People v. Lunsford

3 Citing cases

  1. People v. Martinez

    511 P.3d 739 (Colo. App. 2022)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that "an insurance company that indemnifies a policyholder because the policyholder was the victim of a felony, misdemeanor, or other specified offense can be ‘victim’ for purposes of the restitution statutes."

    People v. Woodward , 11 P.3d 1090, 1092 (Colo. 2000) ; see also People v. Lunsford , 43 P.3d 629, 631 (Colo. App. 2001) (affirming the district court's restitution order requiring payment to the victims’ insurer under the 1985 version of the statute); People v. Rogers , 20 P.3d 1238, 1240 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that the 1985 version "on its face allow[ed] for recovery of the losses claimed by the victim's insurer"). Martinez concedes that insurers could be "victims" under the 1985 version of the statute.

  2. People v. Stone

    471 P.3d 1159 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that although a court generally reviews a court’s restitution order for an abuse of discretion, when the issue is whether sufficient evidence justified the order, the court reviews the order de novo

    ¶57 In this case, disability payments are likewise an insurance policy payout. See id. ; see also § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) ; People v. Lunsford , 43 P.3d 629, 631 (Colo. App. 2001) (noting that an insurer's payout to the victim for "future wage loss" was not relevant to whether the insurer's "expenditures were actual pecuniary damages"). And the payments were "reasonably calculated in money because [they were] a monetary payout entirely determined by a statutory formula."

  3. People v. Trujillo

    75 P.3d 1133 (Colo. App. 2003)   Cited 11 times
    Rejecting restitution request for victim's installation of an alarm system because a general diminished feeling of security could have multiple causes and is attenuated from the offender's criminal conduct

    The precise extent of a victim's pecuniary loss that can be the subject of an order for restitution is difficult to define because the characteristics of victims and the nature of criminal acts are nearly unlimited. See People v. Lunsford, 43 P.3d 629 (Colo.App. 2001) (insurer-victim entitled to restitution for amounts paid to crime victims for noneconomic damages pursuant to an insurance contract); People v. Wright, 18 P.3d 816 (Colo.App. 2000) (legal expenses incurred by victim in filing replevin action to recover personal property were the direct result of defendant's criminal conduct); People v. Witt, 15 P.3d 1109 (Colo.App. 2000) (department of social services entitled to restitution for employee's time spent investigating defendant's conduct, computing losses, and preparing documents for prosecution, all relating to defendant's fraudulent acquisition of food stamps); People v. Estes,supra (counseling expenses for victim's immediate family members who sustained psychological trauma as a result of defendant's criminal conduct were compensable as restitution); People v. Duvall, 908 P.2d 1178 (Colo.App. 1995) (value of time spent by drugstore employees investigating theft of drugs from store was appropriately included in restitution award); Peopl