Opinion
2022-50005
01-07-2022
Unpublished Opinion
Defendant appeals from the judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Abraham Clott, J., at plea; Phyllis Chu, J., at sentencing), rendered May 19, 2017, convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal trespass in the third degree, and imposing sentence.
PRESENT: Edmead, P.J., McShan, Silvera, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Judgment of conviction (Abraham Clott, J., at plea; Phyllis Chu, J., at sentencing), rendered May 19, 2017, modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of vacating the mandatory surcharge and the crime victim assistance fee, and otherwise affirmed.
The court properly revoked its promise that defendant, who originally pleaded guilty to a class B misdemeanor, would be permitted to replead to disorderly conduct, a violation. Defendant repeatedly violated the no arrest condition of the repleader agreement and, even when he was afforded an extension of time to comply in consideration of his alleged mental health and "intellectual disabilities," he again breached the repleader agreement when he was arrested twice more (see People v Roman, 264 A.D.2d 678 [1999], lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 906 [2000]). We decline defendant's invitation to vacate the conviction and dismiss the accusatory instrument in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[3][c]).
Based on our own interest of justice powers and the People's consent, we vacate the surcharge and fees imposed at sentencing (see People v Chirinos, 190 A.D.3d 434 [2021]).
All concur.