Opinion
G056619
12-18-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEANIE LYNN MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Allison V. Acosta, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF1255) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard M. King, Judge. Affirmed. Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Allison V. Acosta, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Deanie Lynn Martin was convicted of one felony count of forgery and a misdemeanor count of identity theft. On appeal, Deanie contends there was a lack of substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdicts, that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of uncharged crimes, that Deanie's trial counsel did not provide effective assistance of counsel, and that her felony count of forgery should have been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 473, subdivision (b), as amended by Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.
At all times relevant to this case, Deanie Martin was married to her husband Bruce Martin. We refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.
All further undesignated references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
We find sufficient evidence supported the convictions, that Deanie forfeited her claims regarding evidence of uncharged crimes, that she has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court properly denied her Proposition 47 motions. We affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2016, Garden Grove Police Officer Bryan Meers visited the Martin residence, in Garden Grove, based upon a report of a disagreement between Bruce and Amanda R. Meers recalled that Amanda had been living in the master bedroom of the residence and was moving out of the residence. Meers had no further contact with Amanda with regard to this case.
Around March 2017, victim Kyrie H. began renting a room at the Martin residence. Kyrie's room was across the hall from the master bedroom where Bruce and Deanie slept. Other individuals, including another tenant renting a third bedroom, would go in and out of the residence and hang out in the master bedroom. After about three weeks, Kyrie got into a verbal disagreement with Deanie and Bruce that led to Deanie telling Kyrie to leave the residence immediately. Kyrie did not have a vehicle and responded by saying that leaving would be difficult and that she did not have any place to go. But Kyrie did leave. Before doing so, she took her belongings out of her bedroom and organized them by the door of the residence. When Kyrie returned to the residence about two days later, she noticed her belonging were not as she had left them and it had looked like someone had gone through them. After leaving the residence, Kyrie realized that some legal documents and clothing belonging to her were indeed missing. Kyrie sent a message to Bruce to discuss the issue. After Bruce replied that he would look for her belongings, Kyrie received no further response and she reported the issue to the Garden Grove Police Department.
About one or two weeks after Kyrie left the residence, Officer Meers was dispatched to respond to Kyrie's report. Meers and his partner went to the Martin residence and first made contact with Deanie and two other individuals, Donald Sauer and Ashley Greaves, sitting in a vehicle parked near the residence. The officers asked them to exit the vehicle. Deanie exited the vehicle first from the front passenger seat followed by Greaves, and then finally the driver of the vehicle, Sauer. Meers asked Deanie whether she had Kyrie's possessions and Deanie responded she did not. Sauer told Meers there was an identification card in the gas cap area of his vehicle that was not his. When Meers asked if there was anything else inside the vehicle, Sauer admitted there was methamphetamine in the vehicle's center console. Meers then received Sauer's consent to search the vehicle and found several of Kyrie's belongings on or near the front passenger seat where Deanie had been seated. Specifically, Meers found Kyrie's debit card, an open envelope containing Kyrie's W-2 form from the prior year, and a checkbook with multiple blank checks belonging to Kyrie. Deanie stated she was the only one of the three individuals in the vehicle who lived at the residence.
At some point during Officer Meers' investigation of the vehicle, Deanie asked Meers for permission to call her husband Bruce, which Meers granted. Meers overheard the ensuing phone conversation, which included Deanie stating to Bruce that she had locked the bedroom door behind her.
Officer Meers and another of his partners proceeded to lawfully search the residence. The officers searched the first floor of the residence based upon Bruce's consent. When Bruce did not consent to a search of the second floor, the officers obtained a search warrant and proceeded to search the floor's three bedrooms. In the first two bedrooms, the officers did not find any items within the search warrant. Inside the third, master bedroom, however, the officers found several items within the search warrant or in plain sight.
