Opinion
2021-50707
07-22-2021
Michael Marom, appellant pro se. Westchester County District Attorney (Brian R. Pouliot and William C. Milaccio of counsel), for respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
Michael Marom, appellant pro se.
Westchester County District Attorney (Brian R. Pouliot and William C. Milaccio of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, P.J., JERRY GARGUILO, TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Greenburgh, Westchester County (Bonnie L. Orden, J.), rendered March 29, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal contempt in the second degree, and imposed sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.50 [3]). On appeal, defendant contends, among other things, that late disclosure of two trial exhibits constituted a Brady violation (see Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [1963]); that an order of protection should not have been issued in favor of a certain individual; and that his CPL 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of newly discovered evidence should have been granted.
Defendant's claim of a Brady violation is without merit. One item which defendant contends was untimely produced was admitted into evidence after inspection and without objection by defendant (see People v Sanchez, 212 A.D.2d 487, 488 [1995]). The second item which defendant contends was untimely produced was also admitted into evidence after inspection by defendant (see id.) and was provided to defendant before cross-examination of the relevant witnesses (see People v King, 298 A.D.2d 530, 531 [2002]). While the People unquestionably have a duty to disclose exculpatory material in their control, a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated where, as here, he "is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People's witnesses or as evidence during his case" (People v Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868, 870 [1987]; see People v Sanchez, 144 A.D.3d 1179, 1180 [2016]).
Defendant's contention that the court should not have issued an order of protection in favor of an individual who was allegedly not an "eyewitness" is without merit. CPL 530.13 (4) (a) provides, as relevant here, that when a court is sentencing a defendant on a conviction for "any offense," it may issue an order of protection directing the defendant to stay away from "any witness... of such offense." Here, the order of protection was issued in favor of an individual who testified that she observed and overheard the offense. Consequently, contrary to defendant's contention, the court had the authority to issue an order of protection in favor of that individual (see CPL 530.13 [4] [a]; People v Daniel A., 183 A.D.3d 909 [2020]).
Finally, we agree with the court's denial, without a hearing, of defendant's motion, pursuant to CPL 330.30, to set aside the verdict on the ground of newly discovered evidence (see CPL 330.30 [3]; People v Miller, 186 A.D.3d 1717, 1719 [2020]).
Defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
RUDERMAN, P.J., GARGUILO and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.