Opinion
E066815
11-07-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KAMAL JEROME MARANON, Defendant and Appellant.
Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FWV1405107) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
While defendant and appellant Kamal Jerome Maranon was drunk, he drove a vehicle with three passengers into a tree, killing two of the passengers and seriously injuring the third passenger. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and driving with a 0.08 percent blood alcohol content causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)). In return, defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term of 11 years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the remaining charges and enhancement allegations that were not part of his plea agreement. The People concede the error. We agree with the parties, and modify the judgment by dismissing the remaining charges and allegations.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from the preliminary hearing transcript and the probation report. --------
On October 21, 2014, at 12:06 a.m., Upland city police officers responded to a traffic collision and found a car crashed up against a tree. Defendant was in the driver's seat with three passengers in the car. Earlier in the evening, defendant and the passengers had been drinking at a nearby bar. Defendant consented to a blood draw. Defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.22 percent. One of the passengers suffered severe injuries, and the other two passengers died as a result of the crash. At the time of the crash, defendant had a suspended license and was on probation due to a prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction.
On March 3, 2015, an information was filed charging defendant with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a); count 2), driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 3), driving with a 0.08 percent blood alcohol content causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 4), and driving when driving privilege suspended for prior DUI conviction (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 5). The information further alleged that as to counts 2, 3, and 4, defendant had proximately caused great bodily injury or death to the victims (Veh. Code, § 23558). The information also alleged that as to counts 3 and 4, defendant's blood alcohol concentration was 0.15 percent by weight and more (Veh. Code, § 23578), and as to count 5, defendant had sustained one prior DUI conviction (Veh. Code, § 23560).
On June 3, 2016, defendant entered a plea agreement under People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, and pled guilty to counts 3, 4, and newly added count 6, voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). In return, the parties agreed defendant would serve 11 years in state prison.
In accordance with his plea agreement, on July 22, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison with 1,054 days' credit for time served. Although the court's minute order for the sentencing hearing indicates the remaining charges and allegations were dismissed, the trial court did not explicitly dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. This appeal followed.
III
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to explicitly dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. He requests that this court dismiss the remaining charges and allegations to comply with the parties' intended plea agreement. The People concede the error, and request this court to dismiss the charges and allegations that were not part of defendant's plea agreement.
Defendant's plea agreement shows the parties implicitly contemplated defendant would plead guilty to counts 3, 4, and 6, in exchange for dismissal of the balance of the charges and allegations. Defendant never admitted to, and the trial court imposed no sentence for, the remaining charges and enhancement allegations. The court clerk's minute order reflects the trial court dismissed the remaining offenses. However, the reporter's transcript shows the trial court did not explicitly do so. Accordingly, to comply with the implied terms of the plea agreement, we will order the remaining charges and allegations dismissed. (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860-861 [The requirements of due process attach to the implementation of a plea bargain. "Specific enforcement [of the bargain] is appropriate when it will implement the reasonable expectations of the parties without binding the trial judge to a disposition that he or she considers unsuitable under all the circumstances."].)
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect that the remaining charges and enhancement allegations alleged in the information, other than counts 3, 4, and 6, are dismissed. The superior court is directed to modify the abstract of judgment accordingly and to forward a certified copy of the modified abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. MILLER
J.