The parties also filed a joint summary of arguments (Dkt. 133). The Court later directed supplemental briefing on the applicability of two cases, Doe v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330 (6th Cir. 2024) and People v. Lymon, __N.W.3d __, No. 164685, 2024 WL 3573528 (Mich. July 29, 2024). Plaintiffs filed a Lee brief (Dkt. 146) and a Lymon brief (Dkt. 155).

The parties shall file supplemental briefs in accordance with MCR 7.312(E), addressing: (1) whether MCL 28.723(1)(e), the "recapture" provision of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021, constitutes ex post facto punishment under the United States or Michigan Constitutions, U.S. Const, art I, § 9; Const 1963, art 1, § 10, see People v Betts, 507 Mich. 527 (2021); (2) whether requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender under MCL 28.723(1)(e) and MCL 28.721 et seq., constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or U.S. Const, Am VIII, see People v Lymon, 514 Mich. ___(July 29, 2024) (Docket No. 164685), and People v Kardasz, 513 Mich. 1118 (2024) (ordering oral argument on the application for leave to appeal in Docket No. 165008); (3) whether the defendant's out-of-state residency and the conditional application of SORA while the defendant remains an out-of-state resident renders the constitutional issues here not ripe for review; (4) for ex post facto purposes, whether it is the later, nonsexual offense that triggers SORA registration rather than the earlier sexual offense, see People v Klinesmith, 342 Mich.App. 39 (2022); (5) how, if at all, the sexual nature of the prior unregistered sex offense affects the determination whether recapture is cruel or unusual punishment, or punishment at all; and (6) assuming arguendo that the focus of the recapture inquiry is properly on the earlier sex offense, whether the defendant's entitlement to relief on ex post facto grounds depends on this Cou

(1) the harshness of the penalty compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed for other offenses in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the goal of rehabilitation. [People v Lymon, 342 Mich.App. 46, 82; 993 N.W.2d 24 (2022), reversed on other grounds, People v Lymon, ___Mich ___(2024; ___N.W.2d___ (2024).]