Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF127226, Helios (Joe) Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.
Leslie Ann Rose, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P.J.
After defendant Karla Malone’s motion to suppress evidence was denied, she pled guilty to possessing methamphetamines for sale in return for a stipulated sentence, and appeals from the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On June 29, 2005, defendant was a passenger in a car that stopped in front of the residence of Ray Harris, a probationer, while members of the Sheriff’s Department Special Enforcement Team were in the process of conducting a probation search. A deputy approached the driver of the vehicle to ask why they had come to the residence. After learning that the driver had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants for driving under the influence, the deputy placed him under arrest. He then directed defendant, the passenger, to exit the vehicle so he could conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. The deputy noticed that defendant appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine. Defendant was placed under arrest for being under the influence of a controlled substance.
The deputies conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, including defendant’s purse, which was on the passenger seat. They found four bags containing methamphetamine in the purse, along with some empty bags and a gravity scale.
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, count 1), the sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a), count 2), and a misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a), count 3.) With respect to counts 1 and 2, it was further alleged that defendant had two prior convictions for possessing controlled substances for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c).) The information also alleged defendant had suffered five prior convictions for which she had served separate prison terms (prison priors). (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)
On May 16, 2008, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The motion was denied on June 2, 2008. The next day, defendant entered an agreement whereby she pled guilty to count 1, the charge of possession of methamphetamine for sale, and admitted one prison prior, in return for a stipulated low term sentence and dismissal of all remaining counts and enhancement allegations. Defendant was sentenced to the low term of 16 months for the substantive charge, and the court imposed a 1 year enhancement for the prison prior, as provided in the plea bargain.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal following a plea of guilty, challenging the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.
DISCUSSION
At her request, this court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1386, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requested that we undertake an independent review of the entire record. We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but she has not done so.
Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have conducted an independent review of the record. Defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, such as would allow her to challenge the validity of her plea agreement or the sentence imposed. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.) Because the length of the sentence was an integral part of the plea agreement, a challenge to the sentence is a challenge to the guilty plea, which requires a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 84.)
More importantly, the record reveals defendant was advised of the constitutional rights she would be waiving orally and in writing, she informed the court she understood his rights, and that no one was forcing her to plead guilty. Thus, her plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243, fn. 5 [89 S.Ct.1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130.)
Finally, we have reviewed the record of the suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), and found no error in the court’s conclusion that the initial contact by sheriff’s deputies was a consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. (I.N.S v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216 [104 S.Ct 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247].)
We have conducted an independent review of the record and find no arguable issues. Appellant was effectively represented by counsel in the trial court as well as on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI, J., MILLER, J.