What constitutes great bodily harm is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact (see People v. Cavanaugh (1957), 18 Ill. App.2d 279, 289, 152 N.E.2d 266). In People v. Machroli (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 230-33, 241 N.E.2d 609, rev'd on other grounds (1969), 44 Ill.2d 222, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for slapping a 2-year-old with sufficient force to knock the child to the floor and jabbing her in the ribs with the end of a spoon, even though there was no breaking of the child's skin, no injury to her bones and no disfigurement or permanent injury of any kind. This court stated that "[e]ven if the defendant stood in loco parentis to * * * [the child] the force he used in reprimanding the child was far beyond the acceptable standards of parental conduct." ( 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 232.)
Subsequent appellate court decisions have reiterated the view that parental rights of discipline are limited by a standard of reasonableness. ( Wegener v. People (1890), 36 Ill. App. 164, 165 — "reasonable corporal punishment"; People v. Machroli (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 232 — "reasonable force"; People v. Parris (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 933, 937 — "reasonable discipline".) The reasonableness standard was departed from in Fox v. People (1899), 84 Ill. App. 270, where a conviction of a teacher for assault and battery on a nine-year-old student was set aside.
Upon the defendant's appeal, the appellate court for the first district affirmed all three convictions. ( 100 Ill. App.2d 227.) We granted leave to appeal.
This court has upheld findings of great bodily harm even when no weapons are used and injuries require little medical treatment. See, e.g., People v. Psichalinos, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1068-69 (1992) (great bodily harm established where defendant punched child causing fracture to nose and bruise lasting one week); People v. Smith, 6 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1972) (sufficient evidence of great bodily harm where defendant "stuck the complainant twice in the face with his fist, gave her a lump in her mouth, put a scar on her face, and left bruises under her chin"); People v. Machroli, 100 Ill. App. 2d 227 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 44 Ill. 2d 222 (1969) (great bodily harm established where defendant slapped two-year-old with open had with sufficient force to knock her down and make her cry, and poked her with spoon). Because what constitutes great bodily harm is a question of fact, we cannot substitute our judgment for the trial court's unless no reasonable trier of fact could find that great bodily harm existed.
Again, the Supreme Court said that the search was valid and where it turned up a package, the policeman was entitled to open it, and when seeing it contained home-made cigarettes which he believed to contain an unlawful substance, he was entitled to seize them. It should be noted that in those two cases the police officers did not directly view the contraband as did the trooper in the instant case, and even after opening the packages the contents were not such that the officers could be positive they were contraband — rather a white powder which the first officer believed to be heroin and the second home-made cigarettes which that officer believed to be marijuana. • 8 In People v. Machroli, 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 241 N.E.2d 609, while in the process of being lawfully arrested, the defendant placed a small box on a dresser in plain view of the arresting officer who picked it up, opened it, and found three tablets, later identified as a narcotic. The seizure of the tablets and the box was held not to be unreasonable.
That argument is not persuasive because what constitutes "great bodily harm" is a question of fact to be determined by the judge or jury. People v. Machroli (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 227, reversed on other grounds (1969), 44 Ill.2d 222; People v. Cavanaugh (1957), 18 Ill. App.2d 279. The defendant also argues the sentence of four to ten years violates the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections. Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, § 12-4(d)), and under the Code the maximum term for a Class 3 felony is ten years and the minimum may not exceed one-third the maximum.
A parent, a step-parent, one standing in loco parentis or a school teacher are all held to the same standard of reasonableness ( People v. Parris (5th Dist. 1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 933, 267 N.E.2d 39). As the court stated in affirming an aggravated battery conviction of one standing in loco parentis in People v. Machroli (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 227 at 232, 241 N.E.2d 609 at 611-12: "Even if the defendant stood in loco parentis to Sharie Bianca the force he used in reprimanding the child was far beyond the acceptable standards of parental conduct.
" The blows caused a swelling of the forehead and pain in his lower chest and upper abdominal area. • 8, 9 It has been repeatedly held that what constitutes great bodily harm is a question of fact. ( People v. Meeks, 11 Ill. App.3d 973, 297 N.E.2d 705; People v. Machroli, 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 241 N.E.2d 609; People v. Cavanaugh, 18 Ill. App.2d 279, 152 N.E.2d 266.) In this case, Sirflonia Barber was hit once on the side of the head by the defendant's fist; she was bitten twice on her arm and had scars left from the bite marks; she bled from the scratch on her neck caused, it may be inferred, by the defendant's knife; she was given an inoculation for the bite marks. From these facts it cannot be said as a matter of law that the proof is so unsatisfactory that a reversal is required.
Subsequently, she could walk only with assistance, and the injury required two further treatments at the hospital. In the case of People v. Machroli, 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 241 N.E.2d 609, the court upheld a conviction of aggravated battery where the evidence showed that the defendant slapped a two-year-old girl with his open hand with sufficient force to knock her down and jabbed her in the ribs with the end of a spoon. She had bruises on her face, her forehead, her back, and on her side near her ribs.
The record discloses that the doctor attending the victim was concerned about the possibility of internal injuries and the fact that such injuries were not present does not detract from the fact that an innocent person received blows which caused a swelling of his forehead and pain in his lower chest and upper abdominal area. • 1-3 The law is settled in Illinois that what constitutes "great bodily harm" is a question of fact to be determined by a judge or jury. ( People v. Cavanaugh, 18 Ill. App.2d 279, 152 N.E.2d 266; People v. Machroli, 100 Ill. App.2d 227, 241 N.E.2d 609.) In the case before us the jury not only heard the testimony of the complaining witness regarding the charge but also heard the testimony of the doctor who examined and treated him. It is the law in Illinois that because a trial court as the trier of facts is peculiarly suited to determine questions of truthfulness, a reviewing court will not readily substitute its own conclusion unless the proof is so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of guilt. ( People v. Boney, 28 Ill.2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920; People v. Woods, 26 Ill.2d 582, 187 N.E.2d 692.) Thus we cannot say, as we would have to do in order to reverse, that the proof in the instant case failed to sustain a charge of aggravated battery.