ΒΆ20 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes if she has been formally arrested or if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt that her freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). To assist courts in this analysis, we have outlined a non-exclusive list of factors to consider when conducting a Miranda custody determination:
Various courts have concluded that suspects, questioned by the police in a hospital or similar settings, such as psychiatric facilities or ambulances, were in custody for purposes of Miranda under the particular facts of the cases before them. See, e.g., People v. Mangum , 48 P.3d 568, 570β72 (Colo. 2002) (defendant was in custody when police handcuffed himβnot because he was under arrest but instead "for his own protection"βtransported him to hospital, and questioned him for two to three hours while he remained handcuffed); State v. Lowe , 81 A.3d 360, 366 (Me. 2013) (defendant questioned by state trooper while in hospital after car accident was in custody after pause in questioning during which trooper gained sufficient information to consider defendant suspect in criminal case before resuming questioning); People v. Tanner , 31 App. Div. 2d 148, 149, 295 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1968) (defendant was in custody when questioned for one hour by police in hospital, where he was connected to IV tube and was unable to move); Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola , 448 Pa. 54, 55, 57β58, 292 A.2d 333 (1972) (defendant who had been admitted to hospital after apparent suicide attempt was in custody when questioned by police in hospital room); Commonwealth v. Whitehead , 427 Pa. Super. 362, 366, 368β69, 629 A.2d 14
If a defendant waives these rights, his statements are admissible against him during the prosecution's case-in-chief. See People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's waiver of these rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Once advised, however, a defendant may waive these rights. People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.
People v. Polander, 41 P.3d 698, 705 (Colo. 2001); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure Β§ 6.6(c), at 556 (2d ed. 1999); see also People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 572 (Colo. 2002) (although not dispositive, use of handcuffs suggests custody).Here, Officer Reed introduced himself to Self at his home and asked Self what had happened.
Our review of these cases indicates that they are factually distinguishable, and the Appellate Court's reliance on them was misplaced. See, e.g., Reinert v. Larkins, 379 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 2004) (defendant was questioned in ambulance while IV was inserted into his arm and he was ''hooked up to an electrocardiograph''), cert. denied sub nom. Reinert v. Wynder, 546 U.S. 890, 126 S.Ct. 173, 163 L.Ed.2d 201 (2005); United States v. Hallford, 280 F.Supp.3d 170, 173, 180 (D.D.C. 2017) (defendant was questioned in psychiatric hospital where he was involuntarily committed), aff'd, 756 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018); People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571-72 (Colo. 2002) (defendant was handcuffed while being questioned); State v. Lowe, 81 A.3d 360, 366 (Me. 2013) (police officer's questioning was ''focused, aggressive, and insistent''); People v. Turkenich, 137 A.D.2d 363, 367, 529 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1988) (defendant with diminished mental capacity was questioned in psychiatric ward of hospital where he was confined pursuant to involuntary commitment order); People v. Tanner, 31 A.D.2d 148, 149, 295 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1968) (defendant was ''undergoing intravenous feeding and was physically incapable of movement''); Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 58, 292 A.2d 333 (1972) (questioning was of ''[an] accusatory nature''); Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 427 Pa. Super. 362, 369, 629 A.2d 142 (1993) (defendant ''was not freely capable of leaving and was fearful of not cooperating''); Scales v. State, 64 Wis.2d 485, 492, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974) (defendant was questioned in hospital after police placed him under arrest). In the present case, the questioning was not agg
As a result of the Supreme Court's refinement of the definition of custody, subsequent cases from other state courts of last resort have iterated that custody exists when there is a "`formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." See, e.g., State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 945 P.2d 1260, 1274 (1997); Fairchild v. State, 349 Ark. 147, 76 S.W.3d 884, 890 (2002); People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal.4th 353, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442, 470 (1998); People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002); State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 736 A.2d 857, 872 (1999); Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 456 (D.C. 2002); Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999); Cook v. State, 274 Ga. 891, 561 S.E.2d 407, 411 (2002); State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 34 P.3d 1006, 1023 (2001); State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995); In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1996); State v. Maise, 805 So.2d 1141, 1149-50 (La. 2002); State v. Higgins, 796 A.2d 50, 54 (Me. 2002); Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 746 N.E.2d 133, 136 (2001); State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1998); State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (1997); State v. Sabinash, 574 N.W.2d 827, 830 (N.D. 1998); State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 678 N.E.2d 891, 904 (1997); State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 240 (R.I. 2002); State v. Hoadley, 651 N.W.2d 249, 256 (S.D. 2002); State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 498 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d
Neither the reasonableness of the force nor its legal justification alters its likely coercive effect. People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 572 (Colo.2002). ΒΆ 54 The public safety exception to the Miranda rule, however, permits custodial questioning directed to obtaining information important to protecting the safety of the public or the officers engaged in immediate, on-scene investigation of a crime.
A defendant is in custody for the purpose of Miranda warnings if he or she was formally arrested or, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt that his or her freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568 (Colo. 2002). An investigatory stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but a person subject to an investigatory stop is not necessarily in custody for purposes of Miranda.
People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 (Colo. 2002); People v. Taylor, supra;see People v. Magnum, 48 P.3d 568 (Colo. 2002). Determining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact.