Opinion
A169607
09-26-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUSTAVO GOMEZ MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR968494)
Petrou, J.
After the trial court denied Gustavo Gomez Martin's motion to suppress evidence found in a consensual search of his car during a traffic stop, he pled no contest to two drug offenses. Martin challenges the denial of the motion to suppress, arguing the traffic stop was not justified because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he violated the Vehicle Code. We affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 26, 2023, Deputy Andres Fernandez with the Lake County Sheriff's Office conducted a traffic stop of Martin's car based on suspected violations of the Vehicle Code. Specifically, the front passenger side window appeared tinted, in violation of section 26708, subdivision (a)(2), and the reflective coating on the rear license plate appeared damaged, in violation of former section 5201.1, subdivision (c).
At all times relevant to this appeal, section 5201.1 stated: "A person shall not erase the reflective coating of, paint over the reflective coating of, or alter a license plate to avoid visual or electronic capture of the license plate or its characters by state or local law enforcement." (Former § 5201.1, subd. (c), amended by Assem. Bill No. 2111, Stats. 2024, ch. 59, § 1.) The statute was amended in July 2024 to remove "by state or local law enforcement." (See ibid.) We consider only the version in effect at the time of the proceedings in this case for purposes of this appeal.
Upon questioning by Deputy Fernandez, Martin admitted he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest from Sonoma County. Martin consented to a search of his car, during which Deputy Fernandez found suspected methamphetamine, suspected cocaine, a digital scale, suspected methamphetamine paraphernalia, and brass knuckles. Martin was arrested on the outstanding warrant.
On November 1, 2023, an information was filed charging Martin with possession for sale of cocaine (Health &Saf. Code, § 11351); transporting cocaine (id., § 11352, subd. (a)); possession for sale of methamphetamine (id., § 11378); transporting methamphetamine (id., § 11379, subd. (a)); and possession of metal knuckles (Pen. Code, § 21810).
Motion to Suppress and Hearing
Martin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the vehicle search and other information obtained during the traffic stop, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and the Fourth Amendment. The motion was premised on Martin's assertion that Deputy Fernandez did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based on the alleged Vehicle Code violations.
On November 7, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, where the only issue Martin challenged was the legality of the traffic stop. The evidence at the hearing, which is not in dispute, was as follows.
At around 2:00 p.m. on the day of the traffic stop, Deputy Fernandez was on patrol on the side of the road when a BMW sedan passed him. The BMW caught his attention because he observed that the front passenger side window had a tint affixed to it, reducing his view of the interior such that he could not see the facial features of the occupants. He believed the tint violated section 26708.
Deputy Fernandez followed behind the BMW and observed that the reflective coating on the rear license plate was entirely removed, as was some of the paint, which obstructed his view of the plate. The reflective coating is a white, reflective paint that is placed on license plates when issued. Deputy Fernandez testified that, "[o]ver time or even purposely, people will remove it to avoid law enforcement detection or even camera detection when passing tolls or when officers are equipped with stolen vehicle devices on their vehicle."
Deputy Fernandez contacted dispatch to run the license plate on the BMW, but he ran the wrong plate because he incorrectly believed one of the letters was an "L" due to the damage to the plate. When the license plate he ran came back as an expired plate belonging to a Toyota, Deputy Fernandez became concerned the BMW was stolen or that the plate did not belong to it. He then initiated the traffic stop. As relevant to the lack of reflective coating on the license plate, he conducted the stop based on a suspected violation of former section 5201.1.
The mistaken "L" was in fact a "J".
During the stop, Deputy Fernandez took a photo of the rear license plate from behind the car. It was difficult for him to see the letters on the plate, even as he was standing still taking the photo. Deputy Fernandez testified that, when looking at the photo he took, there was "no indication" the reflective coating had been "purposefully removed," but it was "clearly removed." There was no testimony as to what evidence is necessary to establish the reflective coating was purposely removed.
Parties' Arguments and Trial Court's Ruling
The prosecution argued Deputy Fernandez had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop based on the license plate being damaged to the point that he could not get an accurate reading of the plate. The prosecution also argued the window tint provided a valid basis for conducting the stop.
