Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CRF064096
RAYE, J.A jury convicted defendant Hamisi Marshall of theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)). Defendant filed a motion for new trial claiming insufficiency of the evidence as to the Vehicle Code violation, and the court granted the motion.
The People appeal, contending the court abused its discretion in granting the motion. We disagree and shall affirm the court’s order.
FACTS
Sometime after 6:00 p.m. on July 17, 2006, Victor Hernandez’s 1997 Toyota Tacoma pickup truck was stolen from in front of his parents’ home in Winters. At that time there was no rollover damage to the pickup and Hernandez was in possession of all known keys to the vehicle.
Sometime close to midnight that same date, Dena Connor was stopped for a light at the intersection of Russell Boulevard and Arthur Street in Davis waiting to make a left turn when she saw defendant staggering across the street. Defendant was stumbling and looked distressed.
Defendant made a “beeline” for Connor’s car, saying there were people chasing him and he needed to go to the hospital. He did not appear to be injured; however, the intersection was poorly lit. Believing defendant was in need of help, Connor called 911. Defendant “sprawled” on the hood of Connor’s car and made “some hand motions on [her] windshield,” leaving blood smears.
While defendant was on the hood of Connor’s car, Brian Charn drove alongside Connor and asked what was going on. Defendant got off the hood and got into the back seat of Charn’s car. Defendant said he had been in an accident in which he was thrown from the vehicle, that his friends had abandoned him, and that he needed to go to a hospital. Charn ordered defendant out of his car. Defendant complied, and Charn waited until an ambulance arrived.
Connor testified that after the police arrived, defendant’s cousin called him on a cell phone. Defendant wanted Connor to talk to the cousin and explain where they were located.
Davis Police Officer Benjamin Adams responded to the Russell/Arthur intersection and contacted defendant, who was now in the back of an ambulance. Defendant had multiple “road rash” injuries. Defendant identified himself as Hamisi Washington and told Adams he had given “three white guys $20 for a ride to El Cerrito from West Sac,” but the vehicle had overturned in the Davis area and he was thrown out. At this point defendant was taken to the hospital.
After briefly speaking with Connor, Adams drove to the hospital and again questioned defendant about the accident. Defendant admitted he had made up the story about the three white guys giving him a ride and that his true name was Hamisi Marshall. Defendant then said he had been in Sacramento, saw a pickup truck with the keys in it, and “jumped in the truck and then headed towards El Cerrito.” Defendant also said that “he didn’t steal the truck, he just jumped into the truck.” Defendant was unable to describe the pickup. Defendant explained that the vehicle had overturned, he had been thrown from it, and that he had walked a “long distance” to the intersection of Russell and Arthur.
California Highway Patrol Officer Corey Shell testified that shortly before midnight on July 17, 2006, he was dispatched to investigate an accident on Russell Boulevard, a distance of approximately five miles from the Russell/Arthur intersection. While en route, Shell received a dispatch that Davis police had found an individual whom they believed had just been involved in an accident.
At the scene, Shell found Hernandez’s pickup overturned with significant rollover damage. Shell checked but found no occupants in or around the pickup. Based upon the driver’s window being open, there being no one in the vehicle, and the seat belts apparently not having been used, Shell concluded the driver had been ejected from the truck.
Shell was unable to find any blood inside the pickup or in the surrounding area. Nor was Shell able to locate any keys to the pickup. The truck’s ignition and steering wheel were intact, eliminating two ways -- breaking the steering column and “punching” the ignition -- in which the vehicle could have been stolen. A third method for stealing the vehicle would have been with a shaved key.
Shell drove to the hospital and contacted defendant around 1:45 a.m. At that time, Shell observed that defendant had “severe abrasions to his arms, torsos [sic] and hands.” Several wounds were seeping blood, and his elbow bone was visible through the skin. Shell, who had investigated several hundred rollover accidents, considered these injuries “road rash burns” and opined that they were “100 percent consistent with a rollover accident.”
