Opinion
H025117.
10-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SEAN MacNAMARA, Defendant and Appellant.
At the conclusion of a jury trial defendant Sean MacNamara was convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, in violation of Penal Code section 4502, subdivision (a). On appeal, he contends that the court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude a statement he had given to prison officials confirming that he occupied the bunk where the weapon was found. Defendant further asserts error in the courts failure to instruct the jury that an oral admission or confession should be viewed with caution, as described in CALJIC No. 2.70. Finally, he complains of the courts instruction with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. We find no reversible error and therefore affirm the judgment.
Background
While defendant and his cellmate, Brian Byrd, were outside their unit, prison officials conducted a random search that included defendant and Byrds cell. In the upper bunk the officers found an inmate-manufactured weapon. Leaving the weapon there, they closed the cell door and secured the area. Defendant and Byrd were summoned, pat-searched, handcuffed, and placed in a holding cell. They were not told why they were being held.
While defendant was in the holding cell, Sergeant Indendi asked him to what bunk he was assigned. To the sergeants surprise, defendant answered that the weapon found was on the top bunk and was his. Sergeant Indendi asked defendant if he was sure; defendant said that he was. Sergeant Indendi did not record the conversation because he did not generally do so unless he was conducting an interrogation. He did not obtain fingerprints from the weapon because defendant had already admitted that it was his.
During in limine motions, defendant moved to exclude his statement to Sergeant Indendi on the ground that he had not first been advised of his Miranda[] rights. At the hearing on the motion and at trial, defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that while he was being handcuffed and searched, an officer asked him if he occupied the top bunk, to which he said yes. The officers then asked if all the property on the top bunk was his; he again answered affirmatively. When they asked whether "the weapon they found" on the bunk was his, he told the officers no, there had been no weapon in his bunk when he left his cell. The defense theory at trial was that someone else put the weapon in his bunk while he and Byrd were outside the cell.
The trial court denied the motion, and the jury subsequently convicted defendant of possessing the weapon while in prison. Defendant subsequently received a sentence of one year, doubled pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1).
Discussion
1. Motion to Exclude In-Custody Statement
In denying defendants motion in limine, the trial court found "no persuasive evidence . . . that this defendant was interrogated before he made the statement that he made or that he was informed about anything pertaining to his transfer holding cell area . . . ." Defendant challenges this ruling, arguing that the inquiry as to which bunk was his was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and therefore was an interrogation subject to Miranda.
In Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, the Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings must be given whenever a person in custody is subjected to "express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term `interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." (Id. at pp. 300-301, fns. omitted.) However, "[n]o interrogation occurs where the purpose behind Miranda is not implicated — preventing government officials from exploiting the `coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not [otherwise] be given." (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 336-337, quoting Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 520, 530.) A trial courts determination regarding the presence or absence of custodial interrogation will not be set aside on appeal unless it is not supported by sufficient evidence. (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 575.)
Deciding whether an interrogation took place turns upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the underlying intent of the police. (Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301.) "[S]ince the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." On the other hand, the officers intent is not necessarily irrelevant, "for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response." (Id. at p. 302, fn. 7.)
We agree that defendant was in custody when questioned by Sergeant Indendi, as he had been handcuffed and placed in the holding cell. It is not so clear, however, that defendant was subjected to interrogation as that concept is defined in Innis. Sergeant Indendi was asking only which bunk defendant was assigned to when defendant volunteered that the weapon was his. The sergeant could not reasonably have anticipated a response that was incriminating to that degree.
Assuming, however, that the sergeants question did constitute interrogation, we nonetheless conclude that the admission of defendants response was harmless. Defendant was asked only to which bunk he was assigned, a fact that was easily verifiable and to which the sergeant independently testified. Furthermore, had the statement been excluded initially, it would later have been admitted to impeach defendants testimony that he knew nothing about the weapon that someone else placed in his bunk. Any error is therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v. Siripongs, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 575.)
2. CALJIC No. 2.70
The trial court instructed the jury with the first portion of CALJIC No. 2.70, which defines the terms "confession" and admission." However, the court declined to read the last bracketed phrase of the CALJIC instruction, which states that "[e]vidence of an oral confession [or oral admission] of the defendant should be viewed with caution." Defendant contends that the courts omission constituted reversible error. We disagree.
"We evaluate a claim of prejudicial failure to give such a cautionary instruction under the Watson standard. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . . . .) As we formulated the test in People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 . . ., where we held that the trial court must give such an instruction sua sponte, `[t]he omission [i.e., of an oral admissions cautionary instruction] does not constitute reversible error if upon a reweighing of the evidence it does not appear reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 455.)" (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 921-922, overruled on another ground in People v Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) In other words, the error is harmless "where the corpus delicti is clearly established by evidence independent of the admissions." (People v. Daly (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 47, 59.) "Corpus delicti of a crime consists of 1) the fact of the injury, loss, or harm, and 2) the existence of a criminal agency as its cause." (Ibid.)
The evidence of defendants guilt was overwhelming. The jury heard extensive testimony that no one could have slipped into defendants cell and planted the weapon in defendants bunk. Under the circumstances, we conclude the jury would not have acquitted defendant had it been instructed to view evidence of his admission or confession with caution. (Cf. People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 94.)
3. CALJIC No. 17.41.1
Defendant next contends that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. Defendant acknowledges the holding of People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, but urges us to depart from that decision and decide instead that "the giving of the instruction did constitute constitutional error." In Engelman the majority determined that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 "does not infringe upon defendants federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury or his state constitutional right to a unanimous verdict," though it directed trial courts not to give the instruction in the future. (Id. at pp. 439-440.) The court addressed all of the specific challenges raised in this appeal. Engelman is dispositive of defendants CALJIC No. 17.41.1 claim and we are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR Premo, Acting P. J. and Bamattre-Manoukian, J. --------------- Notes: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.