People v. Martin

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wesley

    73 N.Y.2d 351 (N.Y. 1989)   Cited 260 times
    In Wesley, the Court of Appeals refused to extend Millan to criminal possession charges arising out of ordinary constructive possession alone (People v Wesley, supra, at 363; see, People v Tejada, supra, at 863).

    Applying the rule set forth in Millan and Mosley, the courts of this State have uniformly allowed defendants charged with constructive possession of an item, based on possessory control over an area, to challenge the legality of the search of that area (see, People v Wesley, 139 A.D.2d 946 [4th Dept]; People v Hicks, 138 A.D.2d 519, 520 [1st Dept]; People v Knight, 138 A.D.2d 294, 296 [1st Dept]; People v Collins, 137 A.D.2d 542, 545 [2d Dept]; People v Giles, 137 A.D.2d 1, 4 [1st Dept]; People v Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355, 356 [1st Dept]; People v Fore, 131 A.D.2d 329, 330 [1st Dept]; People v Pagan, 138 Misc.2d 802, 803-805 [Sup Ct, Bronx County]; People v Martinez, 136 Misc.2d 665, 667-668 [Sup Ct, Queens County]; see also, People v Davis, 130 A.D.2d 268, 272 [1st Dept]; People v Ycasa, 140 Misc.2d 114, 120 [Crim Ct, N Y County]). No distinction has been made between constructive possession charges which are aided by a statutory presumption (see, e.g., Penal Law § 220.25, 265.15) and those which are not (see, e.g., People v Martin, supra, at 356; People v Ycasa, supra, at 120; People v Pagan, supra, at 803-804; and see, Preiser, Criminal Procedure, 39 Syr L Rev 237, 251-252 [1988]).

  2. People v. Neely

    219 A.D.2d 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 18 times

    The question of whether we remit or determine the matter ourselves involves a balancing of a number of factors, including the adequacy of the record, the scope of the hearing itself, the interest of judicial economy, and, of course, elemental considerations of fairness. The most obvious case for remittal is when the motion court summarily and improperly denies a suppression motion without a hearing (e.g., People v Youngblood, 210 A.D.2d 948 [motion to suppress physical evidence]; People v Williams, 182 A.D.2d 490 [motion to suppress identification testimony]; People v Ramos, 130 A.D.2d 439 [motion to suppress physical evidence]; People v Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355 [motion to suppress physical evidence]; People v Estrada, 147 A.D.2d 407 [motion to suppress confession]). Under those circumstances there are no facts to review, and the only question for us is whether the suppression motion was accompanied by sufficient allegations so as to justify a hearing (see, People v Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415; People v Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445). Another basis for remittal is when the Appellate Division cannot possibly make its own factual determinations based on the proceedings at the hearing level, because a record was not developed adequately for appellate review.

  3. People v. Coleman

    191 A.D.2d 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 9 times

    In affirming the summary denial of the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence, the majority, as did the majority which decided People v. Martinez ( 187 A.D.2d 310, lv granted 81 N.Y.2d 796), departs from established precedent in order to deny the defendant a hearing to which he is clearly entitled. The detailed affirmation submitted by defense counsel in support of the defendant's motion to suppress stated the grounds of the motion, and contained allegations of fact supporting such grounds in accordance with CPL 710.60 (1). It is well established that even a minimal factual showing is sufficient to warrant a hearing (see, e.g., People v. Sierra, 179 A.D.2d 601, lv dismissed 79 N.Y.2d 1054; People v. Miller, 162 A.D.2d 248, lv dismissed 76 N.Y.2d 895; People v. Huggins, 162 A.D.2d 129; People v. Harris, 160 A.D.2d 515, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 789; People v Acosta, 150 A.D.2d 166; People v. Marte, 149 A.D.2d 335; People v Estrada, 147 A.D.2d 407; People v. Jones, 136 A.D.2d 510; People v Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355; People v. Fore, 131 A.D.2d 329; People v Lee, 130 A.D.2d 400; People v. Patterson, 129 A.D.2d 527; People v Sutton, 91 A.D.2d 522). The appeals in the cases cited above were all held in abeyance, and the matters remitted for hearings, based on affidavits or affirmations no more detailed than the affirmation submitted in the instant case.

