Opinion
2011-08-23
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,v.Elden MacFARLANE, appellant.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Robert B. Kenney of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Guy Arcidiacono and Anne Oh of counsel), for respondent.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Robert B. Kenney of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Guy Arcidiacono and Anne Oh of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (R. Doyle, J.), rendered March 18, 2008, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
The defendant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt by legally sufficient evidence because he was not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect ( see Penal Law § 40.15). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Noll, 82 A.D.3d 1266, 919 N.Y.S.2d 383, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 897, 926 N.Y.S.2d 33, 949 N.E.2d 981; People v. Trojan, 73 A.D.3d 818, 900 N.Y.S.2d 405; People v. Ginsberg, 36 A.D.3d 627, 628, 831 N.Y.S.2d 81).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902). The People offered expert testimony to rebut the testimony of the defense expert that, due to a mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequences of his conduct, or that his conduct was wrong when he committed the crime ( see People v. Noll, 82 A.D.3d at 1267, 919 N.Y.S.2d 383; People v. Trojan, 73 A.D.3d at 819, 900 N.Y.S.2d 405; People v. Collins, 27 A.D.3d 660, 661, 811 N.Y.S.2d 122; People v. Rahman, 202 A.D.2d 696, 609 N.Y.S.2d 290).
Nonetheless, the judgment of conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
CPL 270.20(1)(b) provides that a prospective juror may be challenged for cause if he or she “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude [her or] him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” Where an issue is raised concerning the ability of a prospective juror to be fair and impartial, the prospective juror must state unequivocally that his or her prior state of mind will not influence his or her verdict, and that he or she will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence ( see People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 614, 709 N.Y.S.2d 134, 730 N.E.2d 932; People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 77–78, 447 N.Y.S.2d 886, 432 N.E.2d 758; People v. Rose, 73 A.D.3d 1091, 901 N.Y.S.2d 375; People v. Goodwin, 64 A.D.3d 790, 791, 882 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Hayes, 61 A.D.3d 992, 992–993, 878 N.Y.S.2d 167; People v. Garrison, 30 A.D.3d 612, 613, 818 N.Y.S.2d 141). “A prospective juror's responses construed as a whole, must demonstrate an ‘ absolute belief that his [or her] opinion will not influence his [or her] verdict’ ” ( People v. Goodwin, 64 A.D.3d at 792, 882 N.Y.S.2d 707, quoting People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 107, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381, 305 N.E.2d 469 [emphasis added]; see People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 301, 18 N.E. 156).
During voir dire, a prospective juror stated that her father and several friends either worked as police officers or were retired from the police force. In addition, the prospective juror added that her husband worked in law enforcement. The prospective juror expressed on two occasions her concern that she may give
the testimony of a police officer more credence than she would to other witnesses. When asked if she would give no greater credibility to the testimony of police officers, the prospective juror replied, “I would like to think that I can be fair, but it's hard.” When asked if she could evaluate the testimony of police officers in the same way as any other witness, the prospective juror answered, “I would hope so.” Further, in response to a query from defense counsel as to whether she could be fair and impartial, the prospective juror stated, “I'd like to think of myself as a fair person, but I—it's—I—I do give police officers a little more credence, I think, than I would other people.”
At no point did the prospective juror unequivocally state that her bias in favor of the police would not influence her verdict, and that she would render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence. Therefore, the trial court should have granted the defendant's challenge for cause to that prospective juror ( see People v. Hayes, 61 A.D.3d at 993, 878 N.Y.S.2d 167; People v. Harris, 14 A.D.3d 622, 623, 789 N.Y.S.2d 210). Since the defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the prospective juror and exhausted his allotment of peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection, the judgment of conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered ( see CPL 270.20[2]; People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361, 365, 482 N.Y.S.2d 448, 472 N.E.2d 298; People v. Goodwin, 64 A.D.3d at 791, 882 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Hayes, 61 A.D.3d at 993, 878 N.Y.S.2d 167).