The term "standing" is no longer used and has been replaced with privacy expectation. People v. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 9, 415 Ill.Dec. 389, 82 N.E.3d 593. ¶ 10 The defense countered that there was in fact a stop but no reasonable suspicion to support it "from the inception."

If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intrusion. People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 18. ¶ 19

The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the building is a family home, and that as such the vestibule was both a constitutionally protected area, and one in which he had an expectation of privacy. For the reasons that shall be explained in detail below, we agree with the defendant. ¶ 41 In deciding this issue, we find the decision in People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, which applied Jardines to a seizure of narcotics that did not involve the use of drug-sniffing dogs, to be instructive. In Martin, the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance.

"Illinois courts have interpreted the search and seizure provision in the Illinois Constitution consistently with the fourth amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court." People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 17 (2017).

Another consideration is whether the evidence would likely disappear without prompt action. People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 34. Our primary consideration in determining whether an exigency existed is whether the officers acted reasonably, which is a question we answer by considering the totality of the circumstances that confronted the officers when the entry was made.

(Pl.'s Mem. at 20.) Mendez asserts in his reply that United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 749 (6th Cir. 2000), and People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 26 “acknowledge a person's right to privacy on his own front porch” (Pl.'s Reply at 12), but this assertion comes too late to satisfy his summary judgment burden. See O'Neal, 961 F.3d at 974; Guyton, 2020 WL 1027886, at *2; Ores, 1998 WL 852839, at *10.

¶ 28 "The fourth amendment is silent about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of its command." People v. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 38, 415 Ill.Dec. 389, 82 N.E.3d 593 (citing Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).

¶ 19 On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence and proving the search and seizure were unlawful, but once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure, the burden then shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intrusion. People v. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 18, 415 Ill.Dec. 389, 82 N.E.3d 593 (citing People v. Woodrome , 2013 IL App (4th) 130142, ¶ 16), 375 Ill.Dec. 87, 996 N.E.2d 1143. ¶ 20 In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply the two-part standard of review in Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

See United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (holding seizure of package containing heroin, which officer observed thrown from window of apartment building, did not violate the fourth amendment where "[w]hatever rights defendant had in these areas was simply to use them in common with other tenants and such members of the public as had business there"). See also People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 20 ("Of note, Illinois courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment buildings that are accessible to others. [Citations.]").

It was defendant's burden to produce the evidence needed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. Johnson , 237 Ill. 2d at 90, 340 Ill.Dec. 168, 927 N.E.2d 1179 ; People v. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 18, 415 Ill.Dec. 389, 82 N.E.3d 593. But we have no idea, from the evidence he offered, how he accessed the