It was well-settled that applications for vacatur of the mandatory surcharge were properly made only at the expiration of incarceration and prisoners' motions seeking waiver of the mandatory surcharge prior to 1995 were dismissed as premature. See, People v. Mack, 237 A.D.2d 535 (2d Dep't, 1997); People v. Velez, 216 A.D.2d 339 (2d Dep't, 1995); People v. Snell, 161 A.D.2d 1125 (4th Dep't, 1990); People v. Santiago, 160 Misc.2d 349 (Sup. Ct, Kings Co., 1994); People v. Olivo, supra, 156 Misc.2d 149; People v. West, 124 Misc.2d 622 (Yates County Ct, 1984)]. Indigence was clearly a condition precedent for obtaining a waiver of all or any part of the mandatory surcharge.

It was well settled that applications for vacatur of the mandatory surcharge were properly made only at the expiration of incarceration and prisoners' motions seeking waiver of the mandatory surcharge prior to 1995 were dismissed as premature. (See, People v Mack, 237 AD2d 535 [2d Dept 1997]; People v Velez, 216 AD2d 339 [2d Dept 1995]; People v Snell, 161 AD2d 1125 [4th Dept 1990]; People v Santiago, 160 Misc 2d 349 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1994]; People v Olivo, 156 Misc 2d 149, supra; People v West, 124 Misc 2d 622 [Yates County Ct 1984].) Indigence was clearly a condition precedent for obtaining a waiver of all or any part of the mandatory surcharge.