Opinion
2013-11-13
PEOPLE of State of New York, respondent, v. Nathaniel MANSON, appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Bonnie C. Brennan of counsel), for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Adam M. Koelsch, and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Bonnie C. Brennan of counsel), for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Adam M. Koelsch, and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Walsh, J.), dated October 18, 2011, as, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
Since it was undisputed that the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony sex crime, the defendant was presumptively a level three sex offender pursuant to an automatic override, irrespective of the points scored on the Risk Assessment Instrument ( see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 3 [2006]; People v. Henry, 107 A.D.3d 678, 679, 966 N.Y.S.2d 499;People v. Palmer, 91 A.D.3d 618, 935 N.Y.S.2d 894). In light of our determination that an override was established, we need not reach the defendant's challenge to the assessment of points under risk factors 4 and 11 ( see People v. Spencer, 104 A.D.3d 660, 661, 960 N.Y.S.2d 322).
Moreover, upon examining all of the circumstances relevant to the defendant's risk of reoffense and danger to the community, we conclude that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's application for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level designation ( see People v. Eaton, 105 A.D.3d 722, 723, 963 N.Y.S.2d 271;People v. Carroll, 102 A.D.3d 848, 849, 959 N.Y.S.2d 503;People v. Tineo–Morales, 101 A.D.3d 839, 955 N.Y.S.2d 213).