Opinion
H050650
10-04-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAIME ARAS MALDONADO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C2015262)
GROVER, J.
A jury convicted defendant Jaime Aras Maldonado of three counts of committing a lewd act on a minor. He argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior conduct under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) and expert testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). He also contends the pattern jury instruction about CSAAS evidence is legally incorrect. We find no error in admitting the CSAAS testimony and find the challenged jury instruction on that topic is legally correct. And as the asserted error in evaluating and admitting evidence of prior conduct under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) would be harmless, we will affirm the judgment.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
The operative third amended information charged defendant with three counts of committing lewd acts on a minor under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)); and with failing to timely register a new address with law enforcement (Pen. Code, § 290.013, subd. (a)). (Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Two lewd acts counts involved victim Cecelia; the third involved victim Hailey. We will refer to the victims by the same first names used in the trial court in the interest of privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.90.) The information alleged defendant had previously been convicted of an offense listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c) (§ 667.61, subds. (a)- (d)), and that he had committed that offense against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2)). The information also alleged defendant had five prior strike convictions. (§ 1170.12, subds. (b)-(d).)
A. Cecelia
Cecelia testified that she was nine years old at the time of trial in February 2022, and her sister Hailey was 10 years old at trial. They lived on the second floor of an apartment complex with their parents and a brother.
Cecelia testified that she was playing hopscotch with her sister and her friends one day near the apartment. When they ran out of chalk, Hailey went into a neighbor's apartment and returned with more. Cecelia described the neighbor as an old man, and identified defendant at trial as that old man. Cecelia had interacted with defendant before at the apartment complex, and she described him organizing scavenger hunts for children.
When they ran out of chalk again, Cecelia went into defendant's apartment. Cecelia stepped onto a chair to reach the chalk on top of the refrigerator. Defendant picked her up by putting his hand under her "no-no square," which she confirmed referred to the "private" area between her legs. He slowly lifted her up and she took a piece of chalk. Cecelia testified that she felt a "little bit nervous" when defendant touched her "no-no square" because no one had touched her there before. Defendant's roommate came into the room and started "cussing" at defendant. Cecelia ran outside. Cecelia later testified that she "got it wrong" when stating that defendant's roommate came while Cecelia was in the apartment. She clarified that Hailey went into the apartment twice, and that the "roommate came out after Hailey came in, not before. Like, when I got out was when she went in again, and the roommate got out."
On cross-examination, Cecelia testified that defendant touched her twice during the incident. She testified, "When I was on my tippy toes, he just picked me up a little in my private spot. Then, when I got it, I took two out from it in my hand, then put the box back on. When I got off, he touched me in the private spot again. Then I went outside and with the chalk." Cecelia did not immediately report the incident to her mother.
On re-direct, Cecelia clarified that defendant touched her "two no-no squares" when he led her off the chair after she took the chalk. She again confirmed that she was referring to "where you go pee and you go poop from."
B. Hailey
Hailey testified that she was 10 years old at the time of trial. She lived with Cecelia, a brother, and their parents at a two-story apartment complex. She knew defendant because he used to arrange scavenger hunts for Hailey and some of her friends.
Hailey recalled an incident from when she was nine years old when defendant touched her "in [her] private spot." Hailey testified that she was playing with chalk with her sister and a boy at the apartment complex. Defendant had given them a piece of chalk earlier in the day. When Hailey went to defendant's apartment to ask for more chalk, he told her to take a piece of chalk from the top of the refrigerator. She stepped onto a chair to reach the chalk, which she could reach without help. Defendant touched Hailey's front private part with his hands while she was standing on the chair. Hailey testified that defendant also touched her back but that she could not remember precisely where on her body he touched her. Hailey felt uncomfortable and told defendant she needed to get down. Hailey went back outside with her sister.
Hailey returned to defendant's apartment when the children ran out of chalk again. Defendant "did the same thing" when Hailey stood on the chair to reach the chalk. He touched her with both of his hands. Defendant's roommate came out of his room while Hailey was on the chair. The roommate talked to defendant, and Hailey went back outside.
Hailey testified that Cecelia never went into defendant's apartment. Hailey testified that she did not initially tell anyone about defendant touching her because she "was playing, and [she] sort of forgot about it."
C. Defendant'S Housemate
Defendant's housemate testified under a use immunity agreement with the prosecution. The housemate confirmed that he was a convicted sex offender who was currently facing charges for failing to update his registration with a new address. The housemate testified that he awoke from a nap and walked into a room to find defendant with two female children. Defendant had his hand on the older of the two girls' bottoms and was telling the girls to get fruit. The housemate became upset and asked defendant why there were children in the apartment. The housemate reported what he saw to a neighbor the next day. The housemate acknowledged on cross-examination that he requires reading glasses to discern details and that he was not wearing them when he saw defendant touching the girl's bottom.
D. The Girls' Mother
Cecelia and Hailey's mother testified that she called the police in September 2020 after hearing from another apartment complex resident that defendant had inappropriately touched her daughters. Cecelia and Hailey both confirmed to their mother that they had been touched inappropriately by defendant.
