People v. Lusby

130 Citing cases

  1. People v. Cole

    2021 Ill. App. 5th 180343 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41. ¶ 29 Although Miller and its progeny focused on juvenile sentencing, our supreme court has indicated the possibility that young adults may assert an as-applied Miller claim. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 46, 48. Assuming that Miller applies to cases involving young adults, we find the recent decision of our supreme court in People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046 instructive. In Lusby, a juvenile defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition which asserted his de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment under Miller.

  2. People v. Brisco

    2020 Ill. App. 130545 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)

    ¶ 110 The dissent relies on our supreme court's recent decision in People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, where our supreme court recently reversed a decision by this court in which we had remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing based on Miller. In Lusby, our supreme court confirmed that, in some cases, life sentences imposed on juveniles before the trial court understood that Miller and Holman had to be applied could survive where the court's "review" of the proceedings confirmed that "the trial court made an informed decision based on the totality of the circumstances that the defendant was incorrigible and a life sentence was appropriate."

  3. People v. Dorsey

    2021 IL 123010 (Ill. 2021)   Cited 229 times
    Determining that Illinois Supreme Court precedent, which held the protections of Miller and Montgomery apply equally to mandatory and discretionary life-without-parole sentences is "questionable in light of Jones," but that, overall, Jones approves of the state's discretionary sentencing scheme at issue in that case

    ¶ 32 "The Act itself contemplates the filing of a single petition ***." People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. As a result, a defendant faces "immense procedural default hurdles when bringing a successive postconviction petition."

  4. People v. Jones

    2021 Ill. App. 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    People v. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B, ¶ 20 (citing Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47 (vacating the defendant's 50-year sentence and remanding for a new sentencing hearing "in the interests of judicial economy")). In the interests of judicial economy, and given the unique facts of this case, and in light of all the relevant cases decided since defendant's sentencing such as Buffer and House, we remand for resentencing now. ¶ 34 As a final note, we observe that this case bears little to no resemblance to People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 1, where our supreme court found no need for resentencing, although the trial court had imposed a discretionary life sentence in a pre-Miller case. In Lusby, before imposing sentence, the trial court found that the 16-year old offender was "depraved" with "absolutely no respect for human life."

  5. People v. Erves

    2020 Ill. App. 171135 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 36 By contrast, in the recent case of People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52, the supreme court found that there was no need for resentencing, even though the case involved a juvenile defendant who was sentenced before Miller was even decided.

  6. People v. Dobbey

    2020 Ill. App. 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)

    Accordingly, issues not presented in an original or amended petition will be deemed waived, and issues that have previously been raised and addressed on appeal will be barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. See Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21; see also People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 24 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014)). ¶ 38 Our supreme court has repeatedly held that the Act contemplates the filing of only one petition without leave of court (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)); see also People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. To obtain leave of court, the petitioner must demonstrate cause for his failure to raise the claim in the initial petition and prejudice from that failure.

  7. People v. McGrone

    2021 Ill. App. 4th 190653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    "That prohibition includes not only inherently barbaric penalties but also disproportionate ones." People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 32. Additionally, the Supreme Court has determined that 'children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.

  8. People v. Moore

    2023 Ill. App. 4th 210245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 7 times

    ¶ 45 "The Act itself contemplates the filing of a single petition ***." People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27, 182 N.E.3d 563. A petitioner must obtain leave of court to file a second or subsequent petition.

  9. People v. Brannon

    2021 Ill. App. 180066 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    ¶ 40 Recently, in People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, our supreme court reversed the appellate court judgment ordering resentencing for a 16-year-old that received a de facto life sentence for a 1996 murder. The appellate court found the trial court did not address Lusby's age-related characteristics; rather, it gave "a generalized statement about youth and their poor judgment."

  10. People v. Williams

    2021 IL App (5th) 180475 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    ¶ 39 Apparent from the parties' authorities, there is some tension among the appellate courts as to whether a young adult defendant who directly participates in the crime and receives a discretionary sentence is able to assert an as-applied Miller challenge. However, we need not address that issue in this case because, under the guidance of a recent supreme court opinion, People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, defendant nevertheless fails to prove prejudice.¶ 40 In Lusby, a juvenile defendant motioned for leave to file a successive postconviction petition which asserted his de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment under Miller.