To the extent that the defendant's contention can be reviewed, the record demonstrates that the defendant was not denied meaningful representation ( see People v Taylor, 1 NY3d 174, 176-177; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712-714; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147; People v Canty, 32 AD3d 1043, 1044). Contrary to the People's contention, preservation of the defendant's claim that his conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree should have been dismissed as a lesser-included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree is unnecessary to obtain appropriate relief ( see People v Manuel, 237 AD2d 307; People v Hammond, 220 AD2d 684, 685). The defendant was convicted of criminal contempt in the first degree under Penal Law § 215.51 (b) (v), which provides, in relevant part, that a person is guilty of that crime when "in violation of a duly served order of protection . . . he or she . . . with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm a person for whose protection such order was issued, strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact or attempts or threatens to do the same."

ORDERED that the judgment under Indictment No. 5677/95, as amended, is affirmed. Although the defendant failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the court should have dismissed the count charging tampering with a witness in the second degree as a lesser-included offense of tampering with a witness in the first degree, preservation of this issue is unnecessary to obtain appropriate relief ( see, People v. Manuel, 237 A.D.2d 307; People v. Hammond, 220 A.D.2d 684). In accordance with the facts of this case, the count charging tampering with a witness in the second degree should have been dismissed as a lesser-included offense of tampering with a witness in the first degree ( see, People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61; People v. Grier, 37 N.Y.2d 847).