¶3 Last year, while in the throes of the COVID-19 pandemic, we approved the addition of paragraph (c)(4) to Crim. P. 24 ("Trial Jurors") to permit a trial court, either upon motion of a party or on its own motion, to declare a mistrial at any time before trial on the ground that a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled as a result of a public health crisis or limitations brought about by such crisis. People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 24 n.3, 467 P.3d 332, 337 n.3. Today, we endeavor to clarify how to calculate the new speedy trial deadline following a mistrial (including one declared under Rule 24(c)(4) ). We hold that a mistrial triggers a tolling, not an extension, of the speedy trial period.
But C.A.R. 21 provides "an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability." People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, ¶ 19, 459 P.3d 540, 545). "Thus, in the past, we have exercised our original jurisdiction in limited circumstances, such as 'when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or when a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.'" People v. Rainey, 2021 CO 53, ¶ 9, 488 P.3d 1081, 1084 (quoting Lucy, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d at 335).
But C.A.R. 21 provides "an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability." People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, ¶ 19, 459 P.3d 540, 545). "Thus, in the past, we have exercised our original jurisdiction in limited circumstances, such as 'when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or when a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.'"
But C.A.R. 21 provides "an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability." People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, ¶ 19, 459 P.3d 540, 545 ). "Thus, in the past, we have exercised our original jurisdiction in limited circumstances, such as ‘when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or when a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.’
¶12 The exercise of this court's original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is entirely discretionary. People v. Lucy , 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 ; C.A.R. 21(a)(1). Relief pursuant to Rule 21 is "an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability."
C.A.R. 21(a)(1) ("Relief under this rule ... is a matter wholly within the discretion of the supreme court."). In exercising our discretion, we are mindful that such relief "is extraordinary in nature," id. , and "is limited in both purpose and availability," People v. Lucy , 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 (quoting People v. Rosas , 2020 CO 22, ¶ 19, 459 P.3d 540, 545 ). In light of this narrow scope, "we have exercised our jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R. 21 when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or when a petition raises ‘issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.’ "
¶16 Because the word "transfer" is not defined by statute, we begin by consulting a recognized dictionary to discern the term's plain and ordinary meaning. See People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 31, 467 P.3d 332, 338. Common dictionary definitions encompass temporary transfers and shared use.
Consequently, as pertinent here, we have limited the exercise of our original jurisdiction to such circumstances as when "an appellate remedy would be inadequate, ... a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or ... a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." People v. Sherwood , 2021 CO 61, ¶ 13, 489 P.3d 1233, 1238 (quoting People v. Lucy , 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 ). ¶22 In her C.A.R. 21 petition, the public defender argued that an original proceeding was her only remedy.
Thus, we have circumscribed exercise of our discretion under Rule 21(a)(1) to such scenarios as when "an appellate remedy would be inadequate, . . . a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or . . . a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." Sherwood, ¶ 13, 489 P.3d at 1238 (quoting People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335).
Thus, we have circumscribed exercise of our discretion under Rule 21(a)(1) to such scenarios as when "an appellate remedy would be inadequate, ... a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or ... a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." Sherwood , ¶ 13, 489 P.3d at 1238 (quoting People v. Lucy , 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 ). ¶16 In his petition, Greer maintained that exercise of our original jurisdiction was justified because he had no other adequate remedy and the case presented an issue of first impression that was of great public importance.