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People v. Lyng

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Oct 19, 1989
154 A.D.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)

Opinion

October 19, 1989

Appeal from the County Court of Saratoga County (Williams, J.).


At about 4:30 A.M. on October 19, 1986, Police Officers Gary Forward and Linda Quattrini responded to a radio report of breaking glass at 45 Caroline Street in the City of Saratoga Springs, Saratoga County. The officers arrived in less than one minute and discovered the glass in the door of the Turf Bar and Grill had been broken. When Police Officers Warren Wildy and Christopher Kuznia arrived, three of them entered the premises and discovered defendant crouched behind a jukebox. He had in his possession a lighted penlight and $5.55 in change. No one else was found in the building. The owner had closed the bar at 4:00 A.M., secured the premises and emptied the cash register, except for some change left in the open register drawer.

At trial, defendant raised the sole defense of intoxication. Richard Perry, a neighbor, testified that defendant was drinking wine when he joined him at 11:00 P.M. on October 18, 1986. They drank Scotch whiskey until 2:00 A.M. when Perry left in a fairly well-intoxicated condition. At that time defendant, who drank more than Perry, still had some Scotch left. On rebuttal, Wildy was recalled and testified that he had previously observed defendant in both intoxicated and not intoxicated conditions and that he believed that defendant was not intoxicated at the time of arrest. Defendant was found guilty of burglary in the third degree by a jury and now appeals.

During trial, defendant called Correction Sergeant Brendan Varley to testify to events occurring when he came on duty at the Saratoga County Jail at 3:00 P.M. on October 19, 1986. Varley was permitted to describe defendant as "quite nervous and shaky". County Court was correct in disallowing Varley's testimony regarding conversations with the jail physician about defendant's condition or that the physician telephoned a pharmacy to prescribe Librium for defendant. Repetition of Varley's observations would be cumulative and the conversations with the physician were inadmissible hearsay. In any event, the prescribed treatment was irrelevant to events more than 10 hours earlier. Defendant neither produced the physician nor pharmacy records. The court's ruling on relevancy and hearsay was entirely appropriate (see, People v Westergard, 113 A.D.2d 640, affd 69 N.Y.2d 642).

Defendant argues that County Court's preliminary instructions implied that the jury should reach a verdict of guilty. We disagree. Prompt objections were sustained and clear, curative instructions were given. Defendant's contrary interpretation is not persuasive. Neither further curative instructions nor a mistrial were requested (see, People v Breland, 109 A.D.2d 890). In any event, any possible prejudice had been dispelled.

We further find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's intent to commit a crime when he entered the premises. On an appeal from a verdict of guilty, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the People and it must be presumed that the jury credited the People's witnesses (People v Mulizia, 62 N.Y.2d 755, 757, cert denied 469 U.S. 932; People v Scallero, 122 A.D.2d 350). Intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the breaking and entering (People v Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274; People v Daye, 150 A.D.2d 481; People v Wright, 92 A.D.2d 722). It was within the province of the jury to accept or reject defendant's contention that intoxication negated the required element of intent (see, People v Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 203).

Finally, we reject defendant's argument that the jury charge relieved the People of the obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In his pro se brief, defendant argues that County Court's use of the words "moral certainty", "reasonable certainty" and "mathematical certainty" in the reasonable doubt charge was erroneous. While these challenged phrases have at times, and under conditions not here found, been held improper and erroneous (e.g., People v Hewlett, 133 A.D.2d 417; People v La Rosa, 112 A.D.2d 954; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600; People v Lanni, 73 A.D.2d 538), we find that this defendant was not denied a fair trial. Taken as a whole, the charge correctly placed the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution (see, People v Patterson, 76 A.D.2d 891). Defendant failed to make timely objection (see, CPL 470.05; People v Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467) and any possible error was dissipated by the overwhelming proof of guilt.

Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P.J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Harvey, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

People v. Lyng

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Oct 19, 1989
154 A.D.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
Case details for

People v. Lyng

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. TERRY D. LYNG…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Oct 19, 1989

Citations

154 A.D.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
546 N.Y.S.2d 464

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