E. CSAAS Expert
A psychologist testified over defense objection as an expert on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. He described CSAAS as an educational tool to "explain why there's such a variety of ways that kids react when they're being abused and how they can appear in very different ways when they are telling about having been abused." It is meant to "dispel those myths and misconceptions and help people understand why there's such a variety of ways that kids do or do not act after being abused." The expert made clear that CSAAS is "not like a diagnosis or something like that," but rather is meant to "help educate and inform people about kids who had been abused." The expert further stated he was not aware of the facts or charges of defendant's case, and he had no opinion about whether anyone in the case had been abused. The expert discussed five categories of CSAAS behavior: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, unconvincing, and conflicting disclosure; and recantation. Not every category is present in every child sexual abuse case. The expert also testified about the concept of grooming, which he described as "establishing a relationship with the child victim" through actions that are not overtly sexual to build the trust necessary to make the child "accepting of, tolerate, and not talk about these very normal occurrences that now have become abusive."
F. Testimony About Uncharged Acts (Evid. Code 1108)
A woman referred to at trial as Angela testified that defendant molested her when she was about 10 years old. She was 33 years old at the time of trial. Defendant had been Angela's neighbor. One day Angela was playing outside with chalk when defendant approached her and told her there was a baby squirrel in a tree. He offered to pick her up so that she could see it. He picked her up, "worked his hands under [her] dress, started pulling [her] school uniform," "worked in there pretty good trying to get past all [her] garments," and "eventually got where he needed to touch." Defendant touched her vagina with his hand. She squirmed until he let her down.
Angela testified that about a week after that incident, defendant gave her magazines with women wearing lingerie. He caressed her face and told her she was beautiful like the women in the magazines. Defendant asked her to imitate the poses from the magazine. Angela complied, although it made her uncomfortable. Defendant touched or rubbed her back on other occasions when she was playing outside.
Angela did not immediately report defendant's misconduct because she was confused about defendant's intentions. She came forward after learning that other girls she knew had made allegations against him.
G. Evidence Code Section 1101, Subdivision (b) Testimony
A retired correctional officer testified over defense objection about defendant's behavior in jail in 2000. The officer was performing a headcount one night when she observed defendant masturbating in his cell. The officer finished her headcount and then returned to defendant's cell to find him still masturbating. Defendant was lying on his bunk, his penis fully erect, holding two photographs in his hand. The officer ordered defendant out of his cell and placed him in a holding cell. Defendant left the photographs on his bunk. The officer testified that one photograph "was of an older female and a younger female, and the second photograph was of ... the same younger female, but she was in the photograph alone." The females were fully clothed. Someone had written," 'To my abuelito'" on the back of one of the photographs. The officer testified that abuelito means grandfather in Spanish. Poor quality copies of the photographs were admitted into evidence. The officer testified that the original photos were "very clear."
The jury was instructed that the correctional officer's testimony "was admitted for the limited purpose of deciding whether Mr. Maldonado acted with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions or sexual desires of himself or the child, in this case as described in instruction 375. This testimony is not evidence that Mr. Maldonado was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses as defined in instruction 1191. You shall not use this evidence to conclude Mr. Maldonado was likely to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a child age 14 or younger as charged herein."
H. Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of the three lewd act counts. The parties waived jury as to the special allegations, which the trial court found true following a bifurcated court trial. Count four (failure to update sex offender registration) was not submitted to the jury and was ultimately dismissed on the prosecution's motion. (§ 1385.) The trial court sentenced defendant to two fully consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences on two of the lewd act counts, (§ 667.61), and a concurrent sentence on the third lewd act count.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Evidence Code Section 1101, Subdivision (b) Evidence
The defense moved in limine to exclude testimony about the jail masturbation incident, citing Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352. The prosecution argued the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to show defendant's intent. The trial court found the testimony admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Defense counsel made a renewed objection before trial, arguing that the evidence should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it was remote and introduced three elements that would otherwise not be mentioned in the trial: defendant's penis; masturbation; and incest. After concluding the evidence was "more probative than prejudicial," the trial court also stated it would be "happy to consider some kind of limiting instruction ... in terms of what factors it's being introduced for and the issue of incest and things like that that maybe don't really play an important part in this." The court "ask[ed] the parties to consult on that and see if there's anything that can be done." The record does not contain an agreement by the parties to limit the testimony as proposed by the trial court.
We review the admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 11471148.) Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) makes admissible "evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." "Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent." (Carter, at p. 1148.) When introduced to show similar intent, the uncharged conduct need only be sufficiently similar to the charged offenses to support the inference that the defendant" '" 'probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.'" '" (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.)
We note that the jail masturbation incident occurred 20 years before the charged crimes. Masturbation is not an inherently criminal act, and it bears little similarity to the charged crimes. There was both an adult female and a minor female in one of the photographs defendant possessed while masturbating, making the object of his interest unclear. The correctional officer's account also introduced the potentially inflammatory and irrelevant concept of incest to the jury by describing one of the photographs as having," 'To my abuelito'" written on the back. And other prior acts evidence, namely the testimony by Angela, was duly admitted under Evidence Code section 1108.
