People v. Lynn

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Laich

    No. 324622 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2015)

    People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 621; 601 NW2d 393 (1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When analyzing whether an item comes within the meaning of MCL 750.227, certain categories of knives and stabbing instruments are dangerous weapons per se. People v Lynn, 459 Mich 53, 58; 586 NW2d 534 (1998). If the object is a dagger, dirk, stiletto, or a double-edged nonfolding stabbing instrument, no further inquiry is required because the item is dangerous per se. Id. However, "[i]f an item does not fall within one of those categories, the prosecution must proceed on the theory that it falls within the 'other dangerous weapon' category."

  2. People v. Harrison

    No. 324355 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    Before we examine the particulars of defendant's arguments, it is necessary to review the caselaw interpreting MCL 750.227(1) in order to provide context to and a better understanding of defendant's claims. In People v Lynn, 459 Mich 53, 58-59; 586 NW2d 534 (1998), our Supreme Court construed MCL 750.227(1), observing: MCL 750.227(1) . . . in effect provides that several categories of knives and stabbing instruments are dangerous weapons per se. If the jury finds that the object is a "dagger," "dirk," "stiletto," or a "double-edged nonfolding stabbing instrument," no further inquiry is required regarding whether the item is within the class of weapons the carrying of which in a vehicle is prohibited. If an item does not fall within one of those categories, the prosecution must proceed on the theory that it falls within the "other dangerous weapon" category.

  3. Tetreau v. Smith

    CASE NO. 12-10013 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2014)

    A pocketknife may be used as a dangerous weapon and the throat a vulnerable area of the body. See People v. Vaines, 310 Mich. 500, 506; 17 NW2d 729 (1945) (stating that an ordinary pocketknife is not dangerous per se when carried for peaceful purposes but it may be considered a dangerous weapon under MCL 750.227 when used "as a weapon of assault or defense"); see also People v. Lynn, 459 Mich. 53, 58-59; 586 NW2d 534 (1998), quoting People v. Brown, 406 Mich. 215, 222-223; 277 NW2d 155 (1979) (stating that an instrument is a dangerous weapon under MCL 750.227 when "used, or intended for use, as a weapon for bodily assault or defense"). If defendant had applied even minimal, additional pressure to Parks' neck, or if Parks had moved even slightly into the knife as he reacted to the situation, defendant's actions could easily have resulted in Parks' death.Tetreau, 2010 WL 2431901, at *8 (footnote in original).

  4. People v. Simmons

    No. 349547 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    This court agrees with the prosecution that the appropriate remedy is reversal and remand for a new trial rather than dismissal. Where a verdict is overturned because of instructional error, the remedy is retrial, not acquittal. People v Lynn, 459 Mich. 53; 586 N.W.2d 534 (1998).

  5. People v. Lange

    251 Mich. App. 247 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 42 times
    Finding that a glass mug is a weapon

    We are convinced that the legislature intended the words "other dangerous weapon," . . . to mean any concealed article or instrument which the carrier used . . . as a weapon for bodily assault or defense. [Quoting People v Goolsby, 284 Mich. 375, 378; 279 N.W. 867 (1938), emphasis added.] This Court relied on the definition in Vaines to opine that a screwdriver, when used as a knife, constitutes a dangerous weapon, see People v Barkley, 151 Mich. App. 234, 238; 390 N.W.2d 705 (1986), and the Supreme Court reaffirmed this definition in People vLynn, 459 Mich. 53, 58-59; 586 N.W.2d 534 (1998). We hold, therefore, that this prior definition of the term "dangerous weapon" is embodied within the phrase "any other type of weapon" set forth in MCL 777.31(1)(c).

  6. A.P.E. v. People

    20 P.3d 1179 (Colo. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    However, jurisdictions with otherwise similar concealed weapons statutes have found that intent to use an object as a weapon is a necessary element of a concealed weapon conviction when the object at issue is not per se a "weapon" according to the relevant statute. Anderson v. State, 614 A.2d 963, 968 (Md. 1992) (finding that the concealed weapons statute "is not violated simply because the instrument can be used to inflict serious or deadly harm"); People v. Lynn, 586 N.W.2d 534 (Mich. 1998) ("The fact that a pointed instrument, such as a machete, has a great potential as a dangerous weapon does not render it a dangerous weapon per se."); see also Mihas v. United States, 618 A.2d 197, 201 (D.C. 1992); State v. Choat, 363 S.E.2d 493, 501 (W.Va. 1987); State v. Blea, 668 P.2d 1114, 1116 (N.M.Ct.App. 1983). With regard to the intent requirement, other jurisdictions have held that there are many factors to be considered in determining whether a person intends to use an instrument as a weapon including: (1) the characteristics of the instrument; (2) the circumstances under which it is carried, for example, the time and place; (3) the person's actions regarding the instrument; and (4) the place of concealment.

  7. People v. Callaghan

    No. 355857 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2021)

    Furthermore, we note that People v Lynn, 229 Mich.App. 116, 122; 580 N.W.2d 472 (1998), rev'd on other grounds 459 Mich. 53 (1998), is instructive. In Lynn, the defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon (CCW).