  4. People v. Stewart

    153 A.D.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    The defendant now appeals arguing that the court erred in determining that he lacked standing to challenge the legality of the search. Since the criminal charges arising from the confiscated narcotics were premised by the People upon the defendant's statutorily derived presumptive possession (see, Penal Law § 220.25), the hearing court erred in concluding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge their seizure (see, People v Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514; cf., People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351; People v. Rada, 141 Misc.2d 218, 220-224; see also, People v Hicks, 138 A.D.2d 519; People v. Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355). We note, however, that pursuant to the Court of Appeals recent determination in People v. Wesley (supra), the defendant was properly denied standing to challenge the seizure of the weapon and drug paraphernalia, inasmuch as there exists no statutory presumption with respect to the possession of these objects, and the defendant otherwise failed to establish the requisite privacy interest in the premises where the contraband was seized (cf.

  5. People v. Whitney

    149 A.D.2d 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    In the instant case, the relevant portion of the defendant's moving papers alleged that the complainant's identification testimony was tainted by an unduly suggestive pretrial procedure because the complainant was permitted to view him in a hospital emergency room where the complainant was being treated for injuries suffered in the assault charged and at the time of the viewing the defendant was handcuffed and surrounded by police officers. We conclude that the alleged facts, if true, might establish improper police conduct and were sufficient to warrant a hearing (see, People v. Daniels, 139 A.D.2d 478; People v Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355, 356). One-on-one showups which are proximate in time and place to the arrest of a suspect are permissible in the interest of prompt identification (see, People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023, 1024; People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 249; People v. Burns, 133 A.D.2d 642, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 873).

  6. People v. Estrada

    147 A.D.2d 407 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    Although the summary denial may have appeared efficient at the time, its ultimate consequence will be unnecessarily to delay the adjudication of defendant's case. If this were an isolated case it would not merit comment but we have on at least six previous occasions had to hold appeals in abeyance and remand for hearings upon suppression motions inappropriately denied by the same Judge. (See, People v Jones, 136 A.D.2d 510; People v Brown, 136 A.D.2d 510; People v Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355; People v Fore, 131 A.D.2d 329; People v Lee, supra; People v Patterson, 129 A.D.2d 527.) Concur — Murphy, P.J., Asch, Kassal and Wallach, JJ.

  7. People v. Martin

    141 A.D.2d 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)

    The order denying defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence without a hearing was reversed by us and the matter remanded for a hearing on the motion to suppress. Pending such hearing, we held this appeal in abeyance (see, People vMartin, 135 A.D.2d 355). After hearing, the Supreme Court, New York County (Allen Alpert, J.), in a decision and order rendered on April 21, 1988, granted defendant's suppression motion. Since the People indicate they will not appeal this order, we reverse the underlying judgment herein and dismiss the indictment.

  8. People v. Giles

    137 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)   Cited 7 times

    (People v Millan, supra, at 516.) Since defendant falls squarely within the Millan criteria, lack of standing does not bar his challenge to the police actions, and the merits of the suppression issue may be addressed. While it is our usual practice to remand cases in this post- Millan posture for a hearing (see, e.g., People v Martin, 135 A.D.2d 355; People v Fore, supra), a review of the transcript reveals that facts sufficient to resolve the suppression issue were developed at trial. These facts, derived from testimony given for the prosecution by the three police officers involved in the stop and search of the taxicab, so favor suppression that we exercise our fact-finding power in the interest of justice and judicial economy (see, CPL 470.15, [6]; People v Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 536; People v Kidd, 76 A.D.2d 665, 667, lv dismissed 51 N.Y.2d 882) and conclude that defendant's motion must be granted and the indictment dismissed.