Specifically, inside the master bedroom, the officers observed women's jewelry, clothes, and feminine hygiene products. The officers did not find any item with Deanie's name on it but did find four items of other persons' belongings. First, on a nightstand, the officers found a California driver's license issued to an individual named Ruchir D. Second, inside a jewelry box on the nightstand, the officers found a credit card issued to an individual named Abruey B. in a jewelry box. Third, on a cabinet, the officers found another California driver's license issued to an individual named Juan C. Fourth, on the bedroom floor, the officers found several letter-sized envelopes addressed to Kyrie contained within a larger United States Postal Service envelope.
The Orange County District Attorney's Office charged Deanie with one felony count of possessing a blank check to forge (§ 475, subd. (b); count one), and one misdemeanor count of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1); count two). Prior to trial, Deanie filed a motion to reduce count one to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b). The trial court denied the motion.
Also prior to trial, Deanie moved in limine to exclude evidence of the driver's licenses belonging to Ruchir D. and Juan C. as well as Abruey B.'s credit card (collectively the uncharged items evidence). Deanie's counsel argued the uncharged items evidence was irrelevant to the charged counts and unduly prejudicial to Deanie. The trial court ruled the evidence could be admitted at trial, with a limiting instruction.
After a trial that included the admission of the uncharged items evidence with limiting instructions, the jury convicted Deanie of both the forgery and identity theft counts charged. (§§ 475, subd. (b); 530.5, subd. (c)(1).) Deanie included with her sentencing brief another motion pursuant to Proposition 47, to reduce her felony forgery conviction to a misdemeanor, that was denied. The trial court ordered Deanie to serve 180 days in county jail and participate in three years of formal probation.
II
DISCUSSION
Deanie makes four contentions on appeal. First, Deanie contends the trial evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of her possession of Kyrie's personal belongings with intent to defraud. Second, she contends the trial court erred in allowing evidence of uncharged offences. Third, she contends her trial counsel did not provide effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, Deanie contends her felony count of forgery should have been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. Deanie, as the appellant, bears the burden of demonstrating the trial court committed reversible error. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 679, 694.) We review each contention in turn. A. Substantial Evidence of Possession and Intent
Deanie asserts there was insufficient evidence of both possession and intent to support her convictions. Specifically, Deanie asserts that "[u]nder the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, there must be sufficient evidence, as to each element of a criminal offense, such that a rational trier of fact could find that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Our California Supreme Court has summarized the "well-established methodology of appellate review" to apply. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) "In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court's task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under principles of federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] '"Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. '"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."'"'" (Ibid.)
Accordingly, in count one (forgery) the prosecution had to prove two facts beyond a reasonable doubt: that Deanie had possessed a blank or unfinished check, and when she possessed the check, she had intended to complete it in order to defraud. (§ 475, subd. (b).) In count two (identity theft), the prosecution was required to prove two similar facts: Deanie acquired or kept personal identifying information of Kyrie, and did so with the intent to defraud another person. (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1).)
Regarding possession of Kyrie's belongings, Deanie contends the trial evidence showed that the belongings found in Sauer's vehicle established that Sauer (and not Deanie) was in possession of the belongings. Deanie's primary argument appears to be that "[b]ecause there was no evidence that [Deanie moved Kyrie's property to Sauer's car], there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions and they must be vacated." We agree with the Attorney General's counterargument that Deanie misapplies the substantial evidence test by interpreting the trial evidence in a light most favorable to herself rather than the judgment.
In People v. Truong (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 551, 553 (Truong), the Second District Court of Appeal applied the substantial evidence test to factual inferences supporting convictions of, among other crimes, illegal possession of others' bank cards and identifying information. We agree with the Truong court's statements that "the trier of fact may rely on inferences to support a conviction where 'those inferences are "of such substantiality that a reasonable trier of fact could determine beyond a reasonable doubt" that the inferred facts are true.' [Citations.] [¶] . . . Reversal on the basis of insufficient evidence is 'unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]."'" (Id. at p. 556, quoting People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Properly viewing it in the light most favorable to the judgment and prosecution (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 11-12), the trial evidence was sufficient to support the inferences necessary for the jury's convictions of Deanie for forgery and identify theft. Circumstantial evidence reasonably justified the jury's implied inferences that Deanie had possessed Kyrie's belongings with intent to defraud. We reject Deanie's argument that "[t]he fact that [Deanie] had been sitting in [Sauer's] car near where the items were found is not sufficient circumstantial evidence of knowing possession."
