Compare 720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 2000) (`Voluntary Act') with 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2000) (`Mental State')." People v. Mandic, 325 Ill. App. 3d 544, 547 (2001). Here, the State was required to prove that: (1) defendant committed an act prohibited by an order of protection or failed to perform an act required by an order of protection, and (2) defendant had been served notice of or otherwise acquired actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

¶ 19 Citing People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 759 N.E.2d 138 (2001), and People v. Reher, 361 Ill.App.3d 697, 838 N.E.2d 206 (2005), defendant contends unintentional, accidental, or aimless conduct does not constitute the violation of a stay-away order. Defendant notes the alleged offense occurred at a party she was invited to attend.

We agree. We begin our analysis with People v. Mandic, 325 Ill. App. 3d 544 (2001), which not only sets out the relevant law but also provides an instructive factual contrast. There, an order of protection required the defendant to "stay away" from his ex-wife and their children.

¶ 41 In a bench trial, although the court is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, this presumption is rebutted when the record affirmatively shows otherwise. People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 546–47, 259 Ill.Dec. 658, 759 N.E.2d 138 (2001); see also, e.g., People v. Robinson, 368 Ill.App.3d 963, 977, 307 Ill.Dec. 232, 859 N.E.2d 232 (2006) (concluding that presumption was rebutted and reversing and remanding for new trial where court in bench trial clearly indicated incorrect understanding of the law by stating that the prior DUIs were to be considered as elements of the DUI charge against defendant); People v. Kluxdal, 225 Ill.App.3d 217, 224, 166 Ill.Dec. 743, 586 N.E.2d 701 (1991) (reversing and remanding for new trial where trial court's repeated reference to incorrect standard of “clear and convincing evidence” rebutted the presumption that trial court applied proper burden of proof in assessing insanity defense). In the instant case, as shown below, the record contains several statements the trial court made in explaining its views that rebut the presumption.

The offense of violating an order of protection is not a strict liability offense, and the State is required to prove both actus reus, a guilty act, and mens rea, a guilty mind. Stiles, 334 Ill.App.3d at 956-57, 268 Ill.Dec. 783, 779 N.E.2d 397; People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 549-50, 259 Ill.Dec. 658, 759 N.E.2d 138 (2001).           In the instant case, it is undisputed that defendant had been served and had notice of the contents of the order of protection entered against him.

"Unlike a jury, a trial judge in a bench trial is presumed to know the law and to follow it and `this presumption may only be rebutted when the record affirmatively shows otherwise.'" People v. Thorne, 352 Ill.App.3d 1062, 288 Ill.Dec. 513, 817 N.E.2d 1163, 1177 (2004) (quoting People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 259 Ill.Dec. 658, 759 N.E.2d 138, 141 (2001)). Many courts have specified (hat there is a presumption that a judge, in reaching a verdict in a non-jury trial, has disregarded any improperly admitted evidence.

"The trier of fact in a bench trial is not required to mention everything-or, for that matter, anything-that contributed to its verdict." People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 546-47 (2001) (quoting People v. Curtis, 296 Ill.App.3d 991, 1000 (1998)). "If the record contains facts that support the trial court's finding, the reviewing court may consider those facts to affirm the finding, even if the trial court did not state specifically that it relied on them."

[A] violation of a stay-away order does not encompass aimless, unintentional, or accidental conduct." People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 549 (2001). Where the State moves to revoke a defendant's probation, it must only prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

"[A] violation of a stay-away order does not encompass aimless, unintentional, or accidental conduct." People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 549 (2001). ¶ 15 Here, the court found that defendant did not see J.H. the first time he entered the restaurant, and we cannot say that the opposite conclusion is "clearly apparent."

If the record contains facts supporting the court's finding, we may consider those facts to affirm the finding, even if the trial court did not specifically state that it relied on them. People v. Mandic, 325 Ill. App. 3d 544, 546-47 (2001). ¶ 33 Since the exhibits were not included in the record on review, we are unable to review any photographic evidence of the knife or Joel's injury. The burden is on the defendant to provide a sufficiently complete record to support a claim of error.