Opinion
F079111
06-15-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JANIE LUNA, Defendant and Appellant.
Mark J. Shusted, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County, No. VCF321069 Brett R. Alldredge, Judge.
Mark J. Shusted, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT[ *]
In this appeal, defendant Janie Luna challenges the trial court's order denying her motion to modify the direct victim restitution awarded at sentencing for funeral expenses, brought more than two years after she was sentenced. We must determine whether the trial court acted in the absence of jurisdiction when it considered defendant's postsentencing motion and, if not, whether the court abused its discretion when it denied defendant relief.
For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify its prior order awarding direct victim restitution for expenses incurred and, therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was arrested after she crashed her vehicle into a highway overpass on May 24, 2015, killing her passenger. Defendant's blood-alcohol level was 0.14 percent.
On July 17, 2015, defendant was charged by complaint with vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence, in violation of Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (b).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
The prosecutor subsequently prepared an amended complaint charging defendant with two additional counts: driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), and driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and causing bodily injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b), with attached sentence enhancements for personal infliction of great bodily injury, in violation of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
On January 26, 2016, the prosecutor withdrew the amended complaint and defendant pleaded guilty as charged in the original complaint, in exchange for a split sentence on the aggravated four-year term, comprised of one year in county jail and three years on mandatory supervision. (§ 1170, subd. (h).)
On March 16, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to a four-year split sentence, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. (§ 1170, subd. (h).) Relevant to the issue raised on appeal, the court also ordered direct victim restitution payable to the victim's mother in the amount of $8, 697.60 for funeral expenses incurred. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
More than two years later, on September 4, 2018, defendant filed a motion pursuant to sections 1202.4, subdivision (f)(1), and 1203.3, subdivision (b)(5), seeking a reduction of the $8, 697.60 direct victim restitution award on the ground that the victim's mother paid no more than $1, 500 toward funeral expenses and the remainder was covered by community donations. The prosecutor opposed the motion. On March 8, 2019, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, after which the prosecutor filed another opposition. The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motion on April 10, 2019, and defendant filed a notice of appeal the same day.
Section 1203.3, subdivision (b)(5), provides: “This section does not prohibit the court from modifying the dollar amount of a restitution order pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4 at any time during the term of the probation.” Section 1202.4, subdivision (f), provides that “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court.” (Italics added.) In this case, as we shall discuss, the trial court ordered direct victim restitution based on funeral expenses incurred. Defendant did not appeal that order and then sought, two years later, to challenge the award based on evidence that was available at the time of sentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
Anticipating the People's argument that this appeal must be dismissed because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain her postsentencing motion to modify restitution, defendant claims the trial properly considered her motion. Citing People v. Walker (1901) 132 Cal. 137, 141 and People v. Miller (1934) 140 Cal.App. 241, 243, defendant contends that this case fits within the exception that applies “where an appeal from the original judgment would have been an inadequate remedy.” Defendant acknowledges the California Supreme Court's later decision in People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 528 (Thomas), which rejected reliance on the aforementioned rule where “the claimed inadequacy of the remedy of appeal was not due to any deficiency in the remedy itself but rather resulted from defendant's failure to make a sufficient record in the trial court.” However, she maintains she “is not seeking a second bite at the apple without a sound reason or good cause. The issue of the impact of fund-raising efforts arguably undertaken to benefit defendant was first presented to the court on the motion to vacate. An appeal after sentencing would have proven an inadequate remedy, whereas the development of the facts surrounding the intent of the donors made defendant's claim of an offset ripe for adjudication.”
As anticipated, the People claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it acted in 2019 and that Thomas applies because the community contribution evidence on which defendant relies to seek modification could have been gathered and presented at the sentencing hearing in 2016. The People also cite People v. Littlefield (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1086 (Littlefield) in support of their jurisdictional argument.
In Littlefield, the appellate court addressed a materially similar postsentencing challenge to direct victim restitution ordered at the sentencing hearing. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider his motion and it dismissed the appeal. We agree with the reasoning of Littlefield and apply it here.
II. Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Consider Postsentencing Motion to Modify Direct Victim Restitution
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court's judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) “Generally, once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence. (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344; People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326.) If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be dismissed.” (People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1084 (Torres); accord, People v. Jinkins (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 707, 712 (Jinkins); Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089; People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1204 (Turrin).)
There are limited exceptions to the rule. (Jinkins, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712-713; Torres, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1085; Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1089-1090; Turrin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1204-1205.) Pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d), “[a] trial court may recall the sentence on its own motion within 120 days after committing a defendant to prison.” (Turrin, supra, at p. 1204; accord, Jinkins, supra, at p. 712; Torres, supra, at p. 1085; Littlefield, supra, at pp. 1089-1090.) “A trial court may [also] correct a clerical error, but not a judicial error, at any time, ” and “an unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time.” (Turrin, supra, at p. 1205; accord, Jinkins, supra, at pp. 712-713; Torres, supra, at p. 1085; Littlefield, supra, at pp. 1089-1090.) None of these exceptions apply here and defendant does not contend otherwise.
As in this case, at the sentencing hearing in Littlefield, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay direct victim restitution for expenses incurred. (Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088.) Almost 17 years later, after receiving a debt collection letter from the California Franchise Tax Board, the defendant moved to vacate the restitution order under the doctrine of laches. (Ibid.) The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and the defendant appealed. (Ibid.)
On review, the defendant in Littlefield cited People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282 (Ford) and argued “that the trial court had ‘fundamental jurisdiction' … to vacate [the victim] restitution order, ” and also that the court had authority under sections 1202.46 and 1214. (Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5that p. 1089.) The appellate court rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal. (Id. at pp. 1090-1093.)
In Ford, the California Supreme Court stated that “[a] court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case, ” and “[i]f a court lacks such ‘“fundamental”' jurisdiction, its ruling is void.” (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 286.) However, “[e]ven when a court has fundamental jurisdiction … the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.” (Id. at pp. 286-287.) In rejecting the defendant's reliance on fundamental jurisdiction as described in Ford, the Littlefield court explained that no party claimed an absence of fundamental jurisdiction. (Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089.) Rather, the issue involved the second aspect, jurisdictional constraint. (Ibid.)
With respect to the statutory grounds cited in Littlefield, section 1202.46 provides, “Notwithstanding Section 1170, when the economic losses of a victim cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined. This section does not prohibit a victim, the district attorney, or a court on its own motion from requesting correction, at any time, of a sentence when the sentence is invalid due to the omission of a restitution order or fine pursuant to Section 1202.4.” (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal found section 1202.46 inapplicable because, as in the case before us, the trial court determined the amount of the defendant's restitution and imposed it at the sentencing hearing. (Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090.)
Littlefield further explained, “Section 1214 does not rescue [the defendant] either. That statute affords a victim the opportunity to enforce a restitution order ‘as if' it were ‘a civil judgment.' (§ 1214, subd. (b).) ‘A victim shall have access to all resources available under the law to enforce the restitution order, including, but not limited to, access to the defendant's financial records, use of wage garnishment and lien procedures, information regarding the defendant's assets.…' (Ibid.) The statute merely enumerates tools available to a victim to enforce a criminal restitution obligation. The statute does not provide a basis for [the defendant] to eschew that obligation.” (Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1090-1091.)
We conclude that the issue in this case is analogous to that presented in Littlefield. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay the victim's mother direct victim restitution for funeral expenses incurred. Defendant did not appeal the order, but more than two years later, she sought to modify it on the ground that the majority of the funeral expenses were covered by community donations rather than by the victim's mother. This information could have been but was not presented at the time of sentencing, and defendant identifies no controlling or persuasive authority for the proposition that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider her motion, two years postsentencing and under these circumstances. Defendant's reliance on the fact that the trial court and the parties apparently overlooked the jurisdictional question is of no moment.
In sum, two years postsentencing, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to modify its sentencing order awarding direct victim restitution for expenses incurred and, therefore, its order is not appealable. (Littlefield, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
[*] Before Detjen, Acting P.J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.