We are not persuaded by Deanie's attempt to analogize her case to In re Elisabeth H. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 323 (Elisabeth H.) and People v. Foster (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 866 (Foster). In Elisabeth H., the appellant had been convicted for being in an automobile where marijuana was being smoked with her knowledge. (Elisabeth H., at pp. 325-326.) She had been one female in a group of three boys and two girls. (Ibid.) The Elisabeth H. court discussed the specific factual circumstances to explain its reversal of the appellant's conviction. The court stated that the marijuana at issue had been located within a pocket of a "boy's jacket" located "on the front seat" of the automobile and that "[t]he [arresting] officers could not identify where the appellant was seated in the car." (Id. at pp. 327, 331.) In contrast, in this case, it was uncontradicted that Deanie had been seated in the location where Kyrie's belongings were found. It was also uncontradicted that Kryie had last left her belongings inside the home and that Deanie was the only one of the vehicle occupants who had resided there. Contrary to Deanie's implicit assertion, there was not an either or choice to be made between whether Sauer or Deanie had possessed Kyrie's belongings in the vehicle. (People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622 ["Actual or constructive possession is the right to exercise dominion and control over the contraband or the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. [Citation.] Exclusive possession is not necessary. A defendant does not avoid conviction if his right to exercise dominion and control over the place where the contraband was located is shared with others"].) The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support an inference that Deanie had possessed Kyrie's belongings.
Deanie's citation to Foster, supra, 115 Cal.App.2d 866, is even less persuasive. That court reviewed the convictions of three codefendants who had all been sitting in the front seat of a vehicle where heroin had been present. (Id. at pp. 867-868.) All three were convicted of possession and two of them appealed: Phillips and Foster. (Ibid.) The appellate court conducted a comparative analysis of the prosecution's cases against the two and reached opposite dispositions. (Id. at p. 869.) As to Phillips, the appellate court rejected the Attorney General's argument that, because Phillips was sitting at the vehicle location from where the heroin had been discarded from the vehicle, "his denial of all knowledge" of how it was discarded was sufficient to convict him of possession. (Id. at p. 868.) In rejecting the argument and reversing Phillips' conviction, the Foster court succinctly stated its rationale: "[t]o infer guilty knowledge in Phillips from the fact, standing alone, that he testified that he did not see the package thrown from the car would be to permit a conviction on the wildest sort of surmise and conjecture." (Ibid., italics added.) The court then affirmed the conviction of codefendant Foster, concluding the jury had convicted him upon a different ground: that Foster had testified falsely about the at issue chain of events. (Id. at p. 869 ["We cannot say that the jury was not entitled to conclude that this defendant first testified falsely . . . . From this clumsy attempt to manufacture a defense the jury might reasonably infer the guilty knowledge necessary to find that Foster was the one of the three defendants who had possession of the heroin"].)
The analyses employed in Elisabeth H. and Foster do not contradict our conclusion of sufficient circumstantial evidence in this case. That is, insufficiency in this case is not demonstrated by a general proposition that "the mere presence of the accused with others in a vehicle in which contraband is found or from which it is thrown is not sufficient evidence, standing alone, to justify a conviction of possession." (Elisabeth H., supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 330, quoting Foster, supra, 115 Cal.App.2d at p. 868.) There was evidence of more than Deanie's mere presence around Kyrie's belongings. Testimonial evidence supported factual conclusions that Kyrie's belongings found in Sauer's vehicle had originated from Deanie's home and that Deanie—the only one of the vehicle occupants who lived there—had knowingly possessed them. Further, anologous to the circumstances of the losing appellant in Foster, Officer Meers clearly testified at trial that, prior to his search of Sauer's vehicle, when he asked Deanie whether she had Kyrie's possessions, Deanie denied it. In other words, Foster supports a conclusion that evidence of Deanie's denial was sufficient for the jury to have found Deanie had the guilty knowledge necessary to establish possession. In sum, the "substantiality" of the inferences supportable by the circumstantial evidence in this case was in clear contrast to what Deanie attempts to analogize to in Elisabeth H. and Foster. (Truong, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 556.)
