Opinion
F061952 Super. Ct. No. BF132584A
12-02-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN ALEXANDER MAALOUF, Defendant and Appellant.
Christian Koster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Dawson, J., and Poochigian, J.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Sidney P. Chapin, Judge.
Christian Koster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
It was alleged in an information filed November 1, 2010, that appellant, Jonathan Alexander Maalouf, committed two felonies, unlawful taking or driving of a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and reckless driving while fleeing a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 2), and one misdemeanor, resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and that he had served a prison term for a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). A jury trial was conducted, and on January 5, 2011, the jury convicted appellant on counts 2 and 3, but was unable to reach a verdict on count 1. The court declared a mistrial as to that count. Also on January 5, 2011, in a separate proceeding, appellant admitted the prior prison term enhancement allegation.
On February 3, 2011, the court imposed a prison term of four years, consisting of the three-year upper term on count 2 and one year on the prior prison term enhancement. The court imposed, on count 3, a concurrent term of 90 days in the custody of the Kern County Sheriff, and awarded appellant 470 days of presentence credits, consisting of 235 days of actual time credits and 235 days of conduct credits.
Appellant's appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court's invitation to submit additional briefing. We will affirm.
FACTS
Kern County Deputy Sheriff Johnny Cawelti testified to the following: In the early morning hours of June 14, 2010, while on patrol, he saw a pickup truck pull into the parking lot of a grocery store he knew to be closed at the time. The truck parked, and Deputy Cawelti pulled in behind it, at which point he saw the license plate number and recognized it as belonging to a vehicle that, according to information he had previously received, had been stolen. The deputy activated the emergency lights on his patrol car, the truck "took off," and Deputy Cawelti, with his emergency lights and siren activated, gave chase. The truck made several turns and at one point was traveling 50 to 60 miles per hour along a residential street where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. After traveling approximately three-fourths of a mile, the truck made a turn, straightened out and slowed to approximately five miles per hour, at which point the driver got out of the truck, ran off and jumped over a brick wall. A short time later, Deputy Cawelti found him hiding on top of a shed and placed him under arrest. When the driver got out of the truck he turned and faced the deputy, at which point the deputy got a good look at him. In court, the deputy identified the person he chased and apprehended as appellant.
Appellant testified to the following: He had borrowed the truck from a friend of his brother. He attempted to get away from the pursuing deputy because earlier "[his] child's mother told [him] that [he] was going to go back to jail." He was afraid he would go to jail because he was on parole, he was required to have a residence address, his most recent address had been that of the "men's home," and he had "just left the men's home."
DISCUSSION
Following independent review of the record, we have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.