Opinion
4-23-0519
12-22-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KORY M. MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County No. 23DT4 Honorable James M. Hauser, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
TURNER, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court's denial of defendant's petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension was proper.
¶ 2 In January 2023, the State charged defendant, Kory M. Martin, by citation with one count of driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2022)), one count of driving while license is suspended or revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2022)), and one count of improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2022)). Defendant's statutory summary suspension of his driver's license under section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2022)) was effective from March 5, 2023, to March 5, 2024. On March 23, 2023, defendant filed a petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension. After an April 2023 hearing, the Stephenson County circuit court denied defendant's petition. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied after a May 2023 hearing.
¶ 3 On appeal, defendant asserts the circuit court erred by denying his petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In the early hours of January 23, 2023, defendant crashed his motor vehicle into a pole. The officer on the scene arrested defendant for driving under the influence. Before requesting defendant submit to chemical testing, the arresting officer read defendant the warning to motorist form. The warning notified defendant, inter alia, of the consequences of submitting "to chemical test(s) disclosing an alcohol concentration of .08 or more or any amount of a drug, substance or intoxicating compound." Defendant submitted to chemical testing and was found to have an alcohol concentration of 0.201. The arresting officer served immediate notice of the statutory summary suspension of driving privileges on defendant. Defendant was also charged by citation with driving under the influence and two other charges.
¶ 6 On February 10, 2023, the State filed the Secretary of State's confirmation of a statutory summary suspension for defendant. The document noted defendant's statutory summary suspension would begin on March 5, 2023, and was for 12 months. On March 23, 2023, defendant filed a petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension setting forth seven different reasons as to why the suspension should be rescinded.
¶ 7 On April 21, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on defendant's petition. Defendant withdrew all of his allegations, except for the third one, which stated the following: "The Defendant was not properly warned by the arresting officer as provided in Section 11-501.1 of the [Code], upon the request of the arresting officer." The parties stipulated the arresting officer did not ask defendant to sign the warning to motorist form. Defense counsel asserted the officer's failure to do so required the rescission of the suspension under section 11-501.1(c) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West 2022)). He also presented the unsigned warning to motorist form. The State contended whether the officer had the motorist sign the warning was not within the scope of a hearing on a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension under section 2-118.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2022)). At the conclusion of the parties' arguments, the court denied the petition finding it would not rescind the statutory summary suspension solely due to the arresting officer's failure to have defendant sign the warning to motorist form.
¶ 8 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, asserting the officer's failure to give him the opportunity to sign the warning to motorist form resulted in the officer's warnings being improper. After a May 19, 2023, hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's motion to reconsider.
¶ 9 On June 12, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court's denial of his petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). See People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 294-95, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (1996) (noting "a hearing on a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of driving privileges is a civil proceeding"). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction of defendant's appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Defendant challenges the circuit court's denial of his statutory summary suspension. At the hearing on his petition to rescind, defendant's sole basis for rescission was the arresting officer's failure to ask him to sign the warning to motorist form. He raised no other challenge to the arresting officer's warnings. On appeal, defendant essentially contends the circuit court erred in interpreting sections 2-118.1 and 11-501.1(c) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1, 11-501.1(c) (West 2022)) to provide an arresting officer's failure to ask a motorist to sign the warning to motorist form alone does not constitute a basis for rescission of the motorist's statutory summary suspension. The State asserts the court's interpretation was correct. Since this case presents only a question of statutory interpretation, we review de novo the circuit court's ruling. People v. Lane, 2023 IL 128269, ¶ 10.
¶ 12 When interpreting statutes, courts strive to give effect to the legislature's intent. Lane, 2023 IL 128269, ¶ 11. "We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute [citation], read in light of the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it [citation]." Lane, 2023 IL 128269, ¶ 11. "No part of a statute should be rendered meaningless or superfluous. *** Courts must construe statutes relating to the same subject matter with reference to one another so as to give effect to the provisions of each, if reasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lane, 2023 IL 128269, ¶ 11.
¶ 13 Section 2-118.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2022)) provides the opportunity for a hearing on a statutory summary suspension issued under section 11-501.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2022)). The petition filed by the defendant requesting such a hearing must set forth the grounds upon which the statutory summary suspension should be rescinded. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2022); People v. McClure, 218 Ill.2d 375, 380, 843 N.E.2d 308, 311 (2006). As explained by our supreme court, section 2-118.1(b) of the Code limits the issues that can be considered at the hearing to the following:
"(a) whether the motorist was lawfully arrested under section 11-501 of the [Code]; (b) whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or both; (c) whether the
motorist refused to submit to chemical testing after being advised that such refusal would result in a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges; and (d) whether the motorist submitted to chemical testing and failed the test." McClure, 218 Ill.2d at 380, 843 N.E.2d at 311 (citing 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002)).See also 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2022) (setting forth the same basic categories). At the hearing, the defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for rescission. McClure, 218 Ill.2d at 380, 843 N.E.2d at 311. Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence justifying the suspension. McClure, 218 Ill.2d at 380, 843 N.E.2d at 311.
