion in affording a defendant a reasonable opportunity to advance the claims from which a determination can be made (see, People v Brown, 142 A.D.2d 683).
In the instant case, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily admitted his guilt in a thorough and complete allocution. He twice indicated that he was entering into the plea voluntarily, stated that no one had forced or coerced him to plead guilty, and averred that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact the perpetrator of the crimes. The defendant indicated satisfaction with his counsel and was fully apprised of his rights (see, People v Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9). Since the court had the defendant's motion papers before it and afforded the defendant ample opportunity to orally set forth his assertions of fear of reprisals prior to the imposition of sentence, we find that the court properly denied the defendant's motion and that a hearing was not necessary even though he made this application in a timely fashion (see, People v McClain, 32 N.Y.2d 697). Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Miller, Copertino and Santucci, JJ., concur.