We also reject Deanie's citation to People v. Norwood (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 148, to argue there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of her intent to defraud. In that inapposite case, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded it was compelled to reverse two of three convictions not based upon a finding of insufficient evidence but because the at issue evidence did not satisfy the charging statute's definition of a negotiable instrument. (Id. pp. 152-157.) Deanie claims Norwood stands for a proposition that "[s]imple possession of unaltered blank checks that belong to another, without more, is insufficient to establish the intent to defraud." We do not find any statement within her citation that supports her claim. To the contrary, the citation contains the following well-established statement of law which supports our conclusion of sufficient evidence: "The trial court [as trier of fact in that case] could have found that defendant's denial to Sergeant Payan that he had never seen or touched the warrants or traveler's checks was a lie betraying a consciousness of guilt." (Id. at p. 159.) Norwood supports a conclusion that Officer Meers' trial testimony that Deanie's denial of possessing Kyrie's belongings, prior to them being found in Sauer's vehicle, supported a finding of intent to defraud.
In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment and prosecution, there was sufficient and substantial circumstantial evidence to support the inferences necessary for the jury to have found Deanie knowingly possessed Kyrie's belongings with an intent to defraud. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.) We cannot conclude there is no possible hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence supports the jury's convictions of Deanie. (Truong, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 556.) B. Abuse of Discretion Regarding Evidence of Uncharged Crimes
Next, Deanie challenges the trial court's admission of the uncharged items evidence found by Officer Meers and his partner in the master bedroom of the residence: the driver's licenses ascribed to individuals Ruchir D. and Juan C. and the credit card ascribed to Abruey B. Deanie asserts three arguments. First, she asserts the preliminary facts necessary for the admission of the uncharged items evidence—"i.e., whether appellant knew that the cards were in the bedroom and whether the cards were in the room without the owner's consent"—were not established and therefore the evidence was irrelevant. Second, Deanie asserts the uncharged items evidence did not have substantial probative value of intent to defraud. Third, she asserts that, in the alternative, the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The Attorney General counterargues, among other things, that Deanie "forfeited her claims regarding foundation and prejudice because she did not object." (Boldfacing and capitalization omitted.) Deanie responds that her trial counsel "clearly objected to admission of the [uncharged items] evidence prior to trial," citing to the reporter's transcript for her pretrial in limine motion.
"Generally when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal." (People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975, fn. 3; compare People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189 ["In some cases, a specific objection to a particular body of evidence can be advanced and ruled upon definitively on a motion in limine, thus satisfying the requirements of the statute" regulating appellate review of a purportedly erroneous admission of evidence].) The rule stated in Jennings is consistent with two propositions the Attorney General cites to in her respondent's brief. First, "a party objecting to the admission of evidence must press for an actual ruling or the point is not preserved for appeal." (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 618-619.) Second, "an appellate court will not consider a claim of error if an objection could have been, but was not, made in the lower court. . . . '[T]he forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error.'" (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46.)
As mentioned above, the trial court ruled that the uncharged items evidence was relevant and could be admitted, with a limiting instruction available upon request. Specifically, the court stated: "[T]he fact that I've ruled that the jury can hear [the evidence] doesn't mean that they are going to hear it unless a foundation has been laid, and the foundation that needs to be laid is that . . . was this property that was under her dominion and control and did she know of it? [¶] . . . [¶] So, in this ruling, I am going to require that the People, and they can do this in front of the jury, establish through circumstantial evidence—and it doesn't—it's just, you know, a reasonable inference—that defendant had knowledge of those three pieces of evidence. So I'm going to require that they prove that before the jury, you know, hears about these other items."
