Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. 05F6320, 05F8185
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
After defendant, Walter Ivan Mapes, pled guilty and no contest to two felonies and admitted several violations of probation, he brought a Marsden motion to discharge his appointed counsel. Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
On October 13, 2005, defendant Walter Ivan Mapes pled guilty to one count of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted one prior conviction pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) (case No. 05F6320). Consistent with his plea, defendant was granted Proposition 36 probation. One week later, the probation department filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation, alleging several violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Less than two weeks later, a second felony complaint was filed charging defendant with possession of methamphetamine, resisting a peace officer, trespassing, and possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (case No. 05F8185).
In April 2006, defendant admitted the probation violation in case No. 05F6320 and pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine in case No. 05F8185. In exchange for his admission and plea, the court reinstated defendant’s probation in case No. 05F6320 and granted him probation in case No. 05F8185.
In May and June 2006, the probation department filed three more petitions to revoke defendant’s probation in both cases. On July 5, 2006, represented by appointed counsel Ted Loos, defendant admitted to violating his probation. Before sentencing, however, defendant sought to withdraw his admission along with his pleas to the underlying offenses.
The court appointed new defense counsel, Mr. Farrell, to determine whether filing a motion to withdraw defendant’s admission and/or defendant’s prior pleas was warranted. Mr. Farrell ultimately determined such a motion was not appropriate and the court reappointed Mr. Loos to represent defendant for sentencing. Defendant then requested a Marsden hearing.
On October 31, 2006, the court conducted a Marsden hearing, and denied defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals that ruling. We shall affirm.
DISCUSSION
Defendant appeals arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to discharge appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, based on an inadequate hearing.
When a defendant seeks to discharge his court-appointed counsel on the basis of inadequate representation, the trial court must allow defendant to explain the basis of his claim and to relate specific instances of counsel’s inadequate representation. (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) We review the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s Marsden motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1245.)
Here, the trial court began the Marsden hearing by explaining to the defendant that the court was looking for “specific reasons” why Mr. Loos had “fallen below the standards, . . . the norms . . . .” The court then asked, “So how is it that now that we are at sentencing, which your previous Motion is being denied -- how is it that the Public Defender’s Office is not representing you appropriately for this sentencing?”
Defendant immediately began talking about a motion he claimed the court had “ordered” Mr. Loos to file. The court clarified that the motion to which defendant referred was the motion to withdraw defendant’s plea and admission, which the court already appointed Mr. Farrell to consider, and which Mr. Farrell determined to be unwarranted. Defendant nevertheless continued to assert that Mr. Loos had fallen below the standards for not filing that motion.
Having already addressed the issue of the motion to withdraw defendant’s pleas and admission, the court attempted to flush out any additional concerns the defendant may have regarding Mr. Loos’s representation:
“THE COURT: “[I] want to hear what it is that Mr. Loos hasn’t done that he should have done. So far I haven’t heard anything.
“A. Okay. Well, I keep getting interrupted. I have been trying to get him to address --
“Q. Address what?
“A. The medication.
“Q. Which medication; the five milligrams --
“A. The medication that is prescribed to me by my doctors.”
Trying to clarify what the defendant’s medication had to do with Mr. Loos’s failure to adequately represent the defendant, the court asked another, more direct question:
“Q. Okay. You pled to sale or transportation of methamphetamine on August 5th. You entered that plea originally on October 13th, 2005. You had gotten a Proposition 36 sentencing on the same date. And so now you want to challenge that plea?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And what did Mr. Loos tell you about challenging a plea 15 months ago?
“A. I have been trying since that very day. I told him that day that I have the medication Disoxyn (phonetic) and it very well may test positive for methamphetamine.
“Q. And you told him that on the day you entered the plea, 10/13 --
“A. Yes. He told me --
“Q. -- of 2005?
“A. If I could carry on --
“Q. No, you can’t. I’m talking now. You told him a year and two weeks ago that you were under the influence of methamphetamine? Help me out.
“A. No, sir. I told him that I have a prescription for it.
“Q. For methamphetamine?
“A. For a drug that has some of that in it.
“Q. And did you give him that prescription at any time prior to entering your plea?
“A. I told him that I was in jail. I told him I wanted my own recognizance back because I was in the hospital on the day that I was supposed to show up for court. And I gave the District Attorney -- I had it dropped off at his office because I had -- I called in after I got out of the hospital -- [¶] . . . [¶]
“THE COURT: If I understand Mr. Mapes now, he’s telling me that back either on the day he entered a plea in 05F6320, which was again October 13, 2005, a year and two weeks ago or so, that he told you he had a prescription for some medication that contained methamphetamine.
“Q. Correct?
“A. Yes.
“THE COURT: Ergo, he would not be guilty of possessing methamphetamine? Is that what I’m supposed to extract from that?
“THE DEFENDANT: That is what I have been trying to get him to get to my doctors . . . . I have been trying to get him to do that since day one.”
Seemingly unable to move defendant away from his concern that Mr. Loos did not file a motion to withdraw defendant’s initial plea based on defendant’s prescription, the court asked defendant again whether he had any other concerns. Defendant responded:
“A. Okay. The Penal Code states --
“Q. I’m not interested in what the Penal Code states, unless it’s relevant --
“A. This is what he has not done for me.
“Q. -- unless it is relevant to what Mr. Loos hasn’t done.
“A. It all stems from if he would have got my prescription from the doctors, as I have asked him to in the very beginning, the whole thing would have been stopped.
“Q. Okay. So your position is, you have a prescription that permits you to carry methamphetamine up to 3.1 grams gross field weight?
“A. There is -- that is not what was in there, sir. That is not what was in there. It comes in a little bottle and it’s liquid. They cannot ship pills in the mail.
“Q. How did they get this white powdery stuff in the baggie?
“A. It probably got hot in the bottle and leaked out.
“Q. Okay. . . .”
Having given the defendant numerous opportunities to identify any concerns other than Mr. Loos’s failure to file this motion, the court then ended the Marsden hearing and denied defendant’s motion.
After the court ended the hearing, the defendant claimed there was “a lot of stuff that Mr. Loos has not done for me.” The court nevertheless told defendant the hearing was over. Defendant now contends the court’s decision to stop the hearing was arbitrary and abrupt, rendering the hearing inadequate. Defendant ignores the rest of the record.
As is evident from the record, the trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to express his concerns regarding Mr. Loos’s representation. Three times during the hearing the court asked defendant if Mr. Loos’s representation fell below the standards for any reason other than Mr. Loos’s failure to file the motion to withdraw defendant’s initial plea. Rather than raising any additional concerns, defendant continued to give reasons to assert that the motion should have been filed. Defendant ignored the fact that Mr. Farrell, independent counsel, appointed to evaluate the merits of such a motion, determined it was unwarranted.
The court is not obligated to rehash the merits of an unfiled motion, argued to the court, in the guise of a Marsden hearing. Nor is the court required to mine a defendant’s psyche for any concern he may have with his appointed counsel. The court is obligated only to give defendant the full opportunity to present all of his concerns regarding his attorney’s alleged inadequate representation. (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.) The record here establishes that this is precisely what the trial court did.
DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P.J., HULL, J.