Shell informed defendant that he “was investigating the crash of a Toyota pickup,” and defendant “acknowledged that he was involved in the crash and that some guy . . . had given him the vehicle.” Defendant refused to answer any more questions, but he did say that he was not driving and that he did not want to talk further. Shell checked and found that Hernandez’s rollover was the only traffic collision that night.
Officer Adams gave Shell a key that Adams found in defendant’s jacket pocket. The key was an Access brand, which is the generic brand for Toyota motors. The key was tested, and while it could be inserted into the pickup’s ignition, it would not turn the engine over.
DISCUSSION
Challenging only his conviction for unauthorized taking of a vehicle, defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1181, case 6 on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. The court granted the motion.
The People appeal the court’s ruling, claiming “[t]he trial court abused its discretion here because, on the instant record, ample uncontradicted evidence supported the jury’s verdict that [defendant] stole and drove the pickup truck.” While we agree that there is clearly substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict, this is not the test applicable when the court rules on a motion for a new trial.
“In reviewing an order granting a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, drawing all factual inferences that favor the trial court’s decision. (People v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303-1304 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 161]; People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 659 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 314].) The trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, will be upheld if supported by any substantial evidence. (People v. Drake (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 92, 97 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 790].) The order will be reversed only if it can be said as a matter of law that there is no substantial evidence to support a judgment contrary to the verdict. (People v. Sheran [(1957)] 49 Cal.2d [101,] 109.” (People v. Dickens (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1252.) In other words, “a decision to grant a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence is an abuse of discretion only if it is arbitrary or irrational, and . . . such a decision is not arbitrary or irrational if a reasonable trier of fact could have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” (Id. at p. 1252, fn. 3, italics added.)
Here, the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict was that Hernandez’s Toyota pickup was stolen sometime after 6:00 p.m. on July 17, 2006. Shortly after midnight, Officer Shell found Hernandez’s pickup overturned on Russell Boulevard with significant rollover damage; the pickup’s engine was warm, indicating the accident likely occurred within the two hours prior to Shell’s arrival; no one was in or around the area of the pickup; the pickup’s driver’s side window was open and the seat belt apparently had not been used, indicating the driver had been ejected; defendant was seen sometime between 11:30 p.m. and midnight at the intersection of Russell Boulevard and Arthur Street, a distance of about five miles from where Hernandez’s pickup was found; among the stories told by defendant, he admitted several times that he had been in a rollover accident in a pickup and had been thrown out of the vehicle; defendant had severe road rash injuries consistent with having been thrown from a moving vehicle; at the hospital, Shell described defendant’s injuries as severe, with blood still seeping; defendant had a key that fit the pickup’s ignition but would not start the engine; and there were no other reported rollover accidents that evening in Yolo County.
Clearly, this evidence constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. But this is not a deciding factor on a motion for a new trial. The question remains whether there is substantial evidence from which a juror or trier of fact could have found defendant not guilty. And we cannot say that the court, “in effect acting as a ‘13th juror’” (People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038, fn. 6), was unreasonable in so finding.
While it is true that defendant had a key that fit the pickup’s ignition, the key would not start the vehicle. The People presented no evidence that the ignition had been damaged in the accident, nor was there any evidence that defendant’s fingerprints were in the vehicle. Even though defendant had severe road rash injuries that had left blood smears on the windshield and hood of Connor’s car and that were still seeping blood in the hospital, there was no blood found in or around the pickup or on the roadway. Additionally, Connor’s observation that when she saw defendant he was staggering and appeared distressed, coupled with Deputy Shell’s descriptions of the severity of defendant’s injuries and the photographs thereof, made it questionable defendant could have made it five miles on foot to where he obtained aid.
From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the People’s evidence was not sufficient to tie defendant to being the driver of the pickup. Consequently, we cannot say the trial court’s granting of the motion was arbitrary or irrational; therefore we must affirm the ruling.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s ruling granting defendant’s new trial motion is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.
We concur, NICHOLSON, Acting P.J. ROBIE, J.