Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08F04519
BUTZ, J.By amended information, Zenith Gilliam was charged with several criminal offenses based upon his having stabbed Branko Majstoric with a knife. Gilliam’s girlfriend, defendant Estrella Luz Macias, was charged with being an accessory to Gilliam’s crimes. In separate trials, juries convicted Gilliam of assault with a deadly weapon and convicted defendant of being an accessory after the fact. As to defendant, imposition of sentence was suspended and she was placed on formal probation for five years.
On appeal, defendant Macias contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for being an accessory. We disagree.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2008, Zenith Gilliam, defendant’s boyfriend, got into an argument with Branko Majstoric and stabbed him. Gilliam was seen leaving the scene in a green 1995 Lexus registered to defendant. That same day, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Stacy Waggoner called defendant and inquired about the Lexus. Defendant claimed to have loaned the car to “Melissa” that morning, but was unable to provide Melissa’s last name or address.
Later that day, Deputy Waggoner personally contacted defendant and showed her a photograph of Gilliam. Defendant denied ever having seen him before. Defendant then reported to the police that her car had been stolen. Still that same day, defendant called the police and said that her car was at a nearby park. Deputy Matthew Silvey met defendant at the park and released the car to her.
On May 26, 2008, Detective Todd Gooler was investigating the stabbing and learned that Gilliam was a suspect and that defendant was his girlfriend. On May 28, 2008, Gooler and other officers met with defendant in a conference room where she worked. The officers’ primary purpose was to search defendant’s Lexus, her home and her purse for information regarding Gilliam’s location.
Detective Gooler explained to defendant that they were looking for Gilliam and showed her a photograph of him. Gooler also told defendant that they were looking for Gilliam because he “did stab somebody, and that he would be arrested for it.” Gooler told defendant that he knew she had lied to Deputy Waggoner about the Lexus having been stolen, and Gooler further explained that defendant could be arrested for a felony “if she continued to lie to us about his whereabouts, if she continued to hide him, or prevent us from apprehending him.”
Defendant admitted to Detective Gooler that Gilliam was her boyfriend and that she had received a call from him on “the 26th.” Defendant said that Gilliam told her he would leave the Lexus at a park near her home and that he needed to hide out for a while. However, defendant claimed that she “didn’t know the exact circumstances” regarding Gilliam’s need to hide. Defendant said she had lied to Deputy Waggoner and falsely reported her car stolen to protect Gilliam. She also told Gooler that she had neither seen nor heard from Gilliam since “the 26th.”
Detective Gooler testified that defendant began “strongly encouraging” him and his team to go to her home, telling them “There is a 50/50 chance” Gilliam would be there. Defendant “fanned” out four or five keys on a key ring and explained that each was necessary for unlocking various locks on her front door. Gooler noticed there was no Lexus key on the key ring and asked if they could search the Lexus. Defendant consented but repeatedly encouraged the officers to “go first to her home and not her car.” She also denied that there was anything in the Lexus that Gooler should know about. Eventually, the officers made it to defendant’s car where they found Gilliam asleep in the front seat and arrested him.
Detective Gooler approached defendant and she said, “I’m sorry I kept lying to you guys. I didn’t want him to go to prison.” Defendant told Gooler that she had driven to work that morning with Gilliam and he was going to wait in the car. She planned to get off work early and take Gilliam to a location where he could hide out.
Defendant testified, essentially contradicting Detective Gooler’s testimony and specifically denying that he had told her that Gilliam was wanted for attempted murder. Instead, defendant maintained that another officer told her only that Gilliam was a suspect in a stabbing.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for being an accessory because “the government presented no proof that [she] knew Gilliam had committed a felony before [Detective] Gooler told her.” The record is to the contrary.
To prove a violation of Penal Code section 32, the People are required to prove “(1) someone other than the accused, that is, a principal, must have committed a specific, completed felony; (2) the accused must have harbored, concealed, or aided the principal; (3) with knowledge that the principal committed the felony or has been charged or convicted of the felony; and (4) with the intent that the principal avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.” (People v. Plengsangtip (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 825, 836.)
Penal Code section 32 (hereafter section 32) provides: “Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony.”
As a reviewing court, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People to the extent it is supported by substantial evidence, and presume every fact in support of the judgment that the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 142-143.)
Defendant argues as follows: “Even after [Detective] Gooler told her Gilliam was a suspect in an assault, there was no reason for her to believe him. But even if the receipt of that information could be considered to be knowledge, [she] did not harbor Gilliam after that point. She had no duty to tell Gooler where Gilliam was.” The argument is unpersuasive.
To the extent that Detective Gooler’s and defendant’s statements were contradictory, rules of appellate review require that we accept that testimony most favorable to the judgment, which in this case is that of Gooler. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.)
Detective Gooler testified that he told defendant that Gilliam had stabbed someone and was wanted for attempted murder; that after Gilliam was taken from defendant’s vehicle and arrested, defendant told him, “I’m sorry I kept lying to you guys. I didn’t want him to go to prison”; and that she had driven Gilliam to her workplace that morning and that the plan was for her to get off work early and drive Gilliam to a place where he could hide. From Gooler’s testimony, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant knew Gilliam was wanted because he had stabbed someone and that her efforts to lead the officers to search her home, rather than her vehicle where she knew Gilliam was waiting for her, was to aid Gilliam in avoiding being arrested and sent back to prison. Such facts substantially support the jury’s verdict that render defendant an accessory as defined by section 32.
In support of defendant’s position, she cites People v. Duty (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 97 (Duty), In re I. M. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1195 (I. M.), People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518 (Nguyen), and Findley v. State (Tex. Crim.App. 1964) 378 S.W.2d 850 (Findley). These cases are of no aid to her.
Duty stands for the proposition that section 32 is not violated by “passive failure to reveal a known felon, by refusal to give information to the authorities, or by a denial of knowledge motivated by self-interest.” (Duty, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d at pp. 103-104, fns. omitted.) Here, defendant’s falsehoods and conduct in attempting to get the officers to search her home were affirmative, not passive, attempts to aid Gilliam in avoiding apprehension.
I. M. is not on point because it upholds, rather than reverses, a section 32 finding on facts dissimilar to those of the instant case. (I. M., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1205-1206.)
Nguyen stands for the proposition that “[a] person who unwittingly aids a perpetrator does not become an accessory when he later learns of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose unless he thereafter does something to help the perpetrator get away with his crime.” (Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.) For reasons stated above, defendant knew that Gilliam had committed a crime, knew that he was trying to hide, and knew that Detective Gooler, a police officer, had told her that the crime Gilliam had committed was a felony stabbing. Thus, there was no “unwitting” aid to defend.
Finally, defendant’s sole comment regarding Findley’s application to the present case is as follows: “In Findley..., the defendant first told the police he knew nothing about a burglary committed by others. The court found that ‘[t]his conduct would not make him an accessory.’” (Quoting Findley, supra, 378 S.W.2d at p. 852.) Because defendant’s conduct constituted an affirmative attempt to lead the officers away from where she knew Gilliam was located, Findley is factually distinguishable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J. ROBIE, J.