Martin asserted the lack of reflective coating on the license plate alone was not sufficient to permit the traffic stop, arguing the statute requires willful conduct by a defendant to" 'erase'" the coating or" 'alter'" a plate to avoid visual electronic capture, but Deputy Fernandez had testified there was no indication the coating was purposefully removed. Martin further contended the window tint basis was unsupported.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It found the license plate was "clearly damaged to the point where [Deputy Fernandez] got the letter wrong." The court concluded that a stop under former section 5201.1 is permissible "when the reflective co[at]ing has been clearly damaged or altered," even without evidence that the damage or alteration was done willfully. The court distinguished between the showing necessary to conduct a traffic stop versus for a successful prosecution of the offense, suggesting that a "stop to do a brief detention and investigation of a potential violation" was permissible even if an officer does not yet know whether there was willful conduct.
The court denied the motion solely on the license plate basis; as to the window tint basis, it found there was no testimony presented as to how dark the window tint was or whether it fell within the permissible amount of tint under the statute.
Plea and Sentencing
On December 8, 2023, pursuant to a plea agreement, Martin pled no contest to possession for sale of cocaine (Health &Saf. Code, § 11351) and possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health &Saf. Code, § 11378), and the prosecution dismissed the remainder of the information.
On January 8, 2024, and in accordance with the negotiated plea, the trial court sentenced Martin to a total of three years and eight months in county jail. Martin appealed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Discussion
Martin contends the trial court erred by concluding Deputy Fernandez had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. He asserts an officer may not pull a car over for a suspected violation of former section 5201.1, subdivision (c) without already possessing evidence that the reflective coating on the license plate was intentionally removed, as opposed to worn away through natural wear and tear. We disagree and affirm.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to its factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, considering the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's order. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) We exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts so found, the challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at pp. 673-674.)
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of vehicles. (People v. Barnes (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1514 (Barnes).) A traffic stop is lawful "when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or another law." (People v. Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937-938.) Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, but an officer cannot rely on a mere hunch. (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981 (Brown).)
"In making determinations of reasonable suspicion to justify a detention, reviewing courts 'must look at the "totality of the circumstances" of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting wrongdoing. [Citation.] This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might elude an untrained person." '" (Barnes, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514.)
An officer does not have to rule out all plausible innocent explanations for suspected criminal activity to conduct a traffic stop, as" '[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.'" (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 233 (Souza).) "Rather, when circumstances are' "consistent with criminal activity," they permit-even demand-an investigation,'" even if those circumstances may also be consistent with lawful activity. (Ibid.) "The purpose of the detention is to resolve the ambiguity by allowing the officer to briefly investigate further" and determine whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 986; Souza, at p. 233.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Fernandez had reasonable suspicion to believe the reflective coating on Martin's license plate had been removed in violation of former section 5201.1, subdivision (c). (See Barnes, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514.) As the trial court found, the license plate was "clearly damaged to the point where [Deputy Fernandez] got the letter wrong" when trying to run the plate. And Deputy Fernandez testified at the hearing that people may "purposely" remove the reflective coating on license plates in order to avoid law enforcement or camera detection-which is precisely the conduct proscribed by the statute. (Former § 5201.1, subd. (c).)
Hence, drawing on his experience and training, Deputy Fernandez made an inference that the lack of reflective coating on Martin's license plate-which was severe enough to prevent an accurate reading the plate- was consistent with criminal activity. (See Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233; Barnes, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514.) This was more than a mere hunch. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 986.) Instead, and contrary to Martin's assertion, Deputy Fernandez articulated a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting wrongdoing, thereby justifying the investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment. (See Barnes, at p. 1514).
Relying on Deputy Fernandez's testimony that there was "no indication" the reflective coating on the plate had been "purposefully removed," Martin argues he lacked reasonable suspicion to believe the coating was actively "erase[d]" (former § 5201.1, subd. (c)), as opposed to simply damaged through natural wear and tear. However, the possibility of an innocent explanation for the lack of reflective coating (natural wear and tear) did not deprive Deputy Fernandez of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion that the coating had been erased to avoid detection. (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233.) As noted above, he testified that people do precisely this proscribed conduct to avoid law enforcement or camera detection. Even without prior knowledge of intentional conduct, and given the extent of the damage to the coating in this case, Deputy Fernandez was justified in conducting the traffic to "resolve the ambiguity" by investigating further as to whether the damage was a result of legal or illegal activity. (See Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 986; Souza, at p. 233.)
In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding Deputy Fernandez had reasonable suspicion to believe Martin violated former section 5201.1, subdivision (c). Accordingly, the traffic stop was lawful, and the motion to suppress was properly denied on that basis. (See People v. Nice, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 937-938.)
As a result, we do not reach the Attorney General's alternative argument that the traffic stop was justified based on the window tint.
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Tucher, P. J., Fujisaki, J.