6(a) (West 1992))). The statute was later declared facially unconstitutional in King v. Ryan (1992), 153 Ill.2d 449, because it permitted unreasonable searches and seizures without the particularized probable cause (indicia of intoxication) necessary under the United States and the Illinois Constitutions. (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; see People v. Lukach (1994), 263 Ill. App.3d 318.) The State argued against suppression because the officer relied in "good faith" on the validity of the statute at the time he requested the test.
A trial court's decision to suppress evidence will not be overturned on review unless that decision is clearly erroneous or against the manifest weight of the evidence, that is, unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. People v. Lukach, 263 Ill. App.3d 318, 323 (1994). When the police arrest a person without a warrant, the trial court making the determination of probable cause must apply standards at least as stringent as those that guide a magistrate in deciding to issue a warrant.
See generally United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir.1995); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Quinones, 301 F.Supp. 246 (D.Vi.1969); State v. Steimel, 921 A.2d 378 (N.H. 2007); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308 (1992); People v. Duemig, 620 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1980); State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1980); State v. Heintz, 286 Or. 239, 594 P.2d 385 (1979); State v. Dewey, 272 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1978); State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1978); State v. Graham, 278 So.2d 78 (La. 1973); De Vaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (1972); People v. Fidler, 175 Colo. 90, 485 P.2d 725 (1971); State v. Kuljis, 70 Wash.2d 168, 422 P.2d 480 (1967); People v. Lukach, 263 Ill. App.3d 318, 200 Ill.Dec. 714, 635 N.E.2d 1053 (1994); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 680 P.2d 1383 (1984); State v. Williams, 4 Kan.App.2d 651, 610 P.2d 111 (1980); State v. Bentley, 92 Wis.2d 860, 286 N.W.2d 153 (Ct.App. 1979); see also People v. Superior Court of Kern County, 6 Cal.3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281, 493 P.2d 1145 (1972); State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 45, 226 A.2d 873 (1967); State v. Wolf, 164 A.2d 865 (Del. 1960); People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957); State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956); State v. Towry, 26 Conn. Supp. 35, 210 A.2d 455 (1965). 2. Exigent Circumstances
An officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts and circumstances known to him before he conducts the search would reasonably lead him to believe that the search is likely to yield evidence of a crime. People v. Lukach , 263 Ill. App. 3d 318, 323, 200 Ill.Dec. 714, 635 N.E.2d 1053 (1994). Here, Detective Parisi testified that he asked emergency room personnel to draw blood from the defendant because he was directed to do so by Chief Jones. He did not personally observe any signs that the defendant was intoxicated, and there is no evidence that he read the reports of any of the responding officers before he requested the blood draw.
Probable cause to conduct a search exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer prior to the search are such that the officer could reasonably believe that the search will likely yield evidence of a crime. People v. Lukach , 263 Ill. App. 3d 318, 323, 200 Ill.Dec. 714, 635 N.E.2d 1053 (1994). Here, the court's finding of probable cause was based on the court's belief that it would be reasonable for Deputy Ash to disbelieve the version of events given by the defendant, but Deputy Ash never testified that this was the case.
Id. at 885 (emphasis added); see People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 242 (2008). Defendant cited People v. Boomer, 325 Ill. App. 3d 206 (2001), and People v. Lukach, 263 Ill. App. 3d 318 (1994), in support of his argument that Johnson did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of DUI. However, these cases consider the different standard of probable cause which is necessary to formally arrest someone: the officer's probable cause "must *** rise to a level higher than 'reasonable articulable suspicion,' the lesser standard required to justify an investigatory stop, rather than a full arrest."
People v. Brodeur, 189 Ill. App.3d 936, 941, 545 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (1989). Defendant points to People v. Lukach, 263 Ill. App.3d 318, 326, 635 N.E.2d 1053, 1059 (1994). Though this case is similar to Lukach in several respects, there are several crucial differences.
A trial court's decision to suppress evidence will not be overturned on review unless the decision is clearly erroneous or is against the manifest weight of the evidence, that is, unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. People v. Lukach, 263 Ill. App.3d 318, 323 (1994). In a motion to suppress evidence, the initial burden is on the defendant to establish that the search or seizure was unreasonable or unlawful.
Probable cause exists when all the facts and circumstances available at the time would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that the suspect is committing or has committed a crime. ( People v. Montgomery (1986), 112 Ill.2d 517, 525; People v. Lukach (1994), 263 Ill. App.3d 318, 323.) While probable cause is sufficient to arrest a suspect, the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant.
-3 We may not disturb a trial court's decision to suppress evidence unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous or against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( People v. Lukach (1994), 263 Ill. App.3d 318, 323.) Generally, a document which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is considered hearsay, and, thus, it is inadmissible. ( People v. Graney (1992), 234 Ill. App.3d 497, 506.