During trial, Deanie did not renew her objection that the uncharged items evidence lacked foundation. Indeed, when the prosecution requested the trial court for permission to publish the evidence to the jury, the court asked Deanie's trial counsel: "Did you wish to be heard?" Counsel responded: "Submit." By failing to object when she could have, Deanie forfeited all three claims regarding the uncharged items evidence for appellate review. (People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 46.) C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Even if the claims were not forfeited, we would find they lack merit.
Deanie also contends that to the extent her trial counsel failed to renew her objection to the uncharged items evidence, it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A trial counsel's failure to object to evidence can provide grounds for an argument of ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment to our federal Constitution. (People v. Myers (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 546, 551-552.)
The well-established test under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, requires a defendant to carry a burden to demonstrate two elements: 1) objectively deficient performance, and 2) resulting prejudice. The Attorney General correctly observes that, under Strickland, an appellate court "presume[s] that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making significant trial decisions. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) Moreover, the Attorney General correctly summarizes the substantive proof that Deanie must demonstrate: "If the record on appeal does not contain an explanation for the challenged action or omission, the reviewing court must reject a claim of deficient performance unless counsel failed to provide an explanation when asked or there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct." (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845-846.)
In this case, the record does not contain an explanation for trial counsel's decision to not renew her objection to the uncharged items evidence and Deanie has not indicated whether her counsel was asked for an explanation. The Attorney General offers a potential explanation that Deanie's trial counsel may have decided trial objections were futile and it would be better to maintain credibility by focusing on a different strategy.
In her reply brief, Deanie cites to her opening brief discussion that contains a potential response to the Attorney General's counterargument: that because her "[c]ounsel sought to convince the trial court to exclude the evidence [prior to trial], . . . any [subsequent] omissions [of objections at trial] could not have been tactical." We are not persuaded by Deanie's proffered reasoning. "An attorney may choose not to object for many reasons, and the failure to object rarely establishes ineffectiveness of counsel." (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540.) Deanie has not met her burden to demonstrate there "could be no satisfactory explanation" of her trial counsel's at issue performance. (People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 845-846.) D. Proposition 47
Finally, we review de novo Deanie's contention that her forgery charge should have been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. (People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 49-50 (Gonzales).) As the California Supreme Court has succinctly stated: "Forgery is a 'wobbler' crime punishable either as a felony or a misdemeanor. (. . . § 473, subd. (a).) When voters enacted Proposition 47, the Penal Code gained a new provision reducing punishment to a misdemeanor for 'forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).' (§ 473, subd. (b).) But forgery remains a wobbler — and therefore an offense ineligible for reclassification as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 — for 'any person who is convicted both of forgery and of identity theft, as defined in Section 530.5.'" (Id. at p. 46.)
The Gonzales court reviewed a defendant's consolidated guilty plea to "multiple offenses stemming from three different cases, including four counts of check forgery arising from conduct that occurred in 2003 and one count of identity theft committed in 2006." (Gonzales, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 46.) The trial court had denied the defendant's petition to reduce his felony forgery convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47 but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal "[b]ecause [defendant's] offenses [of forgery in 2003 and identity theft in 2006 and 2007] were entirely unrelated and therefore [eligible for reduction pursuant to Proposition 47]. . . ." (Id. at p. 47.)
Deanie argues the trial evidence in this case was insufficient "to establish a sufficient transactional 'connection' under Gonzales." Specifically, Deanie asserts that her "act of passively sitting next to or on top of" Kyrie's belongings was not "sufficient evidence of a 'transaction' to make the checks and identification evidence 'transactionally related'" as in Gonzales. The Attorney General counterargues that Deanie's acts of forgery and identity theft were committed "'in connection with' each other" unlike Gonzales. Specifically, "[Deanie] contemporaneously possessed Kyrie's personal identifying information and her debit card and checks. The evidence used to prove the crimes overlapped and arose from related conduct encompassing both crimes. The offenses took place at the same time, in the same place, and involved the same victim."
We agree with the Attorney General on the issue. Deanie's conduct for both her forgery and identity theft convictions were in close connection with each other unlike Gonzales. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error by finding that Deanie was ineligible under Proposition 47 for a reduction of her forgery count to a misdemeanor.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. IKOLA, J.