¶ 14 Section 11-501.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 1998)) "prohibits operation of a vehicle anywhere in the state by individuals under the influence of alcohol or drugs" and has been referred to as the implied-consent law "because motorists are deemed to have given consent to chemical testing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Johnson, 197 Ill.2d 478, 481, 758 N.E.2d 805, 807 (2001). Under section 11-501.1(c) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West 2022)), law enforcement officers are required to warn the motorists about the consequences of the refusal to submit to chemical testing and the consequences of submitting to chemical testing and failing. Section 11-501.1(c) also provides the following:
"A person requested to submit to a test shall also acknowledge, in writing, receipt of the warning required under this Section. If the person refuses to acknowledge receipt of the warning, the law enforcement officer shall make a written notation on the warning that the person refused to sign the warning. A person's refusal to sign the warning shall not be evidence that the person was not
read the warning."
The aforementioned signature language was added by Public Act 99-467, § 5 and became effective on January 1, 2016. Additionally, we note the implied-consent statute is remedial in nature and thus must be liberally construed to accomplish its overall goal of safety. Johnson, 197 Ill.2d at 486, 758 N.E.2d at 810.
¶ 15 Defendant asserts all of section 11-501.1(c), including the aforementioned signature provision, must be incorporated into section 2-118.1 when determining the scope of a hearing for a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension. However, section 2-118.1 expressly limits the issues that can be raised at such a hearing and does not mention anything about the signing of the warning to motorist form. See 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2022). We note section 2-118.1 has been amended twice since the addition of the signature language in section 11-501.1(c), and still no mention of the signing of the warning to motorist form is contained in section 2-118.1. The plain language of the signature provision indicates it is a provision to provide the State with evidence the arresting officer gave the warning to motorist, as it cannot be used to show the person was not read the warnings when he or she refused to sign it. Moreover, we do not find the "shall" language in the provision highlighted by defendant makes the failure to comply with it a basis for rescission of the statutory summary suspension because it is section 2-118.1 that controls what issues may be raised at the hearing. Additionally, to construe the statute in the manner suggested by defendant would be contrary to the goal of safety because it would allow motorists who received a statutory summary suspension after proper warnings to have their suspension rescinded based on the technicality they were not asked to sign the warning. Accordingly, we find the plain language of section 2-118.1 does not allow a defendant to challenge his or her statutory summary suspension solely on the basis the arresting officer did not request him or her to sign the warning to motorist.
¶ 16 Moreover, we note defendant supports his construction of sections 11-501.1(c) and 2-118.1 by citing three cases involving inaccurate warnings. See People v. Estrada, 313 Ill.App.3d 245, 729 N.E.2d 851 (2000); People v. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill.App.3d 550, 588 N.E.2d 452 (1992); People v. Znaniecki, 181 Ill.App.3d 389, 537 N.E.2d 16 (1989)). In Johnson, 197 Ill.2d at 485, 758 N.E.2d at 809-10, our supreme court declined to follow the analytical premise in those three cases, which had held "the purpose of the warnings is to enable the motorist to make an informed choice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) There, the supreme court explained the warnings to motorist set forth in section 11-501.1(c) benefit the State and not the motorist. Johnson, 197 Ill.2d at 487, 758 N.E.2d at 811. It noted the warnings are an evidencegathering tool for the State because "[t]he threat of an extended suspension for motorists who refuse the test motivates individuals to take the test so that the State may gain objective evidence of intoxication." Johnson, 197 Ill.2d at 487, 758 N.E.2d at 811. Such evidence helps the State achieve the implied-consent statute's overall goal of helping "prosecute and remove problem drivers from the highways." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson, 197 Ill.2d at 487, 758 N.E.2d at 811.
¶ 17 The Johnson court went on to hold the following:
"Accordingly, we conclude that rescission is warranted based on the receipt of erroneous or inaccurate warnings only if that misinformation directly affects the motorist's potential length of suspension. If the motorist was misinformed as to the potential suspension of an individual in his or her situation, he was not properly warned as provided in section 6-208.1. To hold that any misinformation-even misinformation which does not concern the motorist-
warrants rescission defeats the purpose of the statute. Thus, in reviewing a petition for rescission based on inaccurate warnings, courts must determine merely whether the motorist is a member of the group affected by the inaccuracy." (Emphases in original.) Johnson, 197 Ill.2d at 488-89, 758 N.E.2d at 811-12.
If an inaccurate warning only results in rescission of a statutory summary suspension if the motorist was a member of the group affected by the inaccuracy, then surely the simple failure to have the motorist sign the warnings alone does not lead to recission of the statutory summary suspension. The Johnson decision supports our interpretation of sections 2-118.1 and 11-501.1(c) of the Code.
¶ 18 Accordingly, we find the circuit court's denial of defendant's petition for recission of his statutory summary suspension was proper.
¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Stephenson County circuit court's judgment.
¶ 21 Affirmed.