" 'Erroneous admission of other crimes evidence is prejudicial if it appears reasonably probable that, absent the error, a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached.'" (People v. Winkler (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1164.) Cecelia and Hailey both testified about defendant inappropriately touching them and both confirmed to their mother the next day that the inappropriate touching occurred when she asked them about it. Defendant's housemate testified that he saw defendant with his hand on one of the girls' bottoms in the apartment. Although the prosecutor argued in closing that the jail incident was relevant to determining defendant's intent, the prosecutor did not unduly emphasize the importance of the correctional officer's brief testimony. And the jury was specifically instructed about the limited purpose of the evidence. We therefore conclude that even if evidence of the jail incident was erroneously admitted, any error was harmless.
B. CSAAS Evidence
Defendant argues broadly that CSAAS evidence should be inadmissible because it is unreliable and will always support the conclusion that abuse actually occurred. The trial court denied defendant's in limine motion to exclude CSAAS evidence. The Evidence Code provides that expert testimony is admissible if it is "[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact" and is "[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing." (Evid. Code, § 801, subds. (a), (b).) We review a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299-1300 (McAlpin).)
In McAlpin, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to expert testimony about "whether a parent might not report a known child molestation, and if so, why." (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1298.) Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court analogized the challenged testimony "to expert testimony on common stress reactions of children who have been sexually molested ('child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome'), which also may include the child's failure to report, or delay in reporting, the abuse." (Id. at p. 1300.) The court noted that several decisions from the courts of appeal had found that while "expert testimony on the common reactions of child molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such witness's credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident-e.g., a delay in reporting- is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation." (Ibid.)
Based on decisions from courts in other states, defendant asks us to find CSAAS evidence inadmissible for all purposes as a matter of law. (E.g., Blount v. Commonwealth (Ky. 2013) 392 S.W.3d 393, 395; State v. Ballard (Tenn. 1993) 855 S.W.2d 557, 561.) But to the extent the California Supreme Court expressly approved the admissibility of CSAAS evidence in McAlpin, we are bound by that precedent (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 405, 455), and defendant acknowledges that intermediate appellate courts in California have consistently found expert testimony about CSAAS admissible based on McAlpin. (See People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468 (Munch); People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 172 (Lapenias).) The authorities defendant cites from other states offer no compelling reason to depart from California precedent.
Defendant argues the CSAAS "evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible in this case because none of the elements of CSAAS were present." But this case featured delayed disclosure. Neither Cecelia nor Hailey reported defendant's actions immediately after they occurred. It was only in response to questioning from their mother the next day that the girls disclosed the inappropriate touching.
Defendant contends for the first time on appeal that "the expert witness testified beyond the parameters of CSAAS by telling the jury that an abuser may 'groom' the victim in ways not overtly sexual, e.g., by playing games or showing attention or affection, a statement obviously tailored to the facts of this case." Defendant forfeited that argument by not raising it in the trial court. (See Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592 ["arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited."].)
We find no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony about CSAAS. And because the evidence was admissible, defendant's federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were not impaired.
C. CALCRIM No. 1193
Defendant argues that instructing the jury about CSAAS using CALCRIM No. 1193 permitted jurors to consider CSAAS evidence for the improper purpose of determining whether Cecelia's and Hailey's allegations were true. The trial court denied defendant's request to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 1064 instead of CALCRIM No. 1193. In our review of a purportedly erroneous instruction, we must decide whether it is reasonably likely, viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole, that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028.)
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1193 as follows: "You have heard testimony from Dr. Blake Carmichael regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [|¶ Dr. Blake Carmichael's testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him or any conduct or crimes in which he was not charged and may not be considered as such. [|¶ You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not Hailey or Cecelia Does' conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of their testimony."
Multiple courts "have held the pattern jury instruction accurately informs the jury on the limited use of CSAAS evidence, [and] the instruction does not: (a) improperly allow an alleged minor victim of sexual abuse to corroborate her own testimony; (b) violate due process; or (c) misapply the burden of proof." (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 175, citing People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503-504; accord, Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473-474; People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 219-220.) We find those authorities persuasive. Defendant's comparison of this situation to People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 is inapt because the CSAAS expert here did not rely on any case-specific out-of-court statements.
The jury was properly instructed not to use CSAAS evidence as proof that defendant committed the charged crimes. The CSAAS expert also made clear he was testifying based solely on his general knowledge of the subject, and that his opinion was about children generally, not specifically about Hailey's or Cecelia's believability. We conclude it is not reasonably likely that the jury misunderstood CALCRIM No. 1193 to allow the CSAAS expert's testimony to be used as proof that Cecilia and Hailey were in fact abused by defendant.
That express limitation distinguishes this case from People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393-395, where an expert was allowed to apply CSAAS concepts to the specific allegations at issue in that case. (See id. at p. 395 ["[B]y delineating each stage of the CSAAS theory, [the expert] constructed a 'scientific' framework into which the jury could pigeonhole[] the facts of the case."].)
As we have found only one potential error that would be harmless, defendant's cumulative prejudice argument must fail.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J. LIE, J.