Summary
upholding statute's predecessor against equal protection, and right to bear arms challenges
Summary of this case from People v. GrossOpinion
No. 24828
Decided June 26, 1972.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, after having been previously convicted of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon during the preceding ten years, and on appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the statute.
Affirmed
1. WEAPONS — Carrying a Concealed Weapon — Statute — Penalize — Any Person — Previous Conviction — Constitutional. The statute, 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-11-10(1), which penalizes the carrying of a concealed weapon by any person previously convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, is not subject to constitutional attack under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Second Amendment right to bear arms.
Appeal from the District Court of Mesa County, Honorable James J. Carter, Judge.
Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, John P. Moore, Deputy, Richard G. McManus, Jr., Assistant, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy, Thomas M. Van Cleave III, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.
[1] The defendant-appellant, William Ray Marques, was convicted of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, after having been previously convicted of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon during the preceding ten years. 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-11-10(1). On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the statute.
One of the arguments raised in this appeal was considered by us and resolved adversely to the defendant-appellant in People v. Trujillo, 178 Colo. 147, 497 P.2d 1, wherein we determined that the statute in question is not subject to constitutional attack under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (Fourteenth Amendment). The defendant-appellant's other claim is that the statute deprives him of his Second Amendment right to bear arms. U.S. Const. amend. II (Second Amendment). This claim is also without merit. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); State v. Bolin, 200 Kan. 369, 436 P.2d 978 (1968); Harris v. State, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967).
Therefore